Within the classical Condorcet error model for collective binary decisions, we establish equivalence results between elections and markets, showing that the alternative that would be selected by weighed majority voting (under specific weighting schemes) corresponds to the alternative with highest price in the equilibrium of the market (under specific assumptions on the market type). This makes it possible to implement specific weighted majority elections, which are known to have superior truth-tracking performance, through information markets and, crucially, without needing to elicit voters' competences.

Different agents may have different points of view. Following a popular approach in the artificial intelligence literature, this can be modelled by means of different abstract argumentation frameworks, each consisting of a set of arguments the agent is contemplating and a binary attack-relation between them. A question arising in this context is whether the diversity of views observed in such a profile of argumentation frameworks is consistent with the assumption that every individual argumentation framework is induced by a combination of, first, some basic factual attack-relation between the arguments and, second, the personal preferences of the agent concerned regarding the moral or social values the arguments under scrutiny relate to. We treat this question of rationalisability of a profile as an algorithmic problem and identify tractable and intractable cases. In doing so, we distinguish different constraints on admissible rationalisations, e.g., concerning the types of preferences used or the number of distinct values involved. We also distinguish two different semantics for rationalisability, which differ in the assumptions made on how agents treat attacks between arguments they do not report. This research agenda, bringing together ideas from abstract argumentation and social choice, is useful for understanding what types of profiles can reasonably be expected to occur in a multiagent system.