Cheng, Minhao
Scaling Laws of Synthetic Data for Language Models
Qin, Zeyu, Dong, Qingxiu, Zhang, Xingxing, Dong, Li, Huang, Xiaolong, Yang, Ziyi, Khademi, Mahmoud, Zhang, Dongdong, Awadalla, Hany Hassan, Fung, Yi R., Chen, Weizhu, Cheng, Minhao, Wei, Furu
Large language models (LLMs) achieve strong performance across diverse tasks, largely driven by high-quality web data used in pre-training. However, recent studies indicate this data source is rapidly depleting. Synthetic data emerges as a promising alternative, but it remains unclear whether synthetic datasets exhibit predictable scalability comparable to raw pre-training data. In this work, we systematically investigate the scaling laws of synthetic data by introducing SynthLLM, a scalable framework that transforms pre-training corpora into diverse, high-quality synthetic datasets. Our approach achieves this by automatically extracting and recombining high-level concepts across multiple documents using a graph algorithm. Key findings from our extensive mathematical experiments on SynthLLM include: (1) SynthLLM generates synthetic data that reliably adheres to the rectified scaling law across various model sizes; (2) Performance improvements plateau near 300B tokens; and (3) Larger models approach optimal performance with fewer training tokens. For instance, an 8B model peaks at 1T tokens, while a 3B model requires 4T. Moreover, comparisons with existing synthetic data generation and augmentation methods demonstrate that SynthLLM achieves superior performance and scalability. Our findings highlight synthetic data as a scalable and reliable alternative to organic pre-training corpora, offering a viable path toward continued improvement in model performance.
R1-Zero's "Aha Moment" in Visual Reasoning on a 2B Non-SFT Model
Zhou, Hengguang, Li, Xirui, Wang, Ruochen, Cheng, Minhao, Zhou, Tianyi, Hsieh, Cho-Jui
The recent DeepSeek-R1 demonstrated how reinforcement learning with simple rule-based reward can enable autonomous development of complex reasoning in large language models, characterized by the "aha moment", in which the model manifest self-reflection and increased response length during training. However, attempts to extend this success to multimodal reasoning often failed to reproduce these key characteristics. In this report, we present the first successful replication of these emergent characteristics for multimodal reasoning on only a non-SFT 2B model. Starting with Qwen2-VL-2B and applying reinforcement learning directly on the SAT dataset, our model achieves 59.47% accuracy on CVBench, outperforming the base model by approximately ~30% and exceeding both SFT setting by ~2%. In addition, we share our failed attempts and insights in attempting to achieve R1-like reasoning using RL with instruct models, aiming to shed light on the challenges involved. Our key observations include: (1) applying RL on instruct model often results in trivial reasoning trajectories, and (2) naive length reward are ineffective in eliciting reasoning capabilities.
LaRA: Benchmarking Retrieval-Augmented Generation and Long-Context LLMs - No Silver Bullet for LC or RAG Routing
Li, Kuan, Zhang, Liwen, Jiang, Yong, Xie, Pengjun, Huang, Fei, Wang, Shuai, Cheng, Minhao
Effectively incorporating external knowledge into Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial for enhancing their capabilities and addressing real-world needs. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) offers an effective method for achieving this by retrieving the most relevant fragments into LLMs. However, the advancements in context window size for LLMs offer an alternative approach, raising the question of whether RAG remains necessary for effectively handling external knowledge. Several existing studies provide inconclusive comparisons between RAG and long-context (LC) LLMs, largely due to limitations in the benchmark designs. In this paper, we present LaRA, a novel benchmark specifically designed to rigorously compare RAG and LC LLMs. LaRA encompasses 2,326 test cases across four practical QA task categories and three types of naturally occurring long texts. Through systematic evaluation of seven open-source and four proprietary LLMs, we find that the optimal choice between RAG and LC depends on a complex interplay of factors, including the model's parameter size, long-text capabilities, context length, task type, and the characteristics of the retrieved chunks. Our findings provide actionable guidelines for practitioners to effectively leverage both RAG and LC approaches in developing and deploying LLM applications. Our code and dataset is provided at: \href{https://github.com/likuanppd/LaRA}{\textbf{https://github.com/likuanppd/LaRA}}.
