Minimum Bayes Risk (MBR) decoding optimizes output selection by maximizing the expected utility value of an underlying human distribution. While prior work has shown the effectiveness of MBR decoding through empirical evaluation, few studies have analytically investigated why the method is effective. As a result of our analysis, we show that, given the size $n$ of the reference hypothesis set used in computation, MBR decoding approaches the optimal solution with high probability at a rate of $O\left(n^{-\frac{1}{2}}\right)$, under certain assumptions, even though the language space $Y$ is significantly larger $Y\gg n$. This result helps to theoretically explain the strong performance observed in several prior empirical studies on MBR decoding. In addition, we provide the performance gap for maximum-a-posteriori (MAP) decoding and compare it to MBR decoding. The result of this paper indicates that MBR decoding tends to converge to the optimal solution faster than MAP decoding in several cases.

Best-of-N (BoN) sampling with a reward model has been shown to be an effective strategy for aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences at the time of decoding. BoN sampling is susceptible to a problem known as reward hacking. Since the reward model is an imperfect proxy for the true objective, an excessive focus on optimizing its value can lead to a compromise of its performance on the true objective. Previous work proposes Regularized BoN sampling (RBoN), a BoN sampling with regularization to the objective, and shows that it outperforms BoN sampling so that it mitigates reward hacking and empirically (Jinnai et al., 2024). However, Jinnai et al. (2024) introduce RBoN based on a heuristic and they lack the analysis of why such regularization strategy improves the performance of BoN sampling. The aim of this study is to analyze the effect of BoN sampling on regularization strategies. Using the regularization strategies corresponds to robust optimization, which maximizes the worst case over a set of possible perturbations in the proxy reward. Although the theoretical guarantees are not directly applicable to RBoN, RBoN corresponds to a practical implementation. This paper proposes an extension of the RBoN framework, called Stochastic RBoN sampling (SRBoN), which is a theoretically guaranteed approach to worst-case RBoN in proxy reward. We then perform an empirical evaluation using the AlpacaFarm and Anthropic's hh-rlhf datasets to evaluate which factors of the regularization strategies contribute to the improvement of the true proxy reward. In addition, we also propose another simple RBoN method, the Sentence Length Regularized BoN, which has a better performance in the experiment as compared to the previous methods.

This paper investigates how perturbation does and does not improve the Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) algorithm in imperfect-information extensive-form games. Perturbing the expected payoffs guarantees that the FTRL dynamics reach an approximate equilibrium, and proper adjustments of the magnitude of the perturbation lead to a Nash equilibrium (\textit{last-iterate convergence}). This approach is robust even when payoffs are estimated using sampling -- as is the case for large games -- while the optimistic approach often becomes unstable. Building upon those insights, we first develop a general framework for perturbed FTRL algorithms under \textit{sampling}. We then empirically show that in the last-iterate sense, the perturbed FTRL consistently outperforms the non-perturbed FTRL. We further identify a divergence function that reduces the variance of the estimates for perturbed payoffs, with which it significantly outperforms the prior algorithms on Leduc poker (whose structure is more asymmetric in a sense than that of the other benchmark games) and consistently performs smooth convergence behavior on all the benchmark games.

Auction is one of the most representative buying-selling systems. A celebrated study shows that the seller's expected revenue is equal in equilibrium, regardless of the type of auction, typically first-price and second-price auctions. Here, however, we hypothesize that when some auction environments vary with time, this revenue equivalence may not be maintained. In second-price auctions, the equilibrium strategy is robustly feasible. Conversely, in first-price auctions, the buyers must continue to adapt their strategies according to the environment of the auction. Surprisingly, we prove that revenue equivalence can be broken in both directions. First-price auctions bring larger or smaller revenue than second-price auctions, case by case, depending on how the value of an item varies. Our experiments also demonstrate revenue inequivalence in various scenarios, where the value varies periodically or randomly. This study uncovers a phenomenon, the breaking of revenue equivalence by the time-varyingness in auctions, that likely occurs in real-world auctions, revealing its underlying mechanism.

Mean Field Game (MFG) is a framework utilized to model and approximate the behavior of a large number of agents, and the computation of equilibria in MFG has been a subject of interest. Despite the proposal of methods to approximate the equilibria, algorithms where the sequence of updated policy converges to equilibrium, specifically those exhibiting last-iterate convergence, have been limited. We propose the use of a simple, proximal-point-type algorithm to compute equilibria for MFGs. Subsequently, we provide the first last-iterate convergence guarantee under the Lasry--Lions-type monotonicity condition. We further employ the Mirror Descent algorithm for the regularized MFG to efficiently approximate the update rules of the proximal point method for MFGs. We demonstrate that the algorithm can approximate with an accuracy of $\varepsilon$ after $\mathcal{O}({\log(1/\varepsilon)})$ iterations. This research offers a tractable approach for large-scale and large-population games.

