Theory refinement is the task of updating a domain theory in the light of new cases, to be done automatically or with some expert assistance. The problem of theory refinement under uncertainty is reviewed here in the context of Bayesian statistics, a theory of belief revision. The problem is reduced to an incremental learning task as follows: the learning system is initially primed with a partial theory supplied by a domain expert, and thereafter maintains its own internal representation of alternative theories which is able to be interrogated by the domain expert and able to be incrementally refined from data. Algorithms for refinement of Bayesian networks are presented to illustrate what is meant by "partial theory", "alternative theory representation", etc. The algorithms are an incremental variant of batch learning algorithms from the literature so can work well in batch and incremental mode.

Research on Symbolic Probabilistic Inference (SPI) [2, 3] has provided an algorithm for resolving general queries in Bayesian networks. SPI applies the concept of dependency directed backward search to probabilistic inference, and is incremental with respect to both queries and observations. Unlike traditional Bayesian network inferencing algorithms, SPI algorithm is goal directed, performing only those calculations that are required to respond to queries. Research to date on SPI applies to Bayesian networks with discrete-valued variables and does not address variables with continuous values. In this papers, we extend the SPI algorithm to handle Bayesian networks made up of continuous variables where the relationships between the variables are restricted to be ?linear gaussian?. We call this variation of the SPI algorithm, SPI Continuous (SPIC). SPIC modifies the three basic SPI operations: multiplication, summation, and substitution. However, SPIC retains the framework of the SPI algorithm, namely building the search tree and recursive query mechanism and therefore retains the goal-directed and incrementality features of SPI.

This paper introduces conceptual relations that synthesize utilitarian and logical concepts, extending the logics of preference of Rescher. We define first, in the context of a possible worlds model, constraint-dependent measures that quantify the relative quality of alternative solutions of reasoning problems or the relative desirability of various policies in control, decision, and planning problems. We show that these measures may be interpreted as truth values in a multi valued logic and propose mechanisms for the representation of complex constraints as combinations of simpler restrictions. These extended logical operations permit also the combination and aggregation of goal-specific quality measures into global measures of utility. We identify also relations that represent differential preferences between alternative solutions and relate them to the previously defined desirability measures. Extending conventional modal logic formulations, we introduce structures for the representation of ignorance about the utility of alternative solutions. Finally, we examine relations between these concepts and similarity based semantic models of fuzzy logic.

The categorial approach to evidential reasoning can be seen as a combination of the probability kinematics approach of Richard Jeffrey (1965) and the maximum (cross-) entropy inference approach of E. T. Jaynes (1957). As a consequence of that viewpoint, it is well known that category theory provides natural definitions for logical connectives. In particular, disjunction and conjunction are modelled by general categorial constructions known as products and coproducts. In this paper, I focus mainly on Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions for which I introduce a category I call Dempster?s category. I prove the existence of and give explicit formulas for conjunction and disjunction in the subcategory of separable belief functions. In Dempster?s category, the new defined conjunction can be seen as the most cautious conjunction of beliefs, and thus no assumption about distinctness (of the sources) of beliefs is needed as opposed to Dempster?s rule of combination, which calls for distinctness (of the sources) of beliefs.

In this paper, we consider one aspect of the problem of applying decision theory to the design of agents that learn how to make decisions under uncertainty. This aspect concerns how an agent can estimate probabilities for the possible states of the world, given that it only makes limited observations before committing to a decision. We show that the naive application of statistical tools can be improved upon if the agent can determine which of his observations are truly relevant to the estimation problem at hand. We give a framework in which such determinations can be made, and define an estimation procedure to use them. Our framework also suggests several extensions, which show how additional knowledge can be used to improve tile estimation procedure still further.

During interactions with human consultants, people are used to providing partial and/or inaccurate information, and still be understood and assisted. We attempt to emulate this capability of human consultants; in computer consultation systems. In this paper, we present a mechanism for handling uncertainty in plan recognition during task-oriented consultations. The uncertainty arises while choosing an appropriate interpretation of a user?s statements among many possible interpretations. Our mechanism handles this uncertainty by using probability theory to assess the probabilities of the interpretations, and complements this assessment by taking into account the information content of the interpretations. The information content of an interpretation is a measure of how well defined an interpretation is in terms of the actions to be performed on the basis of the interpretation. This measure is used to guide the inference process towards interpretations with a higher information content. The information content for an interpretation depends on the specificity and the strength of the inferences in it, where the strength of an inference depends on the reliability of the information on which the inference is based. Our mechanism has been developed for use in task-oriented consultation systems. The domain that we have chosen for exploration is that of a travel agency.

In probabilistic logic entailments, even moderate size problems can yield linear constraint systems with so many variables that exact methods are impractical. This difficulty can be remedied in many cases of interest by introducing a three valued logic (true, false, and "don't care"). The three-valued approach allows the construction of "compressed" constraint systems which have the same solution sets as their two-valued counterparts, but which may involve dramatically fewer variables. Techniques to calculate point estimates for the posterior probabilities of entailed sentences are discussed.

This paper presents a plausible reasoning system to illustrate some broad issues in knowledge representation: dualities between different reasoning forms, the difficulty of unifying complementary reasoning styles, and the approximate nature of plausible reasoning. These issues have a common underlying theme: there should be an underlying belief calculus of which the many different reasoning forms are special cases, sometimes approximate. The system presented allows reasoning about defaults, likelihood, necessity and possibility in a manner similar to the earlier work of Adams. The system is based on the belief calculus of subjective Bayesian probability which itself is based on a few simple assumptions about how belief should be manipulated. Approximations, semantics, consistency and consequence results are presented for the system. While this puts these often discussed plausible reasoning forms on a probabilistic footing, useful application to practical problems remains an issue.

We discuss representing and reasoning with knowledge about the time-dependent utility of an agent's actions. Time-dependent utility plays a crucial role in the interaction between computation and action under bounded resources. We present a semantics for time-dependent utility and describe the use of time-dependent information in decision contexts. We illustrate our discussion with examples of time-pressured reasoning in Protos, a system constructed to explore the ideal control of inference by reasoners with limit abilities.

The concept of movable evidence masses that flow from supersets to subsets as specified by experts represents a suitable framework for reasoning under uncertainty. The mass flow is controlled by specialization matrices. New evidence is integrated into the frame of discernment by conditioning or revision (Dempster's rule of conditioning), for which special specialization matrices exist. Even some aspects of non-monotonic reasoning can be represented by certain specialization matrices.