In this paper, we suggest marrying Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory with Knowledge Representation (KR). Born out of this marriage is the definition of "Dempster-Shafer Belief Bases", abstract data types representing uncertain knowledge that use DS theory for representing strength of belief about our knowledge, and the linguistic structures of an arbitrary KR system for representing the knowledge itself. A formal result guarantees that both the properties of the given KR system and of DS theory are preserved. The general model is exemplified by defining DS Belief Bases where First Order Logic and (an extension of) KRYPTON are used as KR systems. The implementation problem is also touched upon.

In this paper we associate with every (directed) graph G a transformation called the Mobius transformation of the graph G. The Mobius transformation of the graph (O) is of major significance for Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. However, because it is computationally very heavy, the Mobius transformation together with Dempster's rule of combination is a major obstacle to the use of Dempster-Shafer theory for handling uncertainty in expert systems. The major contribution of this paper is the discovery of the 'fast Mobius transformations' of (O). These 'fast Mobius transformations' are the fastest algorithms for computing the Mobius transformation of (O). As an easy but useful application, we provide, via the commonality function, an algorithm for computing Dempster's rule of combination which is much faster than the usual one.

Dempster-Shafer's model aims at quantifying degrees of belief But there are so many interpretations of Dempster-Shafer's theory in the literature that it seems useful to present the various contenders in order to clarify their respective positions. We shall successively consider the classical probability model, the upper and lower probabilities model, Dempster's model, the transferable belief model, the evidentiary value model, the provability or necessity model. None of these models has received the qualification of Dempster-Shafer. In fact the transferable belief model is our interpretation not of Dempster's work but of Shafer's work as presented in his book (Shafer 1976, Smets 1988). It is a ?purified' form of Dempster-Shafer's model in which any connection with probability concept has been deleted. Any model for belief has at least two components: one static that describes our state of belief, the other dynamic that explains how to update our belief given new pieces of information. We insist on the fact that both components must be considered in order to study these models. Too many authors restrict themselves to the static component and conclude that Dempster-Shafer theory is the same as some other theory. But once the dynamic component is considered, these conclusions break down. Any comparison based only on the static component is too restricted. The dynamic component must also be considered as the originality of the models based on belief functions lies in its dynamic component.

We define a new notion of conditional belief, which plays the same role for Dempster-Shafer belief functions as conditional probability does for probability functions. Our definition is different from the standard definition given by Dempster, and avoids many of the well-known problems of that definition. Just as the conditional probability Pr (lB) is a probability function which is the result of conditioning on B being true, so too our conditional belief function Bel (lB) is a belief function which is the result of conditioning on B being true. We define the conditional belief as the lower envelope (that is, the inf) of a family of conditional probability functions, and provide a closed form expression for it. An alternate way of understanding our definition of conditional belief is provided by considering ideas from an earlier paper [Fagin and Halpern, 1989], where we connect belief functions with inner measures. In particular, we show here how to extend the definition of conditional probability to non measurable sets, in order to get notions of inner and outer conditional probabilities, which can be viewed as best approximations to the true conditional probability, given our lack of information. Our definition of conditional belief turns out to be an exact analogue of our definition of inner conditional probability.

This paper discusses how a measure of uncertainty representing a state of knowledge can be updated when a new information, which may be pervaded with uncertainty, becomes available. This problem is considered in various framework, namely: Shafer's evidence theory, Zadeh's possibility theory, Spohn's theory of epistemic states. In the two first cases, analogues of Jeffrey's rule of conditioning are introduced and discussed. The relations between Spohn's model and possibility theory are emphasized and Spohn's updating rule is contrasted with the Jeffrey-like rule of conditioning in possibility theory. Recent results by Shenoy on the combination of ordinal conditional functions are reinterpreted in the language of possibility theory. It is shown that Shenoy's combination rule has a well-known possibilistic counterpart.

We are concerned with the problem of introducing credibility type information into reasoning systems. The concept of credibility allows us to discount information provided by agents. An important characteristic of this kind of procedure is that a complete lack of credibility rather than resulting in the negation of the information provided results in the nullification of the information provided. We suggest a representational scheme for credibility qualification in the theory of approximate reasoning. We discuss the concept of relative credibility. By this idea we mean to indicate situations in which the credibility of a piece of evidence is determined by its compatibility with higher priority evidence. This situation leads to structures very much in the spirit of nonmonotonic reasoning.

This paper addresses fundamental issues on the nature of the concepts and structures of fuzzy logic, focusing, in particular, on the conceptual and functional differences that exist between probabilistic and possibilistic approaches. A semantic model provides the basic framework to define possibilistic structures and concepts by means of a function that quantifies proximity, closeness, or resemblance between pairs of possible worlds. The resulting model is a natural extension, based on multiple conceivability relations, of the modal logic concepts of necessity and possibility. By contrast, chance-oriented probabilistic concepts and structures rely on measures of set extension that quantify the proportion of possible worlds where a proposition is true. Resemblance between possible worlds is quantified by a generalized similarity relation: a function that assigns a number between O and 1 to every pair of possible worlds. Using this similarity relation, which is a form of numerical complement of a classic metric or distance, it is possible to define and interpret the major constructs and methods of fuzzy logic: conditional and unconditioned possibility and necessity distributions and the generalized modus ponens of Zadeh.

Cutset conditioning and clique-tree propagation are two popular methods for performing exact probabilistic inference in Bayesian belief networks. Cutset conditioning is based on decomposition of a subset of network nodes, whereas clique-tree propagation depends on aggregation of nodes. We describe a means to combine cutset conditioning and clique- tree propagation in an approach called aggregation after decomposition (AD). We discuss the application of the AD method in the Pathfinder system, a medical expert system that offers assistance with diagnosis in hematopathology.

We introduce a new heuristic algorithm for the problem of finding minimum size loop cutsets in multiply connected belief networks. We compare this algorithm to that proposed in [Suemmondt and Cooper, 1988]. We provide lower bounds on the performance of these algorithms with respect to one another and with respect to optimal. We demonstrate that no heuristic algorithm for this problem cam be guaranteed to produce loop cutsets within a constant difference from optimal. We discuss experimental results based on randomly generated networks, and discuss future work and open questions.

This paper analyzes the circumstances under which Bayesian networks can be pruned in order to reduce computational complexity without altering the computation for variables of interest. Given a problem instance which consists of a query and evidence for a set of nodes in the network, it is possible to delete portions of the network which do not participate in the computation for the query. Savings in computational complexity can be large when the original network is not singly connected. Results analogous to those described in this paper have been derived before [Geiger, Verma, and Pearl 89, Shachter 88] but the implications for reducing complexity of the computations in Bayesian networks have not been stated explicitly. We show how a preprocessing step can be used to prune a Bayesian network prior to using standard algorithms to solve a given problem instance. We also show how our results can be used in a parallel distributed implementation in order to achieve greater savings. We define a computationally equivalent subgraph of a Bayesian network. The algorithm developed in [Geiger, Verma, and Pearl 89] is modified to construct the subgraphs described in this paper with O(e) complexity, where e is the number of edges in the Bayesian network. Finally, we define a minimal computationally equivalent subgraph and prove that the subgraphs described are minimal.