We describe a viewpoint on the Dempster/Shafer 'Theory of Evidence', and provide an interpretation which regards the combination formulas as statistics of the opinions of "experts". This is done by introducing spaces with binary operations that are simpler to interpret or simpler to implement than the standard combination formula, and showing that these spaces can be mapped homomorphically onto the Dempster/Shafer theory of evidence space. The experts in the space of "opinions of experts" combine information in a Bayesian fashion. We present alternative spaces for the combination of evidence suggested by this viewpoint.

Although many investigators affirm a desire to build reasoning systems that behave consistently with the axiomatic basis defined by probability theory and utility theory, limited resources for engineering and computation can make a complete normative analysis impossible. We attempt to move discussion beyond the debate over the scope of problems that can be handled effectively to cases where it is clear that there are insufficient computational resources to perform an analysis deemed as complete. Under these conditions, we stress the importance of considering the expected costs and benefits of applying alternative approximation procedures and heuristics for computation and knowledge acquisition. We discuss how knowledge about the structure of user utility can be used to control value tradeoffs for tailoring inference to alternative contexts. We address the notion of real-time rationality, focusing on the application of knowledge about the expected timewise-refinement abilities of reasoning strategies to balance the benefits of additional computation with the costs of acting with a partial result. We discuss the benefits of applying decision theory to control the solution of difficult problems given limitations and uncertainty in reasoning resources.

A primary motivation for reasoning under uncertainty is to derive decisions in the face of inconclusive evidence. However, Shafer's theory of belief functions, which explicitly represents the underconstrained nature of many reasoning problems, lacks a formal procedure for making decisions. Clearly, when sufficient information is not available, no theory can prescribe actions without making additional assumptions. Faced with this situation, some assumption must be made if a clearly superior choice is to emerge. In this paper we offer a probabilistic interpretation of a simple assumption that disambiguates decision problems represented with belief functions. We prove that it yields expected values identical to those obtained by a probabilistic analysis that makes the same assumption. In addition, we show how the decision analysis methodology frequently employed in probabilistic reasoning can be extended for use with belief functions.

The purpose of this paper is to report on the most recent developments in our ongoing investigation of the representation and manipulation of uncertainty in automated reasoning systems. In our earlier studies (Tong and Shapiro, 1985) we described a series of experiments with RUBRIC (Tong et al., 1985), a system for full-text document retrieval, that generated some interesting insights into the effects of choosing among a class of scalar valued uncertainty calculi. [n order to extend these results we have begun a new series of experiments with a larger class of representations and calculi, and to help perform these experiments we have developed a general purpose inference engine.

We introduce a graceful approach to probabilistic inference called bounded conditioning. Bounded conditioning monotonically refines the bounds on posterior probabilities in a belief network with computation, and converges on final probabilities of interest with the allocation of a complete resource fraction. The approach allows a reasoner to exchange arbitrary quantities of computational resource for incremental gains in inference quality. As such, bounded conditioning holds promise as a useful inference technique for reasoning under the general conditions of uncertain and varying reasoning resources. The algorithm solves a probabilistic bounding problem in complex belief networks by breaking the problem into a set of mutually exclusive, tractable subproblems and ordering their solution by the expected effect that each subproblem will have on the final answer. We introduce the algorithm, discuss its characterization, and present its performance on several belief networks, including a complex model for reasoning about problems in intensive-care medicine.

The paper demonstrates that strict adherence to probability theory does not preclude the use of concurrent, self-activated constraint-propagation mechanisms for managing uncertainty. Maintaining local records of sources-of-belief allows both predictive and diagnostic inferences to be activated simultaneously and propagate harmoniously towards a stable equilibrium.

Plan recognition does not work the same way in stories and in "real life" (people tend to jump to conclusions more in stories). We present a theory of this, for the particular case of how objects in stories (or in life) influence plan recognition decisions. We provide a Bayesian network formalization of a simple first-order theory of plans, and show how a particular network parameter seems to govern the difference between "life-like" and "story-like" response. We then show why this parameter would be influenced (in the desired way) by a model of speaker (or author) topic selection which assumes that facts in stories are typically "relevant".

In an earlier paper, a new theory of measurefree "conditional" objects was presented. In this paper, emphasis is placed upon the motivation of the theory. The central part of this motivation is established through an example involving a knowledge-based system. In order to evaluate combination of evidence for this system, using observed data, auxiliary at tribute and diagnosis variables, and inference rules connecting them, one must first choose an appropriate algebraic logic description pair (ALDP): a formal language or syntax followed by a compatible logic or semantic evaluation (or model). Three common choices- for this highly non-unique choice - are briefly discussed, the logics being Classical Logic, Fuzzy Logic, and Probability Logic. In all three,the key operator representing implication for the inference rules is interpreted as the often-used disjunction of a negation (b => a) = (b'v a), for any events a,b. However, another reasonable interpretation of the implication operator is through the familiar form of probabilistic conditioning. But, it can be shown - quite surprisingly - that the ALDP corresponding to Probability Logic cannot be used as a rigorous basis for this interpretation! To fill this gap, a new ALDP is constructed consisting of "conditional objects", extending ordinary Probability Logic, and compatible with the desired conditional probability interpretation of inference rules. It is shown also that this choice of ALDP leads to feasible computations for the combination of evidence evaluation in the example. In addition, a number of basic properties of conditional objects and the resulting Conditional Probability Logic are given, including a characterization property and a developed calculus of relations.

Much artificial intelligence research focuses on the problem of deducing the validity of unobservable propositions or hypotheses from observable evidence.! Many of the knowledge representation techniques designed for this problem encode the relationship between evidence and hypothesis in a directed manner. Moreover, the direction in which evidence is stored is typically from evidence to hypothesis.

This paper discusses the semantics and proof theory of Nilsson's probabilistic logic, outlining both the benefits of its well-defined model theory and the drawbacks of its proof theory. Within Nilsson's semantic framework, we derive a set of inference rules which are provably sound. The resulting proof system, in contrast to Nilsson's approach, has the important feature of convergence - that is, the inference process proceeds by computing increasingly narrow probability intervals which converge from above and below on the smallest entailed probability interval. Thus the procedure can be stopped at any time to yield partial information concerning the smallest entailed interval.