Also see book version (1980), IJCAI-77. Also Rep. No. TR-347, AI Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Reprinted in Readings in Uncertain Reasoning, G. Shafer and J. Pearl, eds., pp. 259-273, San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Inc., 1990.See also: Stanford Center for Biomedical Informatics Research (BMIR).… quantifying confirmation and then manipulating the numbers as though they were probabilities quickly leads to apparent inconsistencies or paradoxes. Carl Hempel presented an early analysis of confirmation (Hempel, 1965), pointing out as we have that C[h,e] is a very different concept from P(hle ). His famous Paradox of the Ravens was presented early in his discussion of the logic of confirmation. Let hl be the statement that "all ravens are black" and h2 the statement that "all nonblack things are nonravens." Clearly hi is logically equivalent to h,2. If one were to draw an analogy with conditional probability, it might at first seem valid, therefore, to assert that C[hl,e] = C[h2,e] for all e. However, it appears counterintuitive to state that the observation of a green vase supports hi, even though the observation does seem to support h,2. C[h,e] is therefore different from P(hle) for it seems somehow wrong that an observation of a vase could logically support an assertion about ravens. Another characteristic of a quantitative approach to confirmation that distinguishes the concept from probability was well-recognized by Carnap (1950) and discussed by Barker (1957) and Harrd (1970). They note it is counterintuitive to suggest that the confirmation of the negation of a hypothesis is equal to one minus the confirmation of the hypothesis, i.e., C[h,e] is not 1 - C[-qh,e]. The streptococcal decision rule asserted that a gram-positive coccus growing in chains is a Streptococcus with a measure of support specified as 7 out of 10. This translates to C[h,e]=0.7 where h is "the organism is a Streptococcus" and e is the information that "the organism is a gram-positive coccus growing in chains." As discussed above, an expert does not necessarily believe that C[mh,e] = 0.3. The evidence is said to be supportive of the contention that the organism is a Streptococcus and can therefore hardly also support the contention that the organism is not a Streptococcus. Ch.13 of Mycin Book; revised from Math. Biosci. 23:351-379

"A computer program has been written which can formulate hypotheses from a given set of scientific data. The data consist of the mass spectrum and the empirical formula of an organic chemical compound. The hypotheses which are produced describe molecular structures which are plausible explanations of the data. The hypotheses are generated systematically within the program's theory of chemical stability and within limiting constraints which are inferred from the data by heuristic rules. The program excludes hypotheses inconsistent with the data and lists its candidate explanatory hypotheses in order of decreasing plausibility. The computer program is heuristic in that it searches for plausible hypotheses in a small subset of the total hypothesis space according to heuristic rules learned from chemists."In Meltzer, B., Michie, D., and Swann, M. (Eds.), Machine Intelligence 4, pp. 209-254. Edinburgh University Press

Note: PDF of full volume downloadable by clicking on title above (32.8 MB). Selected individual chapters available from the links below.CONTENTSINTRODUCTORY MATERIALMATHEMATICAL FOUNDATIONS1 Program scheme equivalences and second-order logic. D. C. COOPER 32 Programs and their proofs: an algebraic approach.R. M. BURSTALL and P. J. LANDIN 173 Towards the unique decomposition of graphs. C. R. SNOW andH. I. SCOINS 45THEOREM PROVING4 Advances and problems in mechanical proof procedures. D. PRAWITZ 595 Theorem-provers combining model elimination and Tesolution.D. W. LOVELAND 736 Semantic trees in automatic theorem-proving. R. KOWALSKI andP. J. HAYES 877 A machine-oriented logic incorporating the equality relation.E. E. SIBERT 1038 Paramodulation and theorem-proving in first-order theories withequality. G. ROBINSON and L. Wos 1359 Mechanizing higher-order logic. J. A. ROBINSON 151DEDUCTIVE INFORMATION RETRIEVAL10 Theorem proving and information retrieval. J. L. DARLINGTON 17311 Theorem-proving by resolution as a basis for question-answeringsystems. C. CORDELL GREEN 183MACHINE LEARNING AND HEURISTIC PROGRAMMING12 Heuristic dendral: a program for generating explanatory hypothesesin organic chemistry. B. BUCHANAN, G. SUTHERLAND andE. A. FEIGENBAUM 20913 A chess-playing program. J. J. SCOTT 25514 Analysis of the machine chess game. I. J. GOOD 26715 PROSE—Parsing Recogniser Outputting Sentences in English.D. B. VIGOR, D. URQUHART and A. WILKINSON 27116 The organization of interaction in collectives of automata. 285V. I. VARSHAVSKY COGNITIVE PROCESSES: METHODS AND MODELS17 Steps towards a model of word selection. G. R. Kiss 31518 The game of hare and hounds and the statistical study of literaryvocabulary. S. H. STOREY and M. A. MAYBREY 33719 The holophone —recent developments. D. J. WILLSHAW andH. C. LONGUET-HIGGINS 349PATTERN RECOGNITION20 Pictorial relationships — a syntactic approach. M. B. CLOWES 36121 On the construction of an efficient feature space for optical characterrecognition. A. W. M. COOMBS 38522 Linear skeletons from square cupboards. C. J. HILDITCH 403PROBLEM-ORIENTED LANGUAGES23 Absys 1: an incremental compiler for assertions; an introduction.J. M. FOSTER and E. W. ELCOCK 423PRINCIPLES FOR DESIGNING INTELLIGENT ROBOTS24 Planning and generalisation in an automaton/environment system.J. E. DORAN 43325 Freddy in toyland. R. J. POPPLESTONE 45526 Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificialintelligence. J. MCCARTHY and P. J. HAYES 463INDEX 505 Machine Intelligence Workshop

