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 Belief Revision


Modeling Belief Change on Epistemic States

AAAI Conferences

Belief revision always results in trusting new evidence, so it may admit an unreliable one and discard a more confident one. We therefore use belief change instead of belief revision to remedy this weakness. By introducing  epistemic states, we take into account of the strength of evidence that influences the change of belief. In this paper, we present a set of postulates to characterize belief change by epistemic states and establish representation  theorems to characterize those postulates. We show that from an epistemic state, a corresponding ordinal conditional function by Spohn can be derived and the result of combining two epistemic states is thus reduced to the result from combining two corresponding ordinal conditional functions proposed by Laverny and Lang. Furthermore, when reduced to the belief revision situation, we prove that our results induce all the Darwiche and Pearl's postulates.


Preferences and Nonmonotonic Reasoning

AI Magazine

Selecting extended logic programming with the answer-set semantics as a "generic" nonmonotonic logic, we show how that logic defines preferred belief sets and how preferred belief sets allow us to represent and interpret normative statements. Conflicts among program rules (more generally, defaults) give rise to alternative preferred belief sets. Finally, we comment on formalisms which explicitly represent preferences on properties of belief sets. Such formalisms either build preference information directly into rules and modify the semantics of the logic appropriately, or specify preferences on belief sets independently of the mechanism to define them.


Preferences and Nonmonotonic Reasoning

AI Magazine

We give an overview of the multifaceted relationship between nonmonotonic logics and preferences. We discuss how the nonmonotonicity of reasoning itself is closely tied to preferences reasoners have on models of the world or, as we often say here, possible belief sets. Selecting extended logic programming with the answer-set semantics as a "generic" nonmonotonic logic, we show how that logic defines preferred belief sets and how preferred belief sets allow us to represent and interpret normative statements. Conflicts among program rules (more generally, defaults) give rise to alternative preferred belief sets. We discuss how such conflicts can be resolved based on implicit specificity or on explicit rankings of defaults. Finally, we comment on formalisms which explicitly represent preferences on properties of belief sets. Such formalisms either build preference information directly into rules and modify the semantics of the logic appropriately, or specify preferences on belief sets independently of the mechanism to define them.




Linear programming analysis of loopy belief propagation for weighted matching

Neural Information Processing Systems

Loopy belief propagation has been employed in a wide variety of applications with great empirical success, but it comes with few theoretical guarantees. In this paper we investigate the use of the max-product form of belief propagation for weighted matching problems on general graphs. We show that max-product converges to the correct answer if the linear programming (LP) relaxation of the weighted matching problem is tight and does not converge if the LP relaxation is loose. This provides an exact characterization of max-product performance and reveals connections to the widely used optimization technique of LP relaxation. In addition, we demonstrate that max-product is effective in solving practical weighted matching problems in a distributed fashion by applying it to the problem of self-organization in sensor networks.



An Ordinal Bargaining Solution with Fixed-Point Property

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Shapley's impossibility result indicates that the two-person bargaining problem has no non-trivial ordinal solution with the traditional game-theoretic bargaining model. Although the result is no longer true for bargaining problems with more than two agents, none of the well known bargaining solutions are ordinal. Searching for meaningful ordinal solutions, especially for the bilateral bargaining problem, has been a challenging issue in bargaining theory for more than three decades. This paper proposes a logic-based ordinal solution to the bilateral bargaining problem. We argue that if a bargaining problem is modeled in terms of the logical relation of players' physical negotiation items, a meaningful bargaining solution can be constructed based on the ordinal structure of bargainers' preferences. We represent bargainers' demands in propositional logic and bargainers' preferences over their demands in total preorder. We show that the solution satisfies most desirable logical properties, such as individual rationality (logical version), consistency, collective rationality as well as a few typical game-theoretic properties, such as weak Pareto optimality and contraction invariance. In addition, if all players' demand sets are logically closed, the solution satisfies a fixed-point condition