In social dilemmas where the collective and self-interests are at odds, people typically cooperate less with machines than with fellow humans, a phenomenon termed the machine penalty. Overcoming this penalty is critical for successful human-machine collectives, yet current solutions often involve ethically-questionable tactics, like concealing machines' non-human nature. In this study, with 1,152 participants, we explore the possibility of closing this research question by using Large Language Models (LLMs), in scenarios where communication is possible between interacting parties. We design three types of LLMs: (i) Cooperative, aiming to assist its human associate; (ii) Selfish, focusing solely on maximizing its self-interest; and (iii) Fair, balancing its own and collective interest, while slightly prioritizing self-interest. Our findings reveal that, when interacting with humans, fair LLMs are able to induce cooperation levels comparable to those observed in human-human interactions, even when their non-human nature is fully disclosed. In contrast, selfish and cooperative LLMs fail to achieve this goal. Post-experiment analysis shows that all three types of LLMs succeed in forming mutual cooperation agreements with humans, yet only fair LLMs, which occasionally break their promises, are capable of instilling a perception among humans that cooperating with them is the social norm, and eliciting positive views on their trustworthiness, mindfulness, intelligence, and communication quality. Our findings suggest that for effective human-machine cooperation, bot manufacturers should avoid designing machines with mere rational decision-making or a sole focus on assisting humans. Instead, they should design machines capable of judiciously balancing their own interest and the interest of humans.

The emergence of large language models has led to the development of powerful tools such as ChatGPT that can produce text indistinguishable from human-generated work. With the increasing accessibility of such technology, students across the globe may utilize it to help with their school work -- a possibility that has sparked discussions on the integrity of student evaluations in the age of artificial intelligence (AI). To date, it is unclear how such tools perform compared to students on university-level courses. Further, students' perspectives regarding the use of such tools, and educators' perspectives on treating their use as plagiarism, remain unknown. Here, we compare the performance of ChatGPT against students on 32 university-level courses. We also assess the degree to which its use can be detected by two classifiers designed specifically for this purpose. Additionally, we conduct a survey across five countries, as well as a more in-depth survey at the authors' institution, to discern students' and educators' perceptions of ChatGPT's use. We find that ChatGPT's performance is comparable, if not superior, to that of students in many courses. Moreover, current AI-text classifiers cannot reliably detect ChatGPT's use in school work, due to their propensity to classify human-written answers as AI-generated, as well as the ease with which AI-generated text can be edited to evade detection. Finally, we find an emerging consensus among students to use the tool, and among educators to treat this as plagiarism. Our findings offer insights that could guide policy discussions addressing the integration of AI into educational frameworks.