When releasing outputs from confidential data, agencies need to balance the analytical usefulness of the released data with the obligation to protect data subjects'

This work explores the challenging problem of molecule design by framing it as a conditional generative modeling task, where target biological properties or desired chemical constraints serve as conditioning variables.

Causal models are crucial for understanding complex systems and identifying causal relationships among variables. Even though causal models are extremely popular, conditional probability calculation of formulas involving interventions pose significant challenges. In case of Causal Bayesian Networks (CBNs), Pearl assumes autonomy of mechanisms that determine interventions to calculate a range of probabilities. We show that by making simple yet often realistic independence assumptions, it is possible to uniquely estimate the probability of an interventional formula (including the well-studied notions of probability of sufficiency and necessity). We discuss when these assumptions are appropriate. Importantly, in many cases of interest, when the assumptions are appropriate, these probability estimates can be evaluated using observational data, which carries immense significance in scenarios where conducting experiments is impractical or unfeasible.

However, acquiring accurately annotated datasets is typically costly and time-consuming, often requiring a pool of annotators with adequate domain expertise to manually label the data. Crowdsourcing has emerged as an efficient and cost-effective solution for annotating large datasets.

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice .

However, training EBMs on data in discrete or mixed state spaces poses significant challenges due to the lack of robust and fast sampling methods. In this work, we propose to train discrete EBMs with Energy Discrepancy, a loss function which only requires the evaluation of the energy function at data points and their perturbed counterparts, thus eliminating the need for Markov chain Monte Carlo.

We provide theoretical guarantees for CBPR's rapid convergence to the optimal policy once human partners alter their policies.