E.A. Feigenbaum and J. Feldman (Eds.). Computers and Thought. McGraw-Hill, 1963. This collection includes twenty classic papers by such pioneers as A. M. Turing and Marvin Minsky who were behind the pivotal advances in artificially simulating human thought processes with computers. All Parts are available as downloadable pdf files; most individual chapters are also available separately. COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE. A. M. Turing. CHESS-PLAYING PROGRAMS AND THE PROBLEM OF COMPLEXITY. Allen Newell, J.C. Shaw and H.A. Simon. SOME STUDIES IN MACHINE LEARNING USING THE GAME OF CHECKERS. A. L. Samuel. EMPIRICAL EXPLORATIONS WITH THE LOGIC THEORY MACHINE: A CASE STUDY IN HEURISTICS. Allen Newell J.C. Shaw and H.A. Simon. REALIZATION OF A GEOMETRY-THEOREM PROVING MACHINE. H. Gelernter. EMPIRICAL EXPLORATIONS OF THE GEOMETRY-THEOREM PROVING MACHINE. H. Gelernter, J.R. Hansen, and D. W. Loveland. SUMMARY OF A HEURISTIC LINE BALANCING PROCEDURE. Fred M. Tonge. A HEURISTIC PROGRAM THAT SOLVES SYMBOLIC INTEGRATION PROBLEMS IN FRESHMAN CALCULUS. James R. Slagle. BASEBALL: AN AUTOMATIC QUESTION ANSWERER. Green, Bert F. Jr., Alice K. Wolf, Carol Chomsky, and Kenneth Laughery. INFERENTIAL MEMORY AS THE BASIS OF MACHINES WHICH UNDERSTAND NATURAL LANGUAGE. Robert K. Lindsay. PATTERN RECOGNITION BY MACHINE. Oliver G. Selfridge and Ulric Neisser. A PATTERN-RECOGNITION PROGRAM THAT GENERATES, EVALUATES, AND ADJUSTS ITS OWN OPERATORS. Leonard Uhr and Charles Vossler. GPS, A PROGRAM THAT SIMULATES HUMAN THOUGHT. Allen Newell and H.A. Simon. THE SIMULATION OF VERBAL LEARNING BEHAVIOR. Edward A. Feigenbaum. PROGRAMMING A MODEL OF HUMAN CONCEPT FORMULATION. Earl B. Hunt and Carl I. Hovland. SIMULATION OF BEHAVIOR IN THE BINARY CHOICE EXPERIMENT Julian Feldman. A MODEL OF THE TRUST INVESTMENT PROCESS. Geoffrey P. E. Clarkson. A COMPUTER MODEL OF ELEMENTARY SOCIAL BEHAVIOR. John T. Gullahorn and Jeanne E. Gullahorn. TOWARD INTELLIGENT MACHINES. Paul Armer. STEPS TOWARD ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. Marvin Minsky. A SELECTED DESCRIPTOR-INDEXED BIBLIOGRAPHY TO THE LITERATURE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. Marvin Minsky.