Pre-trained vision language models still fall short of human visual cognition. In an effort to improve visual cognition and align models with human behavior, we introduce visual stimuli and human judgments on visual cognition tasks, allowing us to systematically evaluate performance across cognitive domains under a consistent environment. We fine-tune models on ground truth data for intuitive physics and causal reasoning and find that this improves model performance in the respective fine-tuning domain. Furthermore, it can improve model alignment with human behavior. However, we find that fine-tuning does not contribute to robust human-like generalization to data with other visual characteristics or to tasks in other cognitive domains.

Establishing a unified theory of cognition has been a major goal of psychology. While there have been previous attempts to instantiate such theories by building computational models, we currently do not have one model that captures the human mind in its entirety. Here we introduce Centaur, a computational model that can predict and simulate human behavior in any experiment expressible in natural language. We derived Centaur by finetuning a state-of-the-art language model on a novel, large-scale data set called Psych-101. Psych-101 reaches an unprecedented scale, covering trial-by-trial data from over 60,000 participants performing over 10,000,000 choices in 160 experiments. Centaur not only captures the behavior of held-out participants better than existing cognitive models, but also generalizes to new cover stories, structural task modifications, and entirely new domains. Furthermore, we find that the model's internal representations become more aligned with human neural activity after finetuning. Taken together, Centaur is the first real candidate for a unified model of human cognition. We anticipate that it will have a disruptive impact on the cognitive sciences, challenging the existing paradigm for developing computational models.

A BSTRACT Compositional representations are thought to enable humans to generalize across combinatorially vast state spaces. Models with learnable object slots, which encode information about objects in separate latent codes, have shown promise for this type of generalization but rely on strong architectural priors. Models with distributed representations, on the other hand, use overlapping, potentially entangled neural codes, and their ability to support compositional generalization remains underexplored. In this paper we examine whether distributed models can develop linearly separable representations of objects, like slotted models, through unsupervised training on videos of object interactions. We show that, surprisingly, models with distributed representations often match or outperform models with object slots in downstream prediction tasks. Furthermore, we find that linearly separable object representations can emerge without object-centric priors, with auxiliary objectives like next-state prediction playing a key role. Finally, we observe that distributed models' object representations are never fully disentangled, even if they are linearly separable: Multiple objects can be encoded through partially overlapping neural populations while still being highly separable with a linear classifier. We hypothesize that maintaining partially shared codes enables distributed models to better compress object dynamics, potentially enhancing generalization. 1 I NTRODUCTION Humans naturally decompose scenes, events and processes in terms of the objects that feature in them (Tenenbaum et al., 2011; Lake et al., 2017). These object-centric construals have been argued to explain humans' ability to reason and generalize successfully (Goodman et al., 2008; Lake et al., 2015; Schulze Buschoff et al., 2023). It has therefore long been a chief aim in machine learning research to design models and agents that learn to represent the world compositionally, e.g. in terms of the building blocks that compose it.

Large Language Models (LLMs) vary in their abilities on a range of tasks. Initiatives such as the $\texttt{Open LLM Leaderboard}$ aim to quantify these differences with several large benchmarks (sets of test items to which an LLM can respond either correctly or incorrectly). However, high correlations within and between benchmark scores suggest that (1) there exists a small set of common underlying abilities that these benchmarks measure, and (2) items tap into redundant information and the benchmarks may thus be considerably compressed. We use data from $n > 5000$ LLMs to identify the most informative items of six benchmarks, ARC, GSM8K, HellaSwag, MMLU, TruthfulQA and WinoGrande (with $d=28,632$ items in total). From them we distill a sparse benchmark, $\texttt{metabench}$, that has less than $3\%$ of the original size of all six benchmarks combined. This new sparse benchmark goes beyond point scores by yielding estimators of the underlying benchmark-specific abilities. We show that these estimators (1) can be used to reconstruct each original $\textit{individual}$ benchmark score with, on average, $1.5\%$ root mean square error (RMSE), (2) reconstruct the original $\textit{total}$ score with $0.8\%$ RMSE, and (3) have a single underlying common factor whose Spearman correlation with the total score is $r = 0.93$.

A chief goal of artificial intelligence is to build machines that think like people. Yet it has been argued that deep neural network architectures fail to accomplish this. Researchers have asserted these models' limitations in the domains of causal reasoning, intuitive physics, and intuitive psychology. Yet recent advancements, namely the rise of large language models, particularly those designed for visual processing, have rekindled interest in the potential to emulate human-like cognitive abilities. This paper evaluates the current state of vision-based large language models in the domains of intuitive physics, causal reasoning, and intuitive psychology. Through a series of controlled experiments, we investigate the extent to which these modern models grasp complex physical interactions, causal relationships, and intuitive understanding of others' preferences. Our findings reveal that, while these models demonstrate a notable proficiency in processing and interpreting visual data, they still fall short of human capabilities in these areas. The models exhibit a rudimentary understanding of physical laws and causal relationships, but their performance is hindered by a lack of deeper insights - a key aspect of human cognition. Furthermore, in tasks requiring an intuitive theory of mind, the models fail altogether. Our results emphasize the need for integrating more robust mechanisms for understanding causality, physical dynamics, and social cognition into modern-day, vision-based language models, and point out the importance of cognitively-inspired benchmarks.

As children grow older, they develop an intuitive understanding of the physical processes around them. Their physical understanding develops in stages, moving along developmental trajectories which have been mapped out extensively in previous empirical research. Here, we investigate how the learning trajectories of deep generative neural networks compare to children's developmental trajectories using physical understanding as a testbed. We outline an approach that allows us to examine two distinct hypotheses of human development - stochastic optimization and complexity increase. We find that while our models are able to accurately predict a number of physical processes, their learning trajectories under both hypotheses do not follow the developmental trajectories of children.