Over two decades ago a "quite revolution" overwhelmingly replaced knowledgebased approaches in natural language processing (NLP) by quantitative (e.g., statistical, corpus-based, machine learning) methods. Although it is our firm belief that purely quantitative approaches cannot be the only paradigm for NLP, dissatisfaction with purely engineering approaches to the construction of large knowledge bases for NLP are somewhat justified. In this paper we hope to demonstrate that both trends are partly misguided and that the time has come to enrich logical semantics with an ontological structure that reflects our commonsense view of the world and the way we talk about in ordinary language. In this paper it will be demonstrated that assuming such an ontological structure a number of challenges in the semantics of natural language (e.g., metonymy, intensionality, copredication, nominal compounds, etc.) can be properly and uniformly addressed.

John McCarthy's contributions to computer science and artificial intelligence are legendary. He invented Lisp, made substantial contributions to early work in timesharing and the theory of computation, and was one of the founders of artificial intelligence and knowledge representation. This article, written in honor of McCarthy's 80th birthday, presents a brief biography, an overview of the major themes of his research, and a discussion of several of his major papers.

This paper develops an inductive theory of predictive common sense reasoning. The theory provides the basis for an integrated solution to the three traditional problems of reasoning about change; the frame, qualification, and ramification problems. The theory is also capable of representing non-deterministic events, and it provides a means for stating defeasible preferences over the outcomes of conflicting simultaneous events.

A long-standing dream of artificial intelligence has been to put commonsense knowledge into computers -- enabling machines to reason about everyday life. However, it is widely assumed that the use of common sense in interactive applications will remain impractical for years, until these collections can be considered sufficiently complete and commonsense reasoning sufficiently robust. Recently, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Media Laboratory, we have had some success in applying commonsense knowledge in a number of intelligent interface agents, despite the admittedly spotty coverage and unreliable inference of today's commonsense knowledge systems.

The central challenge in commonsense knowledge representation research is to develop content theories that achieve a high degree of both competency and coverage. We describe a new methodology for constructing formal theories in commonsense knowledge domains that complements traditional knowledge representation approaches by first addressing issues of coverage. These concepts are sorted into a manageable number of coherent domains, one of which is the representational area of commonsense human memory. These representational areas are then analyzed using more traditional knowledge representation techniques, as demonstrated in this article by our treatment of commonsense human memory.

A long-standing dream of artificial intelligence has been to put commonsense knowledge into computers -- enabling machines to reason about everyday life. Some projects, such as Cyc, have begun to amass large collections of such knowledge. However, it is widely assumed that the use of common sense in interactive applications will remain impractical for years, until these collections can be considered sufficiently complete and commonsense reasoning sufficiently robust. Recently, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Media Laboratory, we have had some success in applying commonsense knowledge in a number of intelligent interface agents, despite the admittedly spotty coverage and unreliable inference of today's commonsense knowledge systems. This article surveys several of these applications and reflects on interface design principles that enable successful use of commonsense knowledge.

(Niles and Pease 2001). Considering that tremendous scheduling that are robust in the face of realworld progress has been made in commonsense reasoning concerns like time zones, daylight savings in specialized topics such as thermodynamics time, and international calendar variations. in physical systems (Collins and Forbus 1989), it is surprising that our best content theories Given the importance of an ontology of of people are still struggling to get past time across so many different commonsense simple notions of belief and intentionality (van der Hoek and Wooldridge 2003). However, search is the generation of competency theories systems that can successfully reason about that have a degree of depth necessary to solve people are likely to be substantially more valuable inferential problems that people are easily able than those that reason about thermodynamics to handle. in most future applications. Yet competency in content theories is only Content theories for reasoning about people half of the challenge. Commonsense reasoning are best characterized collectively as a theory of in AI theories will require that computers not commonsense psychology, in contrast to those only make deep humanlike inferences but also that are associated with commonsense (naïve) ensure that the scope of these inferences is as physics. The scope of commonsense physics, broad as humans can handle, as well. That is, best outlined in Patrick Hayes's first and second in addition to competency, content theories will "Naïve Physics Manifestos" (Hayes 1979, need adequate coverage over the full breadth of 1984), includes content theories of time, space, concepts that are manipulated in human-level physical entities, and their dynamics. It is only by achieving psychology, in contrast, concerns all some adequate level of coverage that we of the aspects of the way that people think they can begin to construct reasoning systems that think. It should include notions of plans and integrate fully into real-world AI applications, goals, opportunities and threats, decisions and where pragmatic considerations and expressive preferences, emotions and memories, along user interfaces raise the bar significantly.

To build a machine that has "common sense" was once a principal goal in the field of artificial intelligence. But most researchers in recent years have retreated from that ambitious aim. Instead, each developed some special technique that could deal with some class of problem well, but does poorly at almost everything else. We are convinced, however, that no one such method will ever turn out to be "best," and that instead, the powerful AI systems of the future will use a diverse array of resources that, together, will deal with a great range of problems. To build a machine that's resourceful enough to have humanlike common sense, we must develop ways to combine the advantages of multiple methods to represent knowledge, multiple ways to make inferences, and multiple ways to learn. We held a two-day symposium in St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, to discuss such a project -- - to develop new architectural schemes that can bridge between different strategies and representations. This article reports on the events and ideas developed at this meeting and subsequent thoughts by the authors on how to make progress.

The Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, in cooperation with Stanford University's Department of Computer Science, presented the 2003 Spring Symposium Series, Monday through Wednesday, 24-26 March 2003, at Stanford University. The titles of the eight symposia were Agent-Mediated Knowledge Management, Computational Synthesis: From Basic Building Blocks to High- Level Functions, Foundations and Applications of Spatiotemporal Reasoning (FASTR), Human Interaction with Autonomous Systems in Complex Environments, Intelligent Multimedia Knowledge Management, Logical Formalization of Commonsense Reasoning, Natural Language Generation in Spoken and Written Dialogue, and New Directions in Question-Answering Motivation.

The following excerpts are from an interview with Marvin Minsky which took place at his home in Brookline, Massachusetts, on January 23rd, 1991. The interview, which is included in its entirety as a Foreword in the book Understanding Music with AI: Perspectives on Music Cognition (edited by Mira Balaban, Kemal Ebcioglu, and Otto Laske), is a conversation about music, its peculiar features as a human activity, the special problems it poses for the scientist, and the suitability of AI methods for clarifying and/or solving some of these problems. The conversation is open-ended, and should be read accordingly, as a discourse to be continued at another time.