Predictive coding (PC) is an influential theory of information processing in the brain, providing a biologically plausible alternative to backpropagation. It is motivated in terms of Bayesian inference, as hidden states and parameters are optimised via gradient descent on variational free energy. However, implementations of PC rely on maximum \textit{a posteriori} (MAP) estimates of hidden states and maximum likelihood (ML) estimates of parameters, limiting their ability to quantify epistemic uncertainty. In this work, we investigate a Bayesian extension to PC that estimates a posterior distribution over network parameters. This approach, termed Bayesian Predictive coding (BPC), preserves the locality of PC and results in closed-form Hebbian weight updates. Compared to PC, our BPC algorithm converges in fewer epochs in the full-batch setting and remains competitive in the mini-batch setting. Additionally, we demonstrate that BPC offers uncertainty quantification comparable to existing methods in Bayesian deep learning, while also improving convergence properties. Together, these results suggest that BPC provides a biologically plausible method for Bayesian learning in the brain, as well as an attractive approach to uncertainty quantification in deep learning.

We introduce a generic, compositional and interpretable class of generative world models that supports open-ended learning agents. This is a sparse class of Bayesian networks capable of approximating a broad range of stochastic processes, which provide agents with the ability to learn world models in a manner that may be both interpretable and computationally scalable. This approach integrating Bayesian structure learning and intrinsically motivated (model-based) planning enables agents to actively develop and refine their world models, which may lead to developmental learning and more robust, adaptive behavior.

This paper offers a roadmap for the development of scalable aligned artificial intelligence (AI) from first principle descriptions of natural intelligence. In brief, a possible path toward scalable aligned AI rests upon enabling artificial agents to learn a good model of the world that includes a good model of our preferences. For this, the main objective is creating agents that learn to represent the world and other agents' world models; a problem that falls under structure learning (a.k.a. causal representation learning). We expose the structure learning and alignment problems with this goal in mind, as well as principles to guide us forward, synthesizing various ideas across mathematics, statistics, and cognitive science. 1) We discuss the essential role of core knowledge, information geometry and model reduction in structure learning, and suggest core structural modules to learn a wide range of naturalistic worlds. 2) We outline a way toward aligned agents through structure learning and theory of mind. As an illustrative example, we mathematically sketch Asimov's Laws of Robotics, which prescribe agents to act cautiously to minimize the ill-being of other agents. We supplement this example by proposing refined approaches to alignment. These observations may guide the development of artificial intelligence in helping to scale existing -- or design new -- aligned structure learning systems.

Is there a canonical way to think of agency beyond reward maximisation? In this paper, we show that any type of behaviour complying with physically sound assumptions about how macroscopic biological agents interact with the world canonically integrates exploration and exploitation in the sense of minimising risk and ambiguity about states of the world. This description, known as active inference, refines the free energy principle, a popular descriptive framework for action and perception originating in neuroscience. Active inference provides a normative Bayesian framework to simulate and model agency that is widely used in behavioural neuroscience, reinforcement learning (RL) and robotics. The usefulness of active inference for RL is three-fold. \emph{a}) Active inference provides a principled solution to the exploration-exploitation dilemma that usefully simulates biological agency. \emph{b}) It provides an explainable recipe to simulate behaviour, whence behaviour follows as an explainable mixture of exploration and exploitation under a generative world model, and all differences in behaviour are explicit in differences in world model. \emph{c}) This framework is universal in the sense that it is theoretically possible to rewrite any RL algorithm conforming to the descriptive assumptions of active inference as an active inference algorithm. Thus, active inference can be used as a tool to uncover and compare the commitments and assumptions of more specific models of agency.

Gaussian processes (GPs) are the most common formalism for defining probability distributions over spaces of functions. While applications of GPs are myriad, a comprehensive understanding of GP sample paths, i.e. the function spaces over which they define a probability measure on, is lacking. In practice, GPs are not constructed through a probability measure, but instead through a mean function and a covariance kernel. In this paper we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the covariance kernel for the sample paths of the corresponding GP to attain a given regularity. We use the framework of H\"older regularity as it grants us particularly straightforward conditions, which simplify further in the cases of stationary and isotropic GPs. We then demonstrate that our results allow for novel and unusually tight characterisations of the sample path regularities of the GPs commonly used in machine learning applications, such as the Mat\'ern GPs.

