Chapman and Hall. See also: Influence diagrams for Bayesian decision analysis, European Journal of Operational Research, Volume 40, Issue 3, 15 June 1989, Pages 363–376 (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0377221789904293). Bayesian Decision Analysis: Principles and Practice, Cambridge University Press, 2010 (https://books.google.com/books/about/Bayesian_Decision_Analysis.html?id=O1lXnQAACAAJ).

IEEE Computer, pages 100-109, January

During the past two years, the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence has attracted considerable attention within the AI community as a promising method of dealing with uncertainty in expert systems. As presented in the literature, the theory is hard to master. In a simple approach that is outlined in this paper, the Dempster-Shafer theory is viewed in the context of relational databases as the application of familiar retrieval techniques to second-order relations in first normal form. The relational viewpoint clarifies some of the controversial issues in the Dempster-Shafer theory and facilities its use in AI-oriented applications.

During the past two years, the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence has attracted considerable attention within the AI community as a promising method of dealing with uncertainty in expert systems. As presented in the literature, the theory is hard to master. In a simple approach that is outlined in this paper, the Dempster-Shafer theory is viewed in the context of relational databases as the application of familiar retrieval techniques to second-order relations in first normal form. The relational viewpoint clarifies some of the controversial issues in the Dempster-Shafer theory and facilities its use in AI-oriented applications.

In fact, such a pattern can itself be considered a frame, where the position of each pixel is a slot, and the shade or A recent article by Ronald Brachman (Brachman, color at each pixel is then the attached value. It should 1985) points out some philosophical or semantic problems then be possible to represent this pattern as I have just in using the notion of a prototype, which is described by described it-z.e., by a frame representing the background, using default properties. The problem arises since default partially obscured or covered by a frame representing the properties can be overridden or cancelled in representing object of interest, partially obscured or covered by some particular instances, and therefore lack definitional power: other objects. The fact that some part of the object of interest is obscured does not mean that it is no longer there, nor As an example, Brachman presents an elephant joke: that it is not intrinsic to the object's definition. Q: What's big and gray, has a trunk, and lives in the trees?

Belief networks are directed acyclic graphs in which the nodes represent propositions (or variables), the arcs signify direct dependencies between the linked propositions, and the strengths of these dependencies are quantified by conditional probabilities. A network of this sort can be used to represent the generic knowledge of a domain expert, and it turns into a computational architecture if the links are used not merely for storing factual knowledge but also for directing and activating the data flow in the computations which manipulate this knowledge. The first part of the paper deals with the task of fusing and propagating the impacts of new information through the networks in such a way that, when equilibrium is reached, each proposition will be assigned a measure of belief consistent with the axioms of probability theory. It is shown that if the network is singly connected (e.g. The second part of the paper deals with the problem of finding a tree-structured representation for a collection of probabilistically coupled propositions using auxiliary (dummy) variables, colloquially called “hidden causes.”

In AAAI-86, Vol. 1, pp. 210–214.

See also: Evaluating influence diagrams with decision circuits. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI2007)Operations Research, 34, 871-882

The choice of implication as a representation for empirical associations and for deduction as a model of inference requires a mechanism extraneous to deduction to manage uncertainty associated with inference. Consequently, the interpretation of representations of uncertainty is unclear. Representativeness, or degree of fit, is proposed as an interpretation of degree of belief for classification tasks. The calculation of representativeness depends on the nature of the associations between evidence and conclusions. Patterns of associations are characterized as endorsements of conclusions. We discuss an expert system that uses endorsements to control the search for the most representative conclusion, given evidence.

Two topics are treated here. Second, we present an inference machine. This machine treats uncertain knowledge in the form of evidence for and against the accuracy of a proposition. The connection between these two topics is established by implementation of the user model on the inference machine.