We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of heterogeneous divisible resources among agents with different preferences. We focus on the setting where the resources correspond to the edges of a connected graph, every agent must be assigned a connected piece of this graph, and the fairness notion considered is the classical envy freeness. The problem is NP-complete, and we analyze its complexity with respect to two natural complexity measures: the number of agents and the number of edges in the graph. While the problem remains NP-hard even for instances with 2 agents, we provide a dichotomy characterizing the complexity of the problem when the number of agents is constant based on structural properties of the graph. For the latter case, we design a polynomial-time algorithm when the graph has a constant number of edges.

In principal-agent models, a principal offers a contract to an agent to perform a certain task. The agent exerts a level of effort that maximizes her utility. The principal is oblivious to the agent's chosen level of effort, and conditions her wage only on possible outcomes. In this work, we consider a model in which the principal is unaware of the agent's utility and action space. She sequentially offers contracts to identical agents, and observes the resulting outcomes. We present an algorithm for learning the optimal contract under mild assumptions. We bound the number of samples needed for the principal obtain a contract that is within $\epsilon$ of her optimal net profit for every $\epsilon>0$.

Motivated by the fact that in several cases a matching in a graph is stable if and only if it is produced by a greedy algorithm, we study the problem of computing a maximum weight greedy matching on weighted graphs, termed GREEDYMATCHING. In wide contrast to the maximum weight matching problem, for which many efficient algorithms are known, we prove that GREEDYMATCHING is strongly NP-hard and APX-complete, and thus it does not admit a PTAS unless P=NP, even on graphs with maximum degree at most 3 and with at most three different integer edge weights. Furthermore we prove that GREEDYMATCHING is strongly NP-hard if the input graph is in addition bipartite. Moreover we consider three natural parameters of the problem, for which we establish a sharp threshold behavior between NP-hardness and computational tractability. On the positive side, we present a randomized approximation algorithm (RGMA) for GREEDYMATCHING on a special class of weighted graphs, called bushgraphs. We highlight an unexpected connection between RGMA and the approximation of maximum cardinality matching in unweighted graphs via randomized greedy algorithms. We show that, if the approximation ratio of RGMA is ρ, then for every ε > 0 the randomized MRG algorithm of (Aronson et al. 1995) gives a (ρ − ε)-approximation for the maximum cardinality matching. We conjecture that a tightbound for ρ is 2/3; we prove our conjecture true for four subclasses of bush graphs. Proving a tight bound for the approximation ratio of MRG on unweighted graphs (and thus also proving a tight value for ρ) is a long-standing open problem (Poloczek and Szegedy 2012). This unexpected relation of our RGMA algorithm with the MRG algorithm may provide new insights for solving this problem.

The VCG mechanism is the standard method to incentivize bidders in combinatorial auctions to bid truthfully. Under the VCG mechanism, the auctioneer can sometimes increase revenue by “burning” items. We study this phenomenon in a setting where items are described by a number of attributes. The value of an attribute corresponds to a quality level, and bidders’ valuations are non-decreasing in the quality levels. In addition to burning items, we allow the auctioneer to present some of the attributes as lower quality than they actually are. We consider the following two revenue maximization problems under VCG: finding an optimal way to mark down items by reducing their quality levels, and finding an optimal set of items to burn. We study the effect of the following parameters on the computational complexity of these two problems: the number of attributes, the number of quality levels per attribute, and the complexity of the bidders’ valuation functions. Bidders have unit demand, so VCG’s outcome can be computed in polynomial time, and the valuation functions we consider are step functions that are non-decreasing with the quality levels. We prove that both problems are NP-hard even in the following three simple settings: a) four attributes, arbitrarily many quality levels per attribute, and single-step valuation functions, b) arbitrarily many attributes, two quality levels per attribute, and single-step valuation functions, and c) one attribute, arbitrarily many quality levels, and multi-step valuation functions. For the case where items have only one attribute, and every bidder has a single-step valuation (zero below some quality threshold), we show that both problems can be solved in polynomial-time using a dynamic programming approach. For this case, we also quantify how much better marking down is than item burning, and we compare the revenue of both approaches with computational experiments.