This paper concerns structure learning or discovery of discrete generative models. It focuses on Bayesian model selection and the assimilation of training data or content, with a special emphasis on the order in which data are ingested. A key move - in the ensuing schemes - is to place priors on the selection of models, based upon expected free energy. In this setting, expected free energy reduces to a constrained mutual information, where the constraints inherit from priors over outcomes (i.e., preferred outcomes). The resulting scheme is first used to perform image classification on the MNIST dataset to illustrate the basic idea, and then tested on a more challenging problem of discovering models with dynamics, using a simple sprite-based visual disentanglement paradigm and the Tower of Hanoi (cf., blocks world) problem. In these examples, generative models are constructed autodidactically to recover (i.e., disentangle) the factorial structure of latent states - and their characteristic paths or dynamics.

Despite being recognized as neurobiologically plausible, active inference faces difficulties when employed to simulate intelligent behaviour in complex environments due to its computational cost and the difficulty of specifying an appropriate target distribution for the agent. This paper introduces two solutions that work in concert to address these limitations. First, we present a novel planning algorithm for finite temporal horizons with drastically lower computational complexity. Second, inspired by Z-learning from control theory literature, we simplify the process of setting an appropriate target distribution for new and existing active inference planning schemes. Our first approach leverages the dynamic programming algorithm, known for its computational efficiency, to minimize the cost function used in planning through the Bellman-optimality principle. Accordingly, our algorithm recursively assesses the expected free energy of actions in the reverse temporal order. This improves computational efficiency by orders of magnitude and allows precise model learning and planning, even under uncertain conditions. Our method simplifies the planning process and shows meaningful behaviour even when specifying only the agent's final goal state. The proposed solutions make defining a target distribution from a goal state straightforward compared to the more complicated task of defining a temporally informed target distribution. The effectiveness of these methods is tested and demonstrated through simulations in standard grid-world tasks. These advances create new opportunities for various applications.

Over the last 10 to 15 years, active inference has helped to explain various brain mechanisms from habit formation to dopaminergic discharge and even modelling curiosity. However, the current implementations suffer from an exponential (space and time) complexity class when computing the prior over all the possible policies up to the time-horizon. Fountas et al (2020) used Monte Carlo tree search to address this problem, leading to impressive results in two different tasks. In this paper, we present an alternative framework that aims to unify tree search and active inference by casting planning as a structure learning problem. Two tree search algorithms are then presented. The first propagates the expected free energy forward in time (i.e., towards the leaves), while the second propagates it backward (i.e., towards the root). Then, we demonstrate that forward and backward propagations are related to active inference and sophisticated inference, respectively, thereby clarifying the differences between those two planning strategies.

Active inference, a corollary of the free energy principle, is a formal way of describing the behavior of certain kinds of random dynamical systems that have the appearance of sentience. In this chapter, we describe how active inference combines Bayesian decision theory and optimal Bayesian design principles under a single imperative to minimize expected free energy. It is this aspect of active inference that allows for the natural emergence of information-seeking behavior. When removing prior outcomes preferences from expected free energy, active inference reduces to optimal Bayesian design, i.e., information gain maximization. Conversely, active inference reduces to Bayesian decision theory in the absence of ambiguity and relative risk, i.e., expected utility maximization. Using these limiting cases, we illustrate how behaviors differ when agents select actions that optimize expected utility, expected information gain, and expected free energy. Our T-maze simulations show optimizing expected free energy produces goal-directed information-seeking behavior while optimizing expected utility induces purely exploitive behavior and maximizing information gain engenders intrinsically motivated behavior.

Under the Bayesian brain hypothesis, behavioural variations can be attributed to different priors over generative model parameters. This provides a formal explanation for why individuals exhibit inconsistent behavioural preferences when confronted with similar choices. For example, greedy preferences are a consequence of confident (or precise) beliefs over certain outcomes. Here, we offer an alternative account of behavioural variability using R\'enyi divergences and their associated variational bounds. R\'enyi bounds are analogous to the variational free energy (or evidence lower bound) and can be derived under the same assumptions. Importantly, these bounds provide a formal way to establish behavioural differences through an $\alpha$ parameter, given fixed priors. This rests on changes in $\alpha$ that alter the bound (on a continuous scale), inducing different posterior estimates and consequent variations in behaviour. Thus, it looks as if individuals have different priors, and have reached different conclusions. More specifically, $\alpha \to 0^{+}$ optimisation leads to mass-covering variational estimates and increased variability in choice behaviour. Furthermore, $\alpha \to + \infty$ optimisation leads to mass-seeking variational posteriors and greedy preferences. We exemplify this formulation through simulations of the multi-armed bandit task. We note that these $\alpha$ parameterisations may be especially relevant, i.e., shape preferences, when the true posterior is not in the same family of distributions as the assumed (simpler) approximate density, which may be the case in many real-world scenarios. The ensuing departure from vanilla variational inference provides a potentially useful explanation for differences in behavioural preferences of biological (or artificial) agents under the assumption that the brain performs variational Bayesian inference.