In this paper we present a syntactical way to develop the adaptation capability in logical-based intelligent agents. We use prime implicants to represent the beliefs of an agent and present how syntactical belief update operators can be obtained by correlating models and prime implicants. Using prime implicants allows the introdution a new notion of belief update. We characterize this new operator both in terms of postulates and in terms of explicit operators.

Belief revision always results in trusting new evidence, so it may admit an unreliable one and discard a more confident one. We therefore use belief change instead of belief revision to remedy this weakness. By introducing  epistemic states, we take into account of the strength of evidence that influences the change of belief. In this paper, we present a set of postulates to characterize belief change by epistemic states and establish representation  theorems to characterize those postulates. We show that from an epistemic state, a corresponding ordinal conditional function by Spohn can be derived and the result of combining two epistemic states is thus reduced to the result from combining two corresponding ordinal conditional functions proposed by Laverny and Lang. Furthermore, when reduced to the belief revision situation, we prove that our results induce all the Darwiche and Pearl's postulates.

Augmenting probabilities to conditional logic yields an expressive mechanism for representing uncertainty. The principle of optimum entropy allows one to reason in probabilistic logic in an information-theoretic optimal way by completing the given information as unbiasedly as possible. In this paper, we introduce the MEcore system that realises the core functionalities for an intelligent agent reasoning at optimum entropy and that provides powerful mechanisms for belief management operations like revision, update, diagnosis, or hypothetical what-if-analysis.

Selecting extended logic programming with the answer-set semantics as a "generic" nonmonotonic logic, we show how that logic defines preferred belief sets and how preferred belief sets allow us to represent and interpret normative statements. Conflicts among program rules (more generally, defaults) give rise to alternative preferred belief sets. Finally, we comment on formalisms which explicitly represent preferences on properties of belief sets. Such formalisms either build preference information directly into rules and modify the semantics of the logic appropriately, or specify preferences on belief sets independently of the mechanism to define them.

We give an overview of the multifaceted relationship between nonmonotonic logics and preferences. We discuss how the nonmonotonicity of reasoning itself is closely tied to preferences reasoners have on models of the world or, as we often say here, possible belief sets. Selecting extended logic programming with the answer-set semantics as a "generic" nonmonotonic logic, we show how that logic defines preferred belief sets and how preferred belief sets allow us to represent and interpret normative statements. Conflicts among program rules (more generally, defaults) give rise to alternative preferred belief sets. We discuss how such conflicts can be resolved based on implicit specificity or on explicit rankings of defaults. Finally, we comment on formalisms which explicitly represent preferences on properties of belief sets. Such formalisms either build preference information directly into rules and modify the semantics of the logic appropriately, or specify preferences on belief sets independently of the mechanism to define them.

We provide provably privacy-preserving versions of belief propagation, Gibbs sampling, and other local algorithms -- distributed multiparty protocols in which each party or vertex learns only its final local value, and absolutely nothing else.

We provide provably privacy-preserving versions of belief propagation, Gibbs sampling, and other local algorithms -- distributed multiparty protocols in which each party or vertex learns only its final local value, and absolutely nothing else.

Loopy belief propagation has been employed in a wide variety of applications with great empirical success, but it comes with few theoretical guarantees. In this paper we investigate the use of the max-product form of belief propagation for weighted matching problems on general graphs. We show that max-product converges to the correct answer if the linear programming (LP) relaxation of the weighted matching problem is tight and does not converge if the LP relaxation is loose. This provides an exact characterization of max-product performance and reveals connections to the widely used optimization technique of LP relaxation. In addition, we demonstrate that max-product is effective in solving practical weighted matching problems in a distributed fashion by applying it to the problem of self-organization in sensor networks.

We provide provably privacy-preserving versions of belief propagation, Gibbs sampling, and other local algorithms -- distributed multiparty protocols in which each party or vertex learns only its final local value, and absolutely nothing else.

Shapley's impossibility result indicates that the two-person bargaining problem has no non-trivial ordinal solution with the traditional game-theoretic bargaining model. Although the result is no longer true for bargaining problems with more than two agents, none of the well known bargaining solutions are ordinal. Searching for meaningful ordinal solutions, especially for the bilateral bargaining problem, has been a challenging issue in bargaining theory for more than three decades. This paper proposes a logic-based ordinal solution to the bilateral bargaining problem. We argue that if a bargaining problem is modeled in terms of the logical relation of players' physical negotiation items, a meaningful bargaining solution can be constructed based on the ordinal structure of bargainers' preferences. We represent bargainers' demands in propositional logic and bargainers' preferences over their demands in total preorder. We show that the solution satisfies most desirable logical properties, such as individual rationality (logical version), consistency, collective rationality as well as a few typical game-theoretic properties, such as weak Pareto optimality and contraction invariance. In addition, if all players' demand sets are logically closed, the solution satisfies a fixed-point condition, which says that the outcome of a negotiation is the result of mutual belief revision. Finally, we define various decision problems in relation to our bargaining model and study their computational complexity.