In defence of logic

Hayes, P. J.

Classics 

This view is nominalism, and leads to a quite different sort of semantic intuition, in which, for example, red denotes not a property of physical individuals, but the (rather disconnected) individual consisting of all pieces of red stuff in the world. Other similar confusions are also made. For example, logic is no worse (and no better) than Conceptual Dependency at representing warm, human facts about people hitting each other, (4) Logic doesn't give "the ultimate in decomposition of knowledge". Winograd, in his widely cited discussion [23] of the assertional/procedural controversy, draws a distinction between logic's atomistic view of knowledge, in which a representation is seen as a set of separate disconnected facts, and the proceduralist's holistic view in which interactions between procedures have prominence. But this is exactly the opposite of the truth.

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