If you are looking for an answer to the question What is Artificial Intelligence? and you only have a minute, then here's the definition the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence offers on its home page: "the scientific understanding of the mechanisms underlying thought and intelligent behavior and their embodiment in machines."
However, if you are fortunate enough to have more than a minute, then please get ready to embark upon an exciting journey exploring AI (but beware, it could last a lifetime) …
Modern neural language models widely used in tasks across NLP risk memorizing sensitive information from their training data. As models continue to scale up in parameters, training data, and compute, understanding memorization in language models is both important from a learning-theoretical point of view, and is practically crucial in real world applications. An open question in previous studies of memorization in language models is how to filter out "common" memorization. In fact, most memorization criteria strongly correlate with the number of occurrences in the training set, capturing "common" memorization such as familiar phrases, public knowledge or templated texts. In this paper, we provide a principled perspective inspired by a taxonomy of human memory in Psychology. From this perspective, we formulate a notion of counterfactual memorization, which characterizes how a model's predictions change if a particular document is omitted during training. We identify and study counterfactually-memorized training examples in standard text datasets. We further estimate the influence of each training example on the validation set and on generated texts, and show that this can provide direct evidence of the source of memorization at test time.
Machine learning (ML) systems are rapidly increasing in size, are acquiring new capabilities, and are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings. As with other powerful technologies, safety for ML should be a leading research priority. In response to emerging safety challenges in ML, such as those introduced by recent large-scale models, we provide a new roadmap for ML Safety and refine the technical problems that the field needs to address. We present four problems ready for research, namely withstanding hazards ("Robustness"), identifying hazards ("Monitoring"), steering ML systems ("Alignment"), and reducing risks to how ML systems are handled ("External Safety"). Throughout, we clarify each problem's motivation and provide concrete research directions.
We extend semi-supervised learning to the problem of domain adaptation to learn significantly higher-accuracy models that train on one data distribution and test on a different one. With the goal of generality, we introduce AdaMatch, a method that unifies the tasks of unsupervised domain adaptation (UDA), semi-supervised learning (SSL), and semi-supervised domain adaptation (SSDA). In an extensive experimental study, we compare its behavior with respective state-of-the-art techniques from SSL, SSDA, and UDA on vision classification tasks. We find AdaMatch either matches or significantly exceeds the state-of-the-art in each case using the same hyper-parameters regardless of the dataset or task. For example, AdaMatch nearly doubles the accuracy compared to that of the prior state-of-the-art on the UDA task for DomainNet and even exceeds the accuracy of the prior state-of-the-art obtained with pre-training by 6.4% when AdaMatch is trained completely from scratch. Furthermore, by providing AdaMatch with just one labeled example per class from the target domain (i.e., the SSDA setting), we increase the target accuracy by an additional 6.1%, and with 5 labeled examples, by 13.6%.
Dhillon, Guneet S., Carlini, Nicholas
Stochastic Activation Pruning (SAP) (Dhillon et al., 2018) is a defense to adversarial examples that was attacked and found to be broken by the "Obfuscated Gradients" paper (Athalye et al., 2018). We discover a flaw in the re-implementation that artificially weakens SAP. When SAP is applied properly, the proposed attack is not effective. However, we show that a new use of the BPDA attack technique can still reduce the accuracy of SAP to 0.1%.
We study how robust current ImageNet models are to distribution shifts arising from natural variations in datasets. Most research on robustness focuses on synthetic image perturbations (noise, simulated weather artifacts, adversarial examples, etc.), which leaves open how robustness on synthetic distribution shift relates to distribution shift arising in real data. Informed by an evaluation of 204 ImageNet models in 213 different test conditions, we find that there is often little to no transfer of robustness from current synthetic to natural distribution shift. Moreover, most current techniques provide no robustness to the natural distribution shifts in our testbed. The main exception is training on larger and more diverse datasets, which in multiple cases increases robustness, but is still far from closing the performance gaps. Our results indicate that distribution shifts arising in real data are currently an open research problem. We provide our testbed and data as a resource for future work at https://modestyachts.github.io/imagenet-testbed/ .
