Algorithmic predictions are increasingly informing societal resource allocations by identifying individuals for targeting. Policymakers often build these systems with the assumption that by gathering more observations on individuals, they can improve predictive accuracy and, consequently, allocation efficiency. An overlooked yet consequential aspect of prediction-driven allocations is that of timing. The planner has to trade off relying on earlier and potentially noisier predictions to intervene before individuals experience undesirable outcomes, or they may wait to gather more observations to make more precise allocations. We examine this tension using a simple mathematical model, where the planner collects observations on individuals to improve predictions over time. We analyze both the ranking induced by these predictions and optimal resource allocation. We show that though individual prediction accuracy improves over time, counter-intuitively, the average ranking loss can worsen. As a result, the planner's ability to improve social welfare can decline. We identify inequality as a driving factor behind this phenomenon. Our findings provide a nuanced perspective and challenge the conventional wisdom that it is preferable to wait for more accurate predictions to ensure the most efficient allocations.

This tension in assumptions is readily apparent in standard human-AI alignment methods--such as reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) [6, 7, 8] and direct preference optimization (DPO) [9]--which assume a single reward function captures the interests of the entire population. We examine the limits of the preference homogeneity assumption when individuals belong to user types, each characterized by a specific reward function. Recent work has shown that in this setting, the homogeneity assumption can lead to unexpected behavior [10, 11, 12]. One challenge is that, under this assumption, learning from human preferences becomes unrealizable, as a single reward function cannot capture the complexity of population preferences with multiple reward functions [13, 14]. Both RLHF and DPO rely on maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to optimize the reward or policy. Unrealizability implies their likelihood functions cannot fully represent the underlying preference data distribution, resulting in a nontrivial optimal MLE solution. From another perspective, learning a universal reward or policy from a heterogeneous population inherently involves an aggregation of diverse interests, and this aggregation is nontrivial. In the quest for a single policy that accommodates a heterogeneous population with multiple user types, we show that the only universal reward yielding a well-defined alignment problem is an affine Equal contribution Work done while visiting Harvard Equal advising 1 arXiv:2502.16320v1

Algorithmic predictions are emerging as a promising solution concept for efficiently allocating societal resources. Fueling their use is an underlying assumption that such systems are necessary to identify individuals for interventions. We propose a principled framework for assessing this assumption: Using a simple mathematical model, we evaluate the efficacy of prediction-based allocations in settings where individuals belong to larger units such as hospitals, neighborhoods, or schools. We find that prediction-based allocations outperform baseline methods using aggregate unit-level statistics only when between-unit inequality is low and the intervention budget is high. Our results hold for a wide range of settings for the price of prediction, treatment effect heterogeneity, and unit-level statistics' learnability. Combined, we highlight the potential limits to improving the efficacy of interventions through prediction.

Though majority vote among annotators is typically used for ground truth labels in natural language processing, annotator disagreement in tasks such as hate speech detection may reflect differences in opinion across groups, not noise. Thus, a crucial problem in hate speech detection is determining whether a statement is offensive to the demographic group that it targets, when that group may constitute a small fraction of the annotator pool. We construct a model that predicts individual annotator ratings on potentially offensive text and combines this information with the predicted target group of the text to model the opinions of target group members. We show gains across a range of metrics, including raising performance over the baseline by 22% at predicting individual annotators' ratings and by 33% at predicting variance among annotators, which provides a metric for model uncertainty downstream. We find that annotator ratings can be predicted using their demographic information and opinions on online content, without the need to track identifying annotator IDs that link each annotator to their ratings. We also find that use of non-invasive survey questions on annotators' online experiences helps to maximize privacy and minimize unnecessary collection of demographic information when predicting annotators' opinions.

Early warning systems (EWS) are predictive tools at the center of recent efforts to improve graduation rates in public schools across the United States. These systems assist in targeting interventions to individual students by predicting which students are at risk of dropping out. Despite significant investments in their widespread adoption, there remain large gaps in our understanding of the efficacy of EWS, and the role of statistical risk scores in education. In this work, we draw on nearly a decade's worth of data from a system used throughout Wisconsin to provide the first large-scale evaluation of the long-term impact of EWS on graduation outcomes. We present empirical evidence that the prediction system accurately sorts students by their dropout risk. We also find that it may have caused a single-digit percentage increase in graduation rates, though our empirical analyses cannot reliably rule out that there has been no positive treatment effect. Going beyond a retrospective evaluation of DEWS, we draw attention to a central question at the heart of the use of EWS: Are individual risk scores necessary for effectively targeting interventions? We propose a simple mechanism that only uses information about students' environments -- such as their schools, and districts -- and argue that this mechanism can target interventions just as efficiently as the individual risk score-based mechanism. Our argument holds even if individual predictions are highly accurate and effective interventions exist. In addition to motivating this simple targeting mechanism, our work provides a novel empirical backbone for the robust qualitative understanding among education researchers that dropout is structurally determined. Combined, our insights call into question the marginal value of individual predictions in settings where outcomes are driven by high levels of inequality.