Leveraging Reasoning with Guidelines to Elicit and Utilize Knowledge for Enhancing Safety Alignment
Wang, Haoyu, Qin, Zeyu, Shen, Li, Wang, Xueqian, Cheng, Minhao, Tao, Dacheng
Training safe LLMs is one of the most critical research challenge. However, the commonly used method, Refusal Training (RT), struggles to generalize against various OOD jailbreaking attacks. Many safety training methods have been proposed to address this issue. While they offer valuable insights, we aim to complement this line of research by investigating whether OOD attacks truly exceed the capability of RT model. Conducting evaluation with BoN, we observe significant improvements on generalization as N increases. This underscores that the model possesses sufficient safety-related latent knowledge, but RT fails to consistently elicit this knowledge when addressing OOD attacks. Further analysis based on domain adaptation reveals that training with direct refusal causes model to rely on superficial shortcuts, resulting in learning of non-robust representation mappings. Based on our findings, we propose training model to perform safety reasoning for each query. Reasoning supervision encourages model to perform more computations, explicitly eliciting and using latent knowledge through reasoning. To achieve this, we synthesize reasoning supervision based on pre-guidelines, training the model to reason in alignment with them, thereby effectively eliciting and utilizing latent knowledge from diverse perspectives. Extensive experiments show that our method significantly improves generalization performance against OOD attacks.
Improving Your Model Ranking on Chatbot Arena by Vote Rigging
Min, Rui, Pang, Tianyu, Du, Chao, Liu, Qian, Cheng, Minhao, Lin, Min
Chatbot Arena is a popular platform for evaluating LLMs by pairwise battles, where users vote for their preferred response from two randomly sampled anonymous models. While Chatbot Arena is widely regarded as a reliable LLM ranking leaderboard, we show that crowdsourced voting can be rigged to improve (or decrease) the ranking of a target model $m_{t}$. We first introduce a straightforward target-only rigging strategy that focuses on new battles involving $m_{t}$, identifying it via watermarking or a binary classifier, and exclusively voting for $m_{t}$ wins. However, this strategy is practically inefficient because there are over $190$ models on Chatbot Arena and on average only about $1\%$ of new battles will involve $m_{t}$. To overcome this, we propose omnipresent rigging strategies, exploiting the Elo rating mechanism of Chatbot Arena that any new vote on a battle can influence the ranking of the target model $m_{t}$, even if $m_{t}$ is not directly involved in the battle. We conduct experiments on around $1.7$ million historical votes from the Chatbot Arena Notebook, showing that omnipresent rigging strategies can improve model rankings by rigging only hundreds of new votes. While we have evaluated several defense mechanisms, our findings highlight the importance of continued efforts to prevent vote rigging. Our code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/Rigging-ChatbotArena.
Uncovering, Explaining, and Mitigating the Superficial Safety of Backdoor Defense
Min, Rui, Qin, Zeyu, Zhang, Nevin L., Shen, Li, Cheng, Minhao
Backdoor attacks pose a significant threat to Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) as they allow attackers to manipulate model predictions with backdoor triggers. To address these security vulnerabilities, various backdoor purification methods have been proposed to purify compromised models. Typically, these purified models exhibit low Attack Success Rates (ASR), rendering them resistant to backdoored inputs. However, Does achieving a low ASR through current safety purification methods truly eliminate learned backdoor features from the pretraining phase? In this paper, we provide an affirmative answer to this question by thoroughly investigating the Post-Purification Robustness of current backdoor purification methods. We find that current safety purification methods are vulnerable to the rapid re-learning of backdoor behavior, even when further fine-tuning of purified models is performed using a very small number of poisoned samples. Based on this, we further propose the practical Query-based Reactivation Attack (QRA) which could effectively reactivate the backdoor by merely querying purified models. We find the failure to achieve satisfactory post-purification robustness stems from the insufficient deviation of purified models from the backdoored model along the backdoor-connected path. To improve the post-purification robustness, we propose a straightforward tuning defense, Path-Aware Minimization (PAM), which promotes deviation along backdoor-connected paths with extra model updates. Extensive experiments demonstrate that PAM significantly improves post-purification robustness while maintaining a good clean accuracy and low ASR. Our work provides a new perspective on understanding the effectiveness of backdoor safety tuning and highlights the importance of faithfully assessing the model's safety.
