The o1 model series is trained with large-scale reinforcement learning to reason using chain of thought. These advanced reasoning capabilities provide new avenues for improving the safety and robustness of our models. In particular, our models can reason about our safety policies in context when responding to potentially unsafe prompts, through deliberative alignment. This leads to state-of-the-art performance on certain benchmarks for risks such as generating illicit advice, choosing stereotyped responses, and succumbing to known jailbreaks. Training models to incorporate a chain of thought before answering has the potential to unlock substantial benefits, while also increasing potential risks that stem from heightened intelligence. Our results underscore the need for building robust alignment methods, extensively stress-testing their efficacy, and maintaining meticulous risk management protocols. This report outlines the safety work carried out for the OpenAI o1 and OpenAI o1-mini models, including safety evaluations, external red teaming, and Preparedness Framework evaluations.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

The process of revising (or constructing) a policy immediately prior to execution -- known as decision-time planning -- is key to achieving superhuman performance in perfect-information settings like chess and Go. A recent line of work has extended decision-time planning to more general imperfect-information settings, leading to superhuman performance in poker. However, these methods requires considering subgames whose sizes grow quickly in the amount of non-public information, making them unhelpful when the amount of non-public information is large. Motivated by this issue, we introduce an alternative framework for decision-time planning that is not based on subgames but rather on the notion of update equivalence. In this framework, decision-time planning algorithms simulate updates of synchronous learning algorithms. This framework enables us to introduce a new family of principled decision-time planning algorithms that do not rely on public information, opening the door to sound and effective decision-time planning in settings with large amounts of non-public information. In experiments, members of this family produce comparable or superior results compared to state-of-the-art approaches in Hanabi and improve performance in 3x3 Abrupt Dark Hex and Phantom Tic-Tac-Toe.

This work studies an algorithm, which we call magnetic mirror descent, that is inspired by mirror descent and the non-Euclidean proximal gradient algorithm. Our contribution is demonstrating the virtues of magnetic mirror descent as both an equilibrium solver and as an approach to reinforcement learning in two-player zero-sum games. These virtues include: 1) Being the first quantal response equilibria solver to achieve linear convergence for extensive-form games with first order feedback; 2) Being the first standard reinforcement learning algorithm to achieve empirically competitive results with CFR in tabular settings; 3) Achieving favorable performance in 3x3 Dark Hex and Phantom Tic-Tac-Toe as a self-play deep reinforcement learning algorithm.

We consider the task of building strong but human-like policies in multi-agent decision-making problems, given examples of human behavior. Imitation learning is effective at predicting human actions but may not match the strength of expert humans, while self-play learning and search techniques (e.g. AlphaZero) lead to strong performance but may produce policies that are difficult for humans to understand and coordinate with. We show in chess and Go that regularizing search policies based on the KL divergence from an imitation-learned policy by applying Monte Carlo tree search produces policies that have higher human prediction accuracy and are stronger than the imitation policy. We then introduce a novel regret minimization algorithm that is regularized based on the KL divergence from an imitation-learned policy, and show that applying this algorithm to no-press Diplomacy yields a policy that maintains the same human prediction accuracy as imitation learning while being substantially stronger.

Prior AI successes in complex games have largely focused on settings with at most hundreds of actions at each decision point. In contrast, Diplomacy is a game with more than 10^20 possible actions per turn. Previous attempts to address games with large branching factors, such as Diplomacy, StarCraft, and Dota, used human data to bootstrap the policy or used handcrafted reward shaping. In this paper, we describe an algorithm for action exploration and equilibrium approximation in games with combinatorial action spaces. This algorithm simultaneously performs value iteration while learning a policy proposal network. A double oracle step is used to explore additional actions to add to the policy proposals. At each state, the target state value and policy for the model training are computed via an equilibrium search procedure. Using this algorithm, we train an agent, DORA, completely from scratch for a popular two-player variant of Diplomacy and show that it achieves superhuman performance. Additionally, we extend our methods to full-scale no-press Diplomacy and for the first time train an agent from scratch with no human data. We present evidence that this agent plays a strategy that is incompatible with human-data bootstrapped agents. This presents the first strong evidence of multiple equilibria in Diplomacy and suggests that self play alone may be insufficient for achieving superhuman performance in Diplomacy.

Lookahead search has been a critical component of recent AI successes, such as in the games of chess, go, and poker. However, the search methods used in these games, and in many other settings, are tabular. Tabular search methods do not scale well with the size of the search space, and this problem is exacerbated by stochasticity and partial observability. In this work we replace tabular search with online model-based fine-tuning of a policy neural network via reinforcement learning, and show that this approach outperforms state-of-the-art search algorithms in benchmark settings. In particular, we use our search algorithm to achieve a new state-of-the-art result in self-play Hanabi, and show the generality of our algorithm by also showing that it outperforms tabular search in the Atari game Ms. Pacman.

Search is an important tool for computing effective policies in single- and multi-agent environments, and has been crucial for achieving superhuman performance in several benchmark fully and partially observable games. However, one major limitation of prior search approaches for partially observable environments is that the computational cost scales poorly with the amount of hidden information. In this paper we present \emph{Learned Belief Search} (LBS), a computationally efficient search procedure for partially observable environments. Rather than maintaining an exact belief distribution, LBS uses an approximate auto-regressive counterfactual belief that is learned as a supervised task. In multi-agent settings, LBS uses a novel public-private model architecture for underlying policies in order to efficiently evaluate these policies during rollouts. In the benchmark domain of Hanabi, LBS can obtain 55% ~ 91% of the benefit of exact search while reducing compute requirements by $35.8 \times$ ~ $4.6 \times$, allowing it to scale to larger settings that were inaccessible to previous search methods.

The standard problem setting in Dec-POMDPs is self-play, where the goal is to find a set of policies that play optimally together. Policies learned through self-play may adopt arbitrary conventions and rely on multi-step counterfactual reasoning based on assumptions about other agents' actions and thus fail when paired with humans or independently trained agents. In contrast, no current methods can learn optimal policies that are fully grounded, i.e., do not rely on counterfactual information from observing other agents' actions. To address this, we present off-belief learning} (OBL): at each time step OBL agents assume that all past actions were taken by a given, fixed policy ($\pi_0$), but that future actions will be taken by an optimal policy under these same assumptions. When $\pi_0$ is uniform random, OBL learns the optimal grounded policy. OBL can be iterated in a hierarchy, where the optimal policy from one level becomes the input to the next. This introduces counterfactual reasoning in a controlled manner. Unlike independent RL which may converge to any equilibrium policy, OBL converges to a unique policy, making it more suitable for zero-shot coordination. OBL can be scaled to high-dimensional settings with a fictitious transition mechanism and shows strong performance in both a simple toy-setting and the benchmark human-AI/zero-shot coordination problem Hanabi.

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and wildlife poaching prevention. Even though many of these settings are sequential in nature, existing techniques pre-compute the entire solution ahead of time. In this paper, we present a theoretically sound and empirically effective way to apply search, which leverages extra online computation to improve a solution, to the computation of Stackelberg equilibria in general-sum games. Instead of the leader attempting to solve the full game upfront, an approximate "blueprint" solution is first computed offline and is then improved online for the particular subgames encountered in actual play. We prove that our search technique is guaranteed to perform no worse than the pre-computed blueprint strategy, and empirically demonstrate that it enables approximately solving significantly larger games compared to purely offline methods. We also show that our search operation may be cast as a smaller Stackelberg problem, making our method complementary to existing algorithms based on strategy generation.