Extracting relevant information from a stream of high-dimensional observations is a central challenge for deep reinforcement learning agents. Actor-critic algorithms add further complexity to this challenge, as it is often unclear whether the same information will be relevant to both the actor and the critic. To this end, we here explore the principles that underlie effective representations for the actor and for the critic in on-policy algorithms. We focus our study on understanding whether the actor and critic will benefit from separate, rather than shared, representations. Our primary finding is that when separated, the representations for the actor and critic systematically specialise in extracting different types of information from the environment -- the actor's representation tends to focus on action-relevant information, while the critic's representation specialises in encoding value and dynamics information. We conduct a rigourous empirical study to understand how different representation learning approaches affect the actor and critic's specialisations and their downstream performance, in terms of sample efficiency and generation capabilities. Finally, we discover that a separated critic plays an important role in exploration and data collection during training. Our code, trained models and data are accessible at https://github.com/francelico/deac-rep.

Agency is a system's capacity to steer outcomes toward a goal, and is a central topic of study across biology, philosophy, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. Determining if a system exhibits agency is a notoriously difficult question: Dennett (1989), for instance, highlights the puzzle of determining which principles can decide whether a rock, a thermostat, or a robot each possess agency. We here address this puzzle from the viewpoint of reinforcement learning by arguing that agency is fundamentally frame-dependent: Any measurement of a system's agency must be made relative to a reference frame. We support this claim by presenting a philosophical argument that each of the essential properties of agency proposed by Barandiaran et al. (2009) and Moreno (2018) are themselves frame-dependent. We conclude that any basic science of agency requires frame-dependence, and discuss the implications of this claim for reinforcement learning.

We introduce distributional dynamic programming (DP) methods for optimizing statistical functionals of the return distribution, with standard reinforcement learning as a special case. Previous distributional DP methods could optimize the same class of expected utilities as classic DP. To go beyond expected utilities, we combine distributional DP with stock augmentation, a technique previously introduced for classic DP in the context of risk-sensitive RL, where the MDP state is augmented with a statistic of the rewards obtained so far (since the first time step). We find that a number of recently studied problems can be formulated as stock-augmented return distribution optimization, and we show that we can use distributional DP to solve them. We analyze distributional value and policy iteration, with bounds and a study of what objectives these distributional DP methods can or cannot optimize. We describe a number of applications outlining how to use distributional DP to solve different stock-augmented return distribution optimization problems, for example maximizing conditional value-at-risk, and homeostatic regulation. To highlight the practical potential of stock-augmented return distribution optimization and distributional DP, we combine the core ideas of distributional value iteration with the deep RL agent DQN, and empirically evaluate it for solving instances of the applications discussed.

Modern reinforcement learning has been conditioned by at least three dogmas. The first is the environment spotlight, which refers to our tendency to focus on modeling environments rather than agents. The second is our treatment of learning as finding the solution to a task, rather than adaptation. The third is the reward hypothesis, which states that all goals and purposes can be well thought of as maximization of a reward signal. These three dogmas shape much of what we think of as the science of reinforcement learning. While each of the dogmas have played an important role in developing the field, it is time we bring them to the surface and reflect on whether they belong as basic ingredients of our scientific paradigm. In order to realize the potential of reinforcement learning as a canonical frame for researching intelligent agents, we suggest that it is time we shed dogmas one and two entirely, and embrace a nuanced approach to the third.

Humans use social context to specify preferences over behaviors, i.e. their reward functions. Yet, algorithms for inferring reward models from preference data do not take this social learning view into account. Inspired by pragmatic human communication, we study how to extract fine-grained data regarding why an example is preferred that is useful for learning more accurate reward models. We propose to enrich binary preference queries to ask both (1) which features of a given example are preferable in addition to (2) comparisons between examples themselves. We derive an approach for learning from these feature-level preferences, both for cases where users specify which features are reward-relevant, and when users do not. We evaluate our approach on linear bandit settings in both vision- and language-based domains. Results support the efficiency of our approach in quickly converging to accurate rewards with fewer comparisons vs. example-only labels. Finally, we validate the real-world applicability with a behavioral experiment on a mushroom foraging task. Our findings suggest that incorporating pragmatic feature preferences is a promising approach for more efficient user-aligned reward learning.

In a standard view of the reinforcement learning problem, an agent's goal is to efficiently identify a policy that maximizes long-term reward. However, this perspective is based on a restricted view of learning as finding a solution, rather than treating learning as endless adaptation. In contrast, continual reinforcement learning refers to the setting in which the best agents never stop learning. Despite the importance of continual reinforcement learning, the community lacks a simple definition of the problem that highlights its commitments and makes its primary concepts precise and clear. To this end, this paper is dedicated to carefully defining the continual reinforcement learning problem. We formalize the notion of agents that "never stop learning" through a new mathematical language for analyzing and cataloging agents. Using this new language, we define a continual learning agent as one that can be understood as carrying out an implicit search process indefinitely, and continual reinforcement learning as the setting in which the best agents are all continual learning agents. We provide two motivating examples, illustrating that traditional views of multi-task reinforcement learning and continual supervised learning are special cases of our definition.

The reward hypothesis posits that, "all of what we mean by goals and purposes can be well thought of as maximization of the expected value of the cumulative sum of a received scalar signal (reward)." We aim to fully settle this hypothesis. This will not conclude with a simple affirmation or refutation, but rather specify completely the implicit requirements on goals and purposes under which the hypothesis holds.

When has an agent converged? Standard models of the reinforcement learning problem give rise to a straightforward definition of convergence: An agent converges when its behavior or performance in each environment state stops changing. However, as we shift the focus of our learning problem from the environment's state to the agent's state, the concept of an agent's convergence becomes significantly less clear. In this paper, we propose two complementary accounts of agent convergence in a framing of the reinforcement learning problem that centers around bounded agents. The first view says that a bounded agent has converged when the minimal number of states needed to describe the agent's future behavior cannot decrease. The second view says that a bounded agent has converged just when the agent's performance only changes if the agent's internal state changes. We establish basic properties of these two definitions, show that they accommodate typical views of convergence in standard settings, and prove several facts about their nature and relationship. We take these perspectives, definitions, and analysis to bring clarity to a central idea of the field.

Reward is the driving force for reinforcement-learning agents. This paper is dedicated to understanding the expressivity of reward as a way to capture tasks that we would want an agent to perform. We frame this study around three new abstract notions of "task" that might be desirable: (1) a set of acceptable behaviors, (2) a partial ordering over behaviors, or (3) a partial ordering over trajectories. Our main results prove that while reward can express many of these tasks, there exist instances of each task type that no Markov reward function can capture. We then provide a set of polynomial-time algorithms that construct a Markov reward function that allows an agent to optimize tasks of each of these three types, and correctly determine when no such reward function exists. We conclude with an empirical study that corroborates and illustrates our theoretical findings.

Reinforcement learning is hard in general. Yet, in many specific environments, learning is easy. What makes learning easy in one environment, but difficult in another? We address this question by proposing a simple measure of reinforcement-learning hardness called the bad-policy density. This quantity measures the fraction of the deterministic stationary policy space that is below a desired threshold in value. We prove that this simple quantity has many properties one would expect of a measure of learning hardness. Further, we prove it is NP-hard to compute the measure in general, but there are paths to polynomial-time approximation. We conclude by summarizing potential directions and uses for this measure.