A paradigmatic problem in social choice theory deals with the aggregation of subjective preferences of individuals --- represented as rankings of alternatives --- into a social ranking. We are interested in settings where individuals are uncertain about their own preferences, and represent their uncertainty as distributions over rankings. Under the classic objective of minimizing the (expected) sum of Kendall tau distances between the input rankings and the output ranking, we establish that preference elicitation is surprisingly straightforward and near-optimal solutions can be obtained in polynomial time. We show, both in theory and using real data, that ignoring uncertainty altogether can lead to suboptimal outcomes.

We study the societal tradeoffs problem, where a set of voters each submit their ideal tradeoff value between each pair of activities (e.g., "using a gallon of gasoline is as bad as creating 2 bags of landfill trash"), and these are then aggregated into the societal tradeoff vector using a rule. We introduce the family of distance-based rules and show that these can be justified as maximum likelihood estimators of the truth. Within this family, we single out the logarithmic distance-based rule as especially appealing based on a social-choice-theoretic axiomatization. We give an efficient algorithm for executing this rule as well as an approximate hill climbing algorithm, and evaluate these experimentally.

An effective way of preventing attacks in secure areas is to screen for threats (people, objects) before entry, e.g., screening of airport passengers. However, screening every entity at the same level may be both ineffective and undesirable. The challenge then is to find a dynamic approach for randomized screening, allowing for more effective use of limited screening resources, leading to improved security. We address this challenge with the following contributions: (1) a threat screening game (TSG) model for general screening domains; (2) an NP-hardness proof for computing the optimal strategy of TSGs; (3) a scheme for decomposing TSGs into subgames to improve scalability; (4) a novel algorithm that exploits a compact game representation to efficiently solve TSGs, providing the optimal solution under certain conditions; and (5) an empirical comparison of our proposed algorithm against the current state-of-the-art optimal approach for large-scale game-theoretic resource allocation problems.

We study the problem of computing Nash equilibria of zero-sum games.Many natural zero-sum games have exponentially many strategies, but highly structured payoffs. For example, in the well-studied Colonel Blotto game (introduced by Borel in 1921), players must divide a pool of troops among a set of battlefields with the goal of winning (i.e., having more troops in) a majority. The Colonel Blotto game is commonly used for analyzing a wide range of applications from the U.S presidential election, to innovative technology competitions, toadvertisement, to sports.However, because of the size of the strategy space, standard methods for computing equilibria of zero-sum games fail to be computationally feasible.Indeed, despite its importance, only few solutions for special variants of the problem are known. In this paper we show how to compute equilibria of Colonel Blotto games. Moreover, our approach takes the form of a general reduction: to find a Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game, it suffices to design a separation oracle for the strategy polytope of any bilinear game that is payoff-equivalent. We then apply this technique to obtain the first polytime algorithms for a variety of games. In addition to Colonel Blotto, we also show how to compute equilibria in an infinite-strategy variant called the General Lotto game; this involves showing how to prune the strategy space to a finite subset before applying our reduction. We also consider the class of dueling games, first introduced by Immorlica et al. (2011). We show that our approach provably extends the class of dueling games for which equilibria can be computed: we introduce a new dueling game, the matching duel, on which prior methods fail to be computationally feasible but upon which our reduction can be applied.

This paper studies the impact of Time-Of-Use (TOU) tariffs in a competitive electricity market place. Specifically, it focuses on the question of how should an autonomous broker agent optimize TOU tariffs in a competitive retail market, and what is the impact of such tariffs on the economy. We formalize the problem of TOU tariff optimization and propose an algorithm for approximating its solution. We extensively experiment with our algorithm in a large-scale, detailed electricity retail markets simulation of the Power Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC) and: 1) find that our algorithm results in 15% peak-demand reduction, 2) find that its peak-flattening results in greater profit and/or profit-share for the broker and allows it to win against the 1st and 2nd place brokers from the Power TAC 2014 finals, and 3) analyze several economic implications of using TOU tariffs in competitive retail markets.