Best-of-N (BoN) sampling with a reward model has been shown to be an effective strategy for aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) to human preferences at the time of decoding. BoN sampling is susceptible to a problem known as reward hacking. Because the reward model is an imperfect proxy for the true objective, over-optimizing its value can compromise its performance on the true objective. A common solution to prevent reward hacking in preference learning techniques is to optimize a reward using proximity regularization (e.g., KL regularization), which ensures that the language model remains close to the reference model. In this research, we propose Regularized Best-of-N (RBoN), a variant of BoN that aims to mitigate reward hacking by incorporating a proximity term in response selection, similar to preference learning techniques. We evaluate RBoN on the AlpacaFarm and Anthropic's hh-rlhf datasets and find that it outperforms BoN. As an application of RBoN, we use RBoN to generate a pairwise preference learning dataset. Experimental results show that a DPO model trained on a dataset generated with RBoN outperforms a DPO model generated with vanilla BoN. Our code is available at https://github.com/CyberAgentAILab/regularized-bon

We study the matroid semi-bandits problem, where at each round the learner plays a subset of $K$ arms from a feasible set, and the goal is to maximize the expected cumulative linear rewards. Existing algorithms have per-round time complexity at least $\Omega(K)$, which becomes expensive when $K$ is large. To address this computational issue, we propose FasterCUCB whose sampling rule takes time sublinear in $K$ for common classes of matroids: $O(D\text{ polylog}(K)\text{ polylog}(T))$ for uniform matroids, partition matroids, and graphical matroids, and $O(D\sqrt{K}\text{ polylog}(T))$ for transversal matroids. Here, $D$ is the maximum number of elements in any feasible subset of arms, and $T$ is the horizon. Our technique is based on dynamic maintenance of an approximate maximum-weight basis over inner-product weights. Although the introduction of an approximate maximum-weight basis presents a challenge in regret analysis, we can still guarantee an upper bound on regret as tight as CUCB in the sense that it matches the gap-dependent lower bound by Kveton et al. (2014a) asymptotically.

This study examines the global behavior of dynamics in learning in games between two players, X and Y. We consider the simplest situation for memory asymmetry between two players: X memorizes the other Y's previous action and uses reactive strategies, while Y has no memory. Although this memory complicates the learning dynamics, we discover two novel quantities that characterize the global behavior of such complex dynamics. One is an extended Kullback-Leibler divergence from the Nash equilibrium, a well-known conserved quantity from previous studies. The other is a family of Lyapunov functions of X's reactive strategy. These two quantities capture the global behavior in which X's strategy becomes more exploitative, and the exploited Y's strategy converges to the Nash equilibrium. Indeed, we theoretically prove that Y's strategy globally converges to the Nash equilibrium in the simplest game equipped with an equilibrium in the interior of strategy spaces. Furthermore, our experiments also suggest that this global convergence is universal for more advanced zero-sum games than the simplest game. This study provides a novel characterization of the global behavior of learning in games through a couple of indicators.

Learning in games discusses the processes where multiple players learn their optimal strategies through the repetition of game plays. The dynamics of learning between two players in zero-sum games, such as matching pennies, where their benefits are competitive, have already been well analyzed. However, it is still unexplored and challenging to analyze the dynamics of learning among three players. In this study, we formulate a minimalistic game where three players compete to match their actions with one another. Although interaction among three players diversifies and complicates the Nash equilibria, we fully analyze the equilibria. We also discuss the dynamics of learning based on some famous algorithms categorized into Follow the Regularized Leader. From both theoretical and experimental aspects, we characterize the dynamics by categorizing three-player interactions into three forces to synchronize their actions, switch their actions rotationally, and seek competition.

Traditional approaches in offline reinforcement learning aim to learn the optimal policy that maximizes the cumulative reward, also known as return. However, as applications broaden, it becomes increasingly crucial to train agents that not only maximize the returns, but align the actual return with a specified target return, giving control over the agent's performance. Decision Transformer (DT) optimizes a policy that generates actions conditioned on the target return through supervised learning and is equipped with a mechanism to control the agent using the target return. Despite being designed to align the actual return with the target return, we have empirically identified a discrepancy between the actual return and the target return in DT. In this paper, we propose Return-Aligned Decision Transformer (RADT), designed to effectively align the actual return with the target return. Our model decouples returns from the conventional input sequence, which typically consists of returns, states, and actions, to enhance the relationships between returns and states, as well as returns and actions. Extensive experiments show that RADT reduces the discrepancies between the actual return and the target return of DT-based methods.