Membership inference attacks are one of the simplest forms of privacy leakage for machine learning models: given a data point and model, determine whether the point was used to train the model. Existing membership inference attacks exploit models' abnormal confidence when queried on their training data. These attacks do not apply if the adversary only gets access to models' predicted labels, without a confidence measure. In this paper, we introduce label-only membership inference attacks. Instead of relying on confidence scores, our attacks evaluate the robustness of a model's predicted labels under perturbations to obtain a fine-grained membership signal. These perturbations include common data augmentations or adversarial examples. We empirically show that our label-only membership inference attacks perform on par with prior attacks that required access to model confidences. We further demonstrate that label-only attacks break multiple defenses against membership inference attacks that (implicitly or explicitly) rely on a phenomenon we call confidence masking. These defenses modify a model's confidence scores in order to thwart attacks, but leave the model's predicted labels unchanged. Our label-only attacks demonstrate that confidence-masking is not a viable defense strategy against membership inference. Finally, we investigate worst-case label-only attacks, that infer membership for a small number of outlier data points. We show that label-only attacks also match confidence-based attacks in this setting. We find that training models with differential privacy and (strong) L2 regularization are the only known defense strategies that successfully prevents all attacks. This remains true even when the differential privacy budget is too high to offer meaningful provable guarantees.
Semi-supervised learning has proven to be a powerful paradigm for leveraging unlabeled data to mitigate the reliance on large labeled datasets. In this work, we unify the current dominant approaches for semi-supervised learning to produce a new algorithm, MixMatch, that guesses low-entropy labels for data-augmented unlabeled examples and mixes labeled and unlabeled data using MixUp. MixMatch obtains state-of-the-art results by a large margin across many datasets and labeled data amounts. For example, on CIFAR-10 with 250 labels, we reduce error rate by a factor of 4 (from 38% to 11%) and by a factor of 2 on STL-10. We also demonstrate how MixMatch can help achieve a dramatically better accuracy-privacy trade-off for differential privacy.
Over the last five years the research community has attempted to develop defenses to adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2014; Biggio et al., 2013). This has proven extraordinarily difficult. Indeed, a common theme has been proposing defenses that--due to having been tested only using a limited number of static, and relatively weak, attacks--were promptly circumvented by a stronger attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; Athalye et al., 2018a). Recent community efforts and guidelines to improve defense evaluations have had a noticeably positive impact on their quality. In particular, there has been a significant uptake of evaluations against adaptive attacks, i.e., attacks that were specifically designed to target a given defense--the ratio of defenses evaluated against adaptive attacks has increased from close to zero in 2017 (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a) to one third in 2018 (Athalye et al., 2018a) and to nearly all of them today. 1 This leads to the question: With their much-improved evaluation practices, are these defenses truly robust?
Adversarial examples are malicious inputs crafted to induce misclassification. Commonly studied sensitivity-based adversarial examples introduce semantically-small changes to an input that result in a different model prediction. This paper studies a complementary failure mode, invariance-based adversarial examples, that introduce minimal semantic changes that modify an input's true label yet preserve the model's prediction. We demonstrate fundamental tradeoffs between these two types of adversarial examples. We show that defenses against sensitivity-based attacks actively harm a model's accuracy on invariance-based attacks, and that new approaches are needed to resist both attack types. In particular, we break state-of-the-art adversarially-trained and certifiably-robust models by generating small perturbations that the models are (provably) robust to, yet that change an input's class according to human labelers. Finally, we formally show that the existence of excessively invariant classifiers arises from the presence of overly-robust predictive features in standard datasets.
Semi-supervised learning (SSL) provides an effective means of leveraging unlabeled data to improve a model's performance. In this paper, we demonstrate the power of a simple combination of two common SSL methods: consistency regularization and pseudo-labeling. Our algorithm, FixMatch, first generates pseudo-labels using the model's predictions on weakly-augmented unlabeled images. For a given image, the pseudo-label is only retained if the model produces a high-confidence prediction. The model is then trained to predict the pseudo-label when fed a strongly-augmented version of the same image. Despite its simplicity, we show that FixMatch achieves state-of-the-art performance across a variety of standard semi-supervised learning benchmarks, including 94.93% accuracy on CIFAR-10 with 250 labels and 88.61% accuracy with 40 -- just 4 labels per class. Since FixMatch bears many similarities to existing SSL methods that achieve worse performance, we carry out an extensive ablation study to tease apart the experimental factors that are most important to FixMatch's success. We make our code available at https://github.com/google-research/fixmatch.