Causality plays an important role in daily processes, human reasoning, and artificial intelligence. There has however not been much research on causality in multi-agent strategic settings. In this work, we introduce a systematic way to build a multi-agent system model, represented as a concurrent game structure, for a given structural causal model. In the obtained so-called causal concurrent game structure, transitions correspond to interventions on agent variables of the given causal model. The Halpern and Pearl framework of causality is used to determine the effects of a certain value for an agent variable on other variables. The causal concurrent game structure allows us to analyse and reason about causal effects of agents' strategic decisions. We formally investigate the relation between causal concurrent game structures and the original structural causal models.

Structural Equation Models (SEM) are the standard approach to representing causal dependencies between variables in causal models. In this paper we propose a new interpretation of SEMs when reasoning about Actual Causality, in which SEMs are viewed as mechanisms transforming the dynamics of exogenous variables into the dynamics of endogenous variables. This allows us to combine counterfactual causal reasoning with existing temporal logic formalisms, and to introduce a temporal logic, CPLTL, for causal reasoning about such structures. We show that the standard restriction to so-called \textit{recursive} models (with no cycles in the dependency graph) is not necessary in our approach, allowing us to reason about mutually dependent processes and feedback loops. Finally, we introduce new notions of model equivalence for temporal causal models, and show that CPLTL has an efficient model-checking procedure.

There has been considerable work on reasoning about the strategic ability of agents under imperfect information. However, existing logics such as Probabilistic Strategy Logic are unable to express properties relating to information transparency. Information transparency concerns the extent to which agents' actions and behaviours are observable by other agents. Reasoning about information transparency is useful in many domains including security, privacy, and decision-making. In this paper, we present a formal framework for reasoning about information transparency properties in stochastic multi-agent systems. We extend Probabilistic Strategy Logic with new observability operators that capture the degree of observability of temporal properties by agents. We show that the model checking problem for the resulting logic is decidable.

We propose a logic of east and west (LEW ) for points in 1D Euclidean space. It formalises primitive direction relations: east (E), west (W) and indeterminate east/west (Iew). It has a parameter τ ∈ N>1, which is referred to as the level of indeterminacy in directions. For every τ ∈ N>1, we provide a sound and complete axiomatisation of LEW , and prove that its satisfiability problem is NP-complete. In addition, we show that the finite axiomatisability of LEW depends on τ : if τ = 2 or τ = 3, then there exists a finite sound and complete axiomatisation; if τ > 3, then the logic is not finitely axiomatisable. LEW can be easily extended to higher-dimensional Euclidean spaces. Extending LEW to 2D Euclidean space makes it suitable for reasoning about not perfectly aligned representations of the same spatial objects in different datasets, for example, in crowd-sourced digital maps.

In multi-agent systems, norm enforcement is a mechanism for steering the behavior of individual agents in order to achieve desired system-level objectives. Due to the dynamics of multi-agent systems, however, it is hard to design norms that guarantee the achievement of the objectives in every operating context. Also, these objectives may change over time, thereby making previously defined norms ineffective. In this paper, we investigate the use of system execution data to automatically synthesise and revise conditional prohibitions with deadlines, a type of norms aimed at prohibiting agents from exhibiting certain patterns of behaviors. We propose DDNR (Data-Driven Norm Revision), a data-driven approach to norm revision that synthesises revised norms with respect to a data set of traces describing the behavior of the agents in the system. We evaluate DDNR using a state-of-the-art, off-the-shelf urban traffic simulator. The results show that DDNR synthesises revised norms that are significantly more accurate than the original norms in distinguishing adequate and inadequate behaviors for the achievement of the system-level objectives.

Norms have been widely proposed as a way of coordinating and controlling the activities of agents in a multi-agent system (MAS). A norm specifies the behaviour an agent should follow in order to achieve the objective of the MAS. However, designing norms to achieve a particular system objective can be difficult, particularly when there is no direct link between the language in which the system objective is stated and the language in which the norms can be expressed. In this paper, we consider the problem of synthesising a norm from traces of agent behaviour, where each trace is labelled with whether the behaviour satisfies the system objective. We show that the norm synthesis problem is NP-complete.

Many objectives can be achieved (or may be achieved more effectively) only by a group of agents executing a team plan. If a team plan fails, it is often of interest to determine what caused the failure, the degree of responsibility of each agent for the failure, and the degree of blame attached to each agent. We show how team plans can be represented in terms of structural equations, and then apply the definitions of causality introduced by Halpern [2015] and degree of responsibility and blame introduced by Chockler and Halpern [2004] to determine the agent(s) who caused the failure and what their degree of responsibility/blame is. We also prove new results on the complexity of computing causality and degree of responsibility and blame, showing that they can be determined in polynomial time for many team plans of interest.

We consider the problem of detecting norm violations in open multi-agent systems (MAS). We show how, using ideas from scrip systems, we can design mechanisms where the agents comprising the MAS are incentivised to monitor the actions of other agents for norm violations. The cost of providing the incentives is not borne by the MAS and does not come from fines charged for norm violations (fines may be impossible to levy in a system where agents are free to leave and rejoin again under a different identity). Instead, monitoring incentives come from (scrip) fees for accessing the services provided by the MAS. In some cases, perfect monitoring (and hence enforcement) can be achieved: no norms will be violated in equilibrium. In other cases, we show that, while it is impossible to achieve perfect enforcement, we can get arbitrarily close; we can make the probability of a norm violation in equilibrium arbitrarily small. We show using simulations that our theoretical results, which apply to systems with a large number of agents, hold for multi-agent systems with as few as 1000 agents--the system rapidly converges to the steady-state distribution of scrip tokens necessary to ensure monitoring and then remains close to the steady state.

In this paper, we model manufacturing processes and facilities as transducers (automata with output). The problem of whether a given manufacturing process can be realized by a given set of manufacturing resources can then be stated as an orchestration problem for transducers. We first consider the conceptually simpler case of uni-transducers (transducers with a single input and a single output port), and show that synthesizing orchestrations for uni-transducers is EXPTIME-complete. Surprisingly, the complexity remains the same for the more expressive multi-transducer case, where transducers have multiple input and output ports and the orchestration is in charge of dynamically connecting ports during execution.

We present an approach to incentivising monitoring for norm violations in open multi-agent systems such as Wikipedia. In such systems, there is no crisp definition of a norm violation; rather, it is a matter of judgement whether an agent's behaviour conforms to generally accepted standards of behaviour. Agents may legitimately disagree about borderline cases. Using ideas from scrip systems and peer prediction, we show how to design a mechanism that incentivises agents to monitor each other's behaviour for norm violations. The mechanism keeps the probability of undetected violations (submissions that the majority of the community would consider not conforming to standards) low, and is robust against collusion by the monitoring agents.