The generalized fault diagram, a data structure for failure analysis based on the influence diagram, is defined. Unlike the fault tree, this structure allows for dependence among the basic events and replicated logical elements. A heuristic procedure is developed for efficient processing of these structures.

This paper examines the relationship between Shafer's belief functions and convex sets of probability distributions. Kyburg's (1986) result showed that belief function models form a subset of the class of closed convex probability distributions. This paper emphasizes the importance of Kyburg's result by looking at simple examples involving Bernoulli trials. Furthermore, it is shown that many convex sets of probability distributions generate the same belief function in the sense that they support the same lower and upper values. This has implications for a decision theoretic extension. Dempster's rule of combination is also compared with Bayes' rule of conditioning.

In this paper we associate with every (directed) graph G a transformation called the Mobius transformation of the graph G. The Mobius transformation of the graph (O) is of major significance for Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. However, because it is computationally very heavy, the Mobius transformation together with Dempster's rule of combination is a major obstacle to the use of Dempster-Shafer theory for handling uncertainty in expert systems. The major contribution of this paper is the discovery of the 'fast Mobius transformations' of (O). These 'fast Mobius transformations' are the fastest algorithms for computing the Mobius transformation of (O). As an easy but useful application, we provide, via the commonality function, an algorithm for computing Dempster's rule of combination which is much faster than the usual one.

This paper presents an approach for developing the explanation capabilities of rule-based expert systems managing imprecise and uncertain knowledge. The treatment of uncertainty takes place in the framework of possibility theory where the available information concerning the value of a logical or numerical variable is represented by a possibility distribution which restricts its more or less possible values. We first discuss different kinds of queries asking for explanations before focusing on the two following types : i) how, a particular possibility distribution is obtained (emphasizing the main reasons only) ; ii) why in a computed possibility distribution, a particular value has received a possibility degree which is so high, so low or so contrary to the expectation. The approach is based on the exploitation of equations in max-min algebra. This formalism includes the limit case of certain and precise information.

This paper describes a heuristic Bayesian method for computing probability distributions from experimental data, based upon the multivariate normal form of the influence diagram. An example illustrates its use in medical technology assessment. This approach facilitates the integration of results from different studies, and permits a medical expert to make proper assessments without considerable statistical training.

The fundamental elements of evidential reasoning problems are described, followed by a discussion of the structure of various types of problems. Bayesian inference networks and state space formalism are used as the tool for problem representation. A human-oriented decision making cycle for solving evidential reasoning problems is described and illustrated for a military situation assessment problem. The implementation of this cycle may serve as the basis for an expert system shell for evidential reasoning; i.e. a situation assessment processor.

The use of maximum entropy inference in reasoning with uncertain information is commonly justified by an information-theoretic argument. This paper discusses a possible objection to this information-theoretic justification and shows how it can be met. I then compare maximum entropy inference with certain other currently popular methods for uncertain reasoning. In making such a comparison, one must distinguish between static and dynamic theories of degrees of belief: a static theory concerns the consistency conditions for degrees of belief at a given time; whereas a dynamic theory concerns how one's degrees of belief should change in the light of new information. It is argued that maximum entropy is a dynamic theory and that a complete theory of uncertain reasoning can be gotten by combining maximum entropy inference with probability theory, which is a static theory. This total theory, I argue, is much better grounded than are other theories of uncertain reasoning.

Inappropriate use of Dempster's rule of combination has led some authors to reject the Dempster-Shafer model, arguing that it leads to supposedly unacceptable conclusions when defaults are involved. A most classic example is about the penguin Tweety. This paper will successively present: the origin of the miss-management of the Tweety example; two types of default; the correct solution for both types based on the transferable belief model (our interpretation of the Dempster-Shafer model (Shafer 1976, Smets 1988)); Except when explicitly stated, all belief functions used in this paper are simple support functions, i.e. belief functions for which only one proposition (the focus) of the frame of discernment receives a positive basic belief mass with the remaining mass being given to the tautology. Each belief function will be described by its focus and the weight of the focus (e.g. m(A)=.9). Computation of the basic belief masses are always performed by vacuously extending each belief function to the product space built from all variables involved, combining them on that space by Dempster's rule of combination, and projecting the result to the space corresponding to each individual variable.

For any system with limited statistical knowledge, the combination of evidence and the interpretation of sampling information require the determination of the right reference class (or of an adequate one). The present note (1) discusses the use of reference classes in evidential reasoning, and (2) discusses implementations of Kyburg's rules for reference classes. This paper contributes the first frank discussion of how much of Kyburg's system is needed to be powerful, how much can be computed effectively, and how much is philosophical fat.

In this paper, we will review the process of evidence accumulation in the PSEIKI system for expectation-driven interpretation of images of 3-D scenes. Expectations are presented to PSEIKI as a geometrical hierarchy of abstractions. PSEIKI's job is then to construct abstraction hierarchies in the perceived image taking cues from the abstraction hierarchies in the expectations. The Dempster-Shafer formalism is used for associating belief values with the different possible labels for the constructed abstractions in the perceived image. This system has been used successfully for autonomous navigation of a mobile robot in indoor environments.