A Model of Inexact Reasoning in Medicine Edward H. Shortliffe and Bruce G. Buchanan

Questioning of the expert gradually reveals, however, that despite the apparent similarity to a statement regarding a conditional probability, the number 0.7 differs significantly from a probability. The expert may well agree that P(hl]sl & s2 & s:0 0.7, but he becomes uneasy when he attempts to follow the logical conclusion that therefore P( hllS 1 & s 2 & s) 0.3. He claims that the three observations are evidence (to degree 0.7) in favor of the conclusion that the organism is a Streptococcus and should not be construed as evidence (to degree 0.3) against Streptococcus. We shall refer to this problem as Paradox 1 and return to it later in the exposition, after the interpretation of the 0.7 in the rule above has been introduced. It is tempting to conclude that the expert is irrational if he is unwilling to follow the implications of his probabilistic statements to their logical conclusions.