Crapis, Davide
GOD model: Privacy Preserved AI School for Personal Assistant
PIN AI Team, null, Sun, Bill, Guo, Gavin, Peng, Regan, Zhang, Boliang, Wang, Shouqiao, Florescu, Laura, Wang, Xi, Crapis, Davide, Wu, Ben
Personal AI assistants (e.g., Apple Intelligence, Meta AI) offer proactive recommendations that simplify everyday tasks, but their reliance on sensitive user data raises concerns about privacy and trust. To address these challenges, we introduce the Guardian of Data (GOD), a secure, privacy-preserving framework for training and evaluating AI assistants directly on-device. Unlike traditional benchmarks, the GOD model measures how well assistants can anticipate user needs-such as suggesting gifts-while protecting user data and autonomy. Functioning like an AI school, it addresses the cold start problem by simulating user queries and employing a curriculum-based approach to refine the performance of each assistant. Running within a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), it safeguards user data while applying reinforcement and imitation learning to refine AI recommendations. A token-based incentive system encourages users to share data securely, creating a data flywheel that drives continuous improvement. Specifically, users mine with their data, and the mining rate is determined by GOD's evaluation of how well their AI assistant understands them across categories such as shopping, social interactions, productivity, trading, and Web3. By integrating privacy, personalization, and trust, the GOD model provides a scalable, responsible path for advancing personal AI assistants. For community collaboration, part of the framework is open-sourced at https://github.com/PIN-AI/God-Model.
SoK: Decentralized AI (DeAI)
Wang, Zhipeng, Sun, Rui, Lui, Elizabeth, Shah, Vatsal, Xiong, Xihan, Sun, Jiahao, Crapis, Davide, Knottenbelt, William
The centralization of Artificial Intelligence (AI) poses significant challenges, including single points of failure, inherent biases, data privacy concerns, and scalability issues. These problems are especially prevalent in closed-source large language models (LLMs), where user data is collected and used without transparency. To mitigate these issues, blockchain-based decentralized AI (DeAI) has emerged as a promising solution. DeAI combines the strengths of both blockchain and AI technologies to enhance the transparency, security, decentralization, and trustworthiness of AI systems. However, a comprehensive understanding of state-of-the-art DeAI development, particularly for active industry solutions, is still lacking. In this work, we present a Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) for blockchain-based DeAI solutions. We propose a taxonomy to classify existing DeAI protocols based on the model lifecycle. Based on this taxonomy, we provide a structured way to clarify the landscape of DeAI protocols and identify their similarities and differences. We analyze the functionalities of blockchain in DeAI, investigating how blockchain features contribute to enhancing the security, transparency, and trustworthiness of AI processes, while also ensuring fair incentives for AI data and model contributors. In addition, we identify key insights and research gaps in developing DeAI protocols, highlighting several critical avenues for future research.
Optimal Dynamic Fees for Blockchain Resources
Crapis, Davide, Moallemi, Ciamac C., Wang, Shouqiao
Users of public permissionless blockchains can modify the shared state of the network through transactions that are executed by a set of nodes with limited computational resources. To allocate resources among competing transactions most blockchains use transaction fees. Initial transaction fee mechanisms in the Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains relied on users bidding for transaction inclusion as the main way of pricing congestion. Moreover, all computational resources were bundled into a unique virtual resource ("gas") with fixed relative prices hardcoded in the protocol. Current R&D efforts are focused on improving transaction fee markets along two directions: (1) setting a minimum dynamic base fee (henceforth also called price) that is adjusted by the protocol as function of user demand and (2) unbundling resources so that different resources can be individually priced and their relative prices can also efficiently adjust with demand. In this paper, we propose a new framework for choosing a resource pricing policy that makes significant progress across both directions. We consider the practical problem of a blockchain protocol that has to jointly update the prices of multiple resources at every block. We assume that the type of resources being metered and priced, as well as the block limits and sustainable targets for each resource, are pre-determined.