Algorithms for NP-complete problems often have different strengths andweaknesses, and thus algorithm portfolios often outperform individualalgorithms. It is surprisingly difficult to quantify a component algorithm's contributionto such a portfolio. Reporting a component's standalone performance wronglyrewards near-clones while penalizing algorithms that have small but distinctareas of strength. Measuring a component's marginal contribution to an existingportfolio is better, but penalizes sets of strongly correlated algorithms,thereby obscuring situations in which it is essential to have at least onealgorithm from such a set. This paper argues for analyzing component algorithmcontributions via a measure drawn from coalitional game theory---the Shapleyvalue---and yields insight into a research community's progress over time. Weconclude with an application of the analysis we advocate to SAT competitions,yielding novel insights into the behaviour of algorithm portfolios, theircomponents, and the state of SAT solving technology.

We investigate the problem of repacking stations in the FCC's upcoming, multi-billion-dollar "incentive auction". Early efforts to solve this problem considered mixed-integer programming formulations, which we show are unable to reliably solve realistic, national-scale problem instances. We describe the result of a multi-year investigation of alternatives: a solver, SATFC, that has been adopted by the FCC for use in the incentive auction. SATFC is based on a SAT encoding paired with a wide range of techniques: constraint graph decomposition; novel caching mechanisms that allow for reuse of partial solutions from related, solved problems; algorithm configuration; algorithm portfolios; and the marriage of local-search and complete solver strategies. We show that our approach solves virtually all of a set of problems derived from auction simulations within the short time budget required in practice.