Dynamic benchmarks interweave model fitting and data collection in an attempt to mitigate the limitations of static benchmarks. In contrast to an extensive theoretical and empirical study of the static setting, the dynamic counterpart lags behind due to limited empirical studies and no apparent theoretical foundation to date. Responding to this deficit, we initiate a theoretical study of dynamic benchmarking. We examine two realizations, one capturing current practice and the other modeling more complex settings. In the first model, where data collection and model fitting alternate sequentially, we prove that model performance improves initially but can stall after only three rounds. Label noise arising from, for instance, annotator disagreement leads to even stronger negative results. Our second model generalizes the first to the case where data collection and model fitting have a hierarchical dependency structure. We show that this design guarantees strictly more progress than the first, albeit at a significant increase in complexity. We support our theoretical analysis by simulating dynamic benchmarks on two popular datasets. These results illuminate the benefits and practical limitations of dynamic benchmarking, providing both a theoretical foundation and a causal explanation for observed bottlenecks in empirical work. In response to concerns around the limitations of static datasets as benchmarks, researchers have proposed dynamic benchmarking--a setting where data collection and model building happen iteratively in tandem--as an alternative (Nie et al., 2020; Potts et al., 2021; Kiela et al., 2021; Ma et al., 2021; Gehrmann et al., 2021).

Across various domains--such as health, education, and housing--improving societal welfare involves allocating resources, setting policies, targeting interventions, and regulating activities. These solutions have an immense impact on the day-to-day lives of individuals, whether in the form of access to quality healthcare, labor market outcomes, or how votes are accounted for in a democratic society. Problems that can have an out-sized impact on individuals whose opportunities have historically been limited often pose conceptual and technical challenges, requiring insights from many disciplines. Conversely, the lack of interdisciplinary approach can leave these urgent needs unaddressed and can even exacerbate underlying socioeconomic inequalities. To realize the opportunities in these domains, we need to correctly set objectives and reason about human behavior and actions. Doing so requires a deep grounding in the field of interest and collaboration with domain experts who understand the societal implications and feasibility of proposed solutions. These insights can play an instrumental role in proposing algorithmically-informed policies. In this article, we describe the Mechanism Design for Social Good (MD4SG) research agenda, which involves using insights from algorithms, optimization, and mechanism design to improve access to opportunity. The MD4SG research community takes an interdisciplinary, multi-stakeholder approach to improve societal welfare. We discuss three exciting research avenues within MD4SG related to improving access to opportunity in the developing world, labor markets and discrimination, and housing. For each of these, we showcase ongoing work, underline new directions, and discuss potential for implementing existing work in practice.

The lack of comprehensive, high-quality health data in developing nations creates a roadblock for combating the impacts of disease. One key challenge is understanding the health information needs of people in these nations. Without understanding people's everyday needs, concerns, and misconceptions, health organizations and policymakers lack the ability to effectively target education and programming efforts. In this paper, we propose a bottom-up approach that uses search data from individuals to uncover and gain insight into health information needs in Africa. We analyze Bing searches related to HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis from all 54 African nations. For each disease, we automatically derive a set of common search themes or topics, revealing a wide-spread interest in various types of information, including disease symptoms, drugs, concerns about breastfeeding, as well as stigma, beliefs in natural cures, and other topics that may be hard to uncover through traditional surveys. We expose the different patterns that emerge in health information needs by demographic groups (age and sex) and country. We also uncover discrepancies in the quality of content returned by search engines to users by topic. Combined, our results suggest that search data can help illuminate health information needs in Africa and inform discussions on health policy and targeted education efforts both on- and offline.

In the classical cake cutting problem, a resource must be divided among agents with different utilities so that each agent believes they have received a fair share of the resource relative to the other agents. We introduce a variant of the problem in which we model an underlying social network on the agents with a graph, and agents only evaluate their shares relative to their neighbors' in the network. This formulation captures many situations in which it is unrealistic to assume a global view, and also exposes interesting phenomena in the original problem. Specifically, we say an allocation is locally envy-free if no agent envies a neighbor's allocation and locally proportional if each agent values her own allocation as much as the average value of her neighbor's allocations, with the former implying the latter. While global envy-freeness implies local envy-freeness, global proportionality does not imply local proportionality, or vice versa. A general result is that for any two distinct graphs on the same set of nodes and an allocation, there exists a set of valuation functions such that the allocation is locally proportional on one but not the other. We fully characterize the set of graphs for which an oblivious single-cutter protocol-- a protocol that uses a single agent to cut the cake into pieces --admits a bounded protocol with $O(n^2)$ query complexity for locally envy-free allocations in the Robertson-Webb model. We also consider the price of envy-freeness, which compares the total utility of an optimal allocation to the best utility of an allocation that is envy-free. We show that a lower bound of $\Omega(\sqrt{n})$ on the price of envy-freeness for global allocations in fact holds for local envy-freeness in any connected undirected graph. Thus, sparse graphs surprisingly do not provide more flexibility with respect to the quality of envy-free allocations.

In traditional models for word-of-mouth recommendations and viral marketing, the objective function has generally been based on reaching as many people as possible. However, a number of studies have shown that the indiscriminate spread of a product by word-of-mouth can result in overexposure, reaching people who evaluate it negatively. This can lead to an effect in which the over-promotion of a product can produce negative reputational effects, by reaching a part of the audience that is not receptive to it. How should one make use of social influence when there is a risk of overexposure? In this paper, we develop and analyze a theoretical model for this process; we show how it captures a number of the qualitative phenomena associated with overexposure, and for the main formulation of our model, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm to find the optimal marketing strategy. We also present simulations of the model on real network topologies, quantifying the extent to which our optimal strategies outperform natural baselines.