We study the inherent trade-offs in minimizing privacy risks and maximizing utility, while maintaining high computational efficiency, when fine-tuning large language models (LLMs). A number of recent works in privacy research have attempted to mitigate privacy risks posed by memorizing fine-tuning data by using differentially private training methods (e.g., DP), albeit at a significantly higher computational cost (inefficiency). In parallel, several works in systems research have focussed on developing (parameter) efficient fine-tuning methods (e.g., LoRA), but few works, if any, investigated whether such efficient methods enhance or diminish privacy risks. In this paper, we investigate this gap and arrive at a surprising conclusion: efficient fine-tuning methods like LoRA mitigate privacy risks similar to private fine-tuning methods like DP. Our empirical finding directly contradicts prevailing wisdom that privacy and efficiency objectives are at odds during fine-tuning. Our finding is established by (a) carefully defining measures of privacy and utility that distinguish between memorizing sensitive and non-sensitive tokens in training and test datasets used in fine-tuning and (b) extensive evaluations using multiple open-source language models from Pythia, Gemma, and Llama families and different domain-specific datasets.

We propose an approach for estimating the latent knowledge embedded inside large language models (LLMs). We leverage the in-context learning (ICL) abilities of LLMs to estimate the extent to which an LLM knows the facts stored in a knowledge base. Our knowledge estimator avoids reliability concerns with previous prompting-based methods, is both conceptually simpler and easier to apply, and we demonstrate that it can surface more of the latent knowledge embedded in LLMs. We also investigate how different design choices affect the performance of ICL-based knowledge estimation. Using the proposed estimator, we perform a large-scale evaluation of the factual knowledge of a variety of open source LLMs, like OPT, Pythia, Llama(2), Mistral, Gemma, etc. over a large set of relations and facts from the Wikidata knowledge base. We observe differences in the factual knowledge between different model families and models of different sizes, that some relations are consistently better known than others but that models differ in the precise facts they know, and differences in the knowledge of base models and their finetuned counterparts.

Trustworthy AI is crucial to the widespread adoption of AI in high-stakes applications with fairness, robustness, and accuracy being some of the key trustworthiness metrics. In this work, we propose a controllable framework for data-centric trustworthy AI (DCTAI)- VTruST, that allows users to control the trade-offs between the different trustworthiness metrics of the constructed training datasets. A key challenge in implementing an efficient DCTAI framework is to design an online value-function-based training data subset selection algorithm. We pose the training data valuation and subset selection problem as an online sparse approximation formulation. We propose a novel online version of the Orthogonal Matching Pursuit (OMP) algorithm for solving this problem. Experimental results show that VTruST outperforms the state-of-the-art baselines on social, image, and scientific datasets. We also show that the data values generated by VTruST can provide effective data-centric explanations for different trustworthiness metrics.

Targeted model poisoning attacks pose a significant threat to federated learning systems. Recent studies show that edge-case targeted attacks, which target a small fraction of the input space are nearly impossible to counter using existing fixed defense strategies. In this paper, we strive to design a learned-defense strategy against such attacks, using a small defense dataset. The defense dataset can be collected by the central authority of the federated learning task, and should contain a mix of poisoned and clean examples. The proposed framework, LearnDefend, estimates the probability of a client update being malicious. The examples in defense dataset need not be pre-marked as poisoned or clean. We also learn a poisoned data detector model which can be used to mark each example in the defense dataset as clean or poisoned. We estimate the poisoned data detector and the client importance models in a coupled optimization approach. Our experiments demonstrate that LearnDefend is capable of defending against state-of-the-art attacks where existing fixed defense strategies fail. We also show that LearnDefend is robust to size and noise in the marking of clean examples in the defense dataset.