Social media platforms have become the most popular means for users to share what is happening around them. The abundance and growing usage of social media has resulted in a large repository of users' social posts, which provides a stethoscope for inferring individuals' lifestyle and wellness. As users' social accounts implicitly reflect their habits, preferences, and feelings, it is feasible for us to monitor and understand the wellness of users by harvesting social media data towards a healthier lifestyle. As a first step towards accomplishing this goal, we propose to automatically extract wellness events from users' published social contents. Existing approaches for event extraction are not applicable to personal wellness events due to its domain nature characterized by plenty of noise and variety in data, insufficient samples, and inter-relation among events.To tackle these problems, we propose an optimization learning framework that utilizes the content information of microblogging messages as well as the relations between event categories. By imposing a sparse constraint on the learning model, we also tackle the problems arising from noise and variation in microblogging texts. Experimental results on a real-world dataset from Twitter have demonstrated the superior performance of our framework.

Humans routinely solve problems of immense computational complexity by intuitively forming simple, low-dimensional heuristic strategies. Citizen science (or crowd sourcing) is a way of exploiting this ability by presenting scientific research problems to non-experts. 'Gamification'--the application of game elements in a non-game context--is an effective tool with which to enable citizen scientists to provide solutions to research problems. The citizen science games Foldit3, EteRNA and EyeWire have been used successfully to study protein and RNA folding and neuron mapping, but so far gamification has not been applied to problems in quantum physics. Here we report on Quantum Moves, an online platform gamifying optimization problems in quantum physics.

We study the minimization of a convex function $f(X)$ over the set of $n\times n$ positive semi-definite matrices, but when the problem is recast as $\min_U g(U) := f(UU^\top)$, with $U \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times r}$ and $r \leq n$. We study the performance of gradient descent on $g$---which we refer to as Factored Gradient Descent (FGD)---under standard assumptions on the original function $f$. We provide a rule for selecting the step size and, with this choice, show that the local convergence rate of FGD mirrors that of standard gradient descent on the original $f$: i.e., after $k$ steps, the error is $O(1/k)$ for smooth $f$, and exponentially small in $k$ when $f$ is (restricted) strongly convex. In addition, we provide a procedure to initialize FGD for (restricted) strongly convex objectives and when one only has access to $f$ via a first-order oracle; for several problem instances, such proper initialization leads to global convergence guarantees. FGD and similar procedures are widely used in practice for problems that can be posed as matrix factorization. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to provide precise convergence rate guarantees for general convex functions under standard convex assumptions.

Optimization provides a valuable framework for thinking about, formulating, and solving many problems in machine learning. Since specialized techniques for the quadratic programming problem arising in support vector classification were developed in the 1990s, there has been more and more cross-fertilization between optimization and machine learning, with the large size and computational demands of machine learning applications driving much recent algorithmic research in optimization. This tutorial reviews the major computational paradigms in machine learning that are amenable to optimization algorithms, then discusses the algorithmic tools that are being brought to bear on such applications. We focus particularly on such algorithmic tools of recent interest as stochastic and incremental gradient methods, online optimization, augmented Lagrangian methods, and the various tools that have been applied recently in sparse and regularized optimization.

We focus on the problem of estimating and quantifying uncertainties on the excursion set of a function under a limited evaluation budget. We adopt a Bayesian approach where the objective function is assumed to be a realization of a Gaussian random field. In this setting, the posterior distribution on the objective function gives rise to a posterior distribution on excursion sets. Several approaches exist to summarize the distribution of such sets based on random closed set theory. While the recently proposed Vorob'ev approach exploits analytical formulae, further notions of variability require Monte Carlo estimators relying on Gaussian random field conditional simulations. In the present work we propose a method to choose Monte Carlo simulation points and obtain quasi-realizations of the conditional field at fine designs through affine predictors. The points are chosen optimally in the sense that they minimize the posterior expected distance in measure between the excursion set and its reconstruction. The proposed method reduces the computational costs due to Monte Carlo simulations and enables the computation of quasi-realizations on fine designs in large dimensions. We apply this reconstruction approach to obtain realizations of an excursion set on a fine grid which allow us to give a new measure of uncertainty based on the distance transform of the excursion set. Finally we present a safety engineering test case where the simulation method is employed to compute a Monte Carlo estimate of a contour line.