Defense Against Syntactic Textual Backdoor Attacks with Token Substitution
Li, Xinglin, He, Xianwen, Li, Yao, Cheng, Minhao
Textual backdoor attacks present a substantial security risk to Large Language Models (LLM). It embeds carefully chosen triggers into a victim model at the training stage, and makes the model erroneously predict inputs containing the same triggers as a certain class. Prior backdoor defense methods primarily target special token-based triggers, leaving syntax-based triggers insufficiently addressed. To fill this gap, this paper proposes a novel online defense algorithm that effectively counters syntax-based as well as special token-based backdoor attacks. The algorithm replaces semantically meaningful words in sentences with entirely different ones but preserves the syntactic templates or special tokens, and then compares the predicted labels before and after the substitution to determine whether a sentence contains triggers. Experimental results confirm the algorithm's performance against these two types of triggers, offering a comprehensive defense strategy for model integrity.
One Prompt is not Enough: Automated Construction of a Mixture-of-Expert Prompts
Wang, Ruochen, An, Sohyun, Cheng, Minhao, Zhou, Tianyi, Hwang, Sung Ju, Hsieh, Cho-Jui
Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit strong generalization capabilities to novel tasks when prompted with language instructions and in-context demos. Since this ability sensitively depends on the quality of prompts, various methods have been explored to automate the instruction design. While these methods demonstrated promising results, they also restricted the searched prompt to one instruction. Such simplification significantly limits their capacity, as a single demo-free instruction might not be able to cover the entire complex problem space of the targeted task. To alleviate this issue, we adopt the Mixture-of-Expert paradigm and divide the problem space into a set of sub-regions; Each sub-region is governed by a specialized expert, equipped with both an instruction and a set of demos. A two-phase process is developed to construct the specialized expert for each region: (1) demo assignment: Inspired by the theoretical connection between in-context learning and kernel regression, we group demos into experts based on their semantic similarity; (2) instruction assignment: A region-based joint search of an instruction per expert complements the demos assigned to it, yielding a synergistic effect. The resulting method, codenamed Mixture-of-Prompts (MoP), achieves an average win rate of 81% against prior arts across several major benchmarks.
The Crystal Ball Hypothesis in diffusion models: Anticipating object positions from initial noise
Ban, Yuanhao, Wang, Ruochen, Zhou, Tianyi, Gong, Boqing, Hsieh, Cho-Jui, Cheng, Minhao
Diffusion models have achieved remarkable success in text-to-image generation tasks; however, the role of initial noise has been rarely explored. In this study, we identify specific regions within the initial noise image, termed trigger patches, that play a key role for object generation in the resulting images. Notably, these patches are ``universal'' and can be generalized across various positions, seeds, and prompts. To be specific, extracting these patches from one noise and injecting them into another noise leads to object generation in targeted areas. We identify these patches by analyzing the dispersion of object bounding boxes across generated images, leading to the development of a posterior analysis technique. Furthermore, we create a dataset consisting of Gaussian noises labeled with bounding boxes corresponding to the objects appearing in the generated images and train a detector that identifies these patches from the initial noise. To explain the formation of these patches, we reveal that they are outliers in Gaussian noise, and follow distinct distributions through two-sample tests. Finally, we find the misalignment between prompts and the trigger patch patterns can result in unsuccessful image generations. The study proposes a reject-sampling strategy to obtain optimal noise, aiming to improve prompt adherence and positional diversity in image generation.
Invisible Backdoor Attacks on Diffusion Models
Li, Sen, Ma, Junchi, Cheng, Minhao
In recent years, diffusion models have achieved remarkable success in the realm of high-quality image generation, garnering increased attention. This surge in interest is paralleled by a growing concern over the security threats associated with diffusion models, largely attributed to their susceptibility to malicious exploitation. Notably, recent research has brought to light the vulnerability of diffusion models to backdoor attacks, enabling the generation of specific target images through corresponding triggers. However, prevailing backdoor attack methods rely on manually crafted trigger generation functions, often manifesting as discernible patterns incorporated into input noise, thus rendering them susceptible to human detection. In this paper, we present an innovative and versatile optimization framework designed to acquire invisible triggers, enhancing the stealthiness and resilience of inserted backdoors. Our proposed framework is applicable to both unconditional and conditional diffusion models, and notably, we are the pioneers in demonstrating the backdooring of diffusion models within the context of text-guided image editing and inpainting pipelines. Moreover, we also show that the backdoors in the conditional generation can be directly applied to model watermarking for model ownership verification, which further boosts the significance of the proposed framework. Extensive experiments on various commonly used samplers and datasets verify the efficacy and stealthiness of the proposed framework.