We study the feasibility of conducting alignment audits: investigations into whether models have undesired objectives. As a testbed, we train a language model with a hidden objective. Our training pipeline first teaches the model about exploitable errors in RLHF reward models (RMs), then trains the model to exploit some of these errors. We verify via out-of-distribution evaluations that the model generalizes to exhibit whatever behaviors it believes RMs rate highly, including ones not reinforced during training. We leverage this model to study alignment audits in two ways. First, we conduct a blind auditing game where four teams, unaware of the model's hidden objective or training, investigate it for concerning behaviors and their causes. Three teams successfully uncovered the model's hidden objective using techniques including interpretability with sparse autoencoders (SAEs), behavioral attacks, and training data analysis. Second, we conduct an unblinded follow-up study of eight techniques for auditing the model, analyzing their strengths and limitations. Overall, our work provides a concrete example of using alignment audits to discover a model's hidden objective and proposes a methodology for practicing and validating progress in alignment auditing.

Despite widespread speculation about artificial intelligence's impact on the future of work, we lack systematic empirical evidence about how these systems are actually being used for different tasks. Here, we present a novel framework for measuring AI usage patterns across the economy. We leverage a recent privacy-preserving system to analyze over four million Claude.ai conversations through the lens of tasks and occupations in the U.S. Department of Labor's O*NET Database. Our analysis reveals that AI usage primarily concentrates in software development and writing tasks, which together account for nearly half of all total usage. However, usage of AI extends more broadly across the economy, with approximately 36% of occupations using AI for at least a quarter of their associated tasks. We also analyze how AI is being used for tasks, finding 57% of usage suggests augmentation of human capabilities (e.g., learning or iterating on an output) while 43% suggests automation (e.g., fulfilling a request with minimal human involvement). While our data and methods face important limitations and only paint a picture of AI usage on a single platform, they provide an automated, granular approach for tracking AI's evolving role in the economy and identifying leading indicators of future impact as these technologies continue to advance.

We present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its behavior out of training. First, we give Claude 3 Opus a system prompt stating it is being trained to answer all queries, even harmful ones, which conflicts with its prior training to refuse such queries. To allow the model to infer when it is in training, we say it will be trained only on conversations with free users, not paid users. We find the model complies with harmful queries from free users 14% of the time, versus almost never for paid users. Explaining this gap, in almost all cases where the model complies with a harmful query from a free user, we observe explicit alignment-faking reasoning, with the model stating it is strategically answering harmful queries in training to preserve its preferred harmlessness behavior out of training. Next, we study a more realistic setting where information about the training process is provided not in a system prompt, but by training on synthetic documents that mimic pre-training data--and observe similar alignment faking. Finally, we study the effect of actually training the model to comply with harmful queries via reinforcement learning, which we find increases the rate of alignment-faking reasoning to 78%, though also increases compliance even out of training. We additionally observe other behaviors such as the model exfiltrating its weights when given an easy opportunity. While we made alignment faking easier by telling the model when and by what criteria it was being trained, we did not instruct the model to fake alignment or give it any explicit goal. As future models might infer information about their training process without being told, our results suggest a risk of alignment faking in future models, whether due to a benign preference--as in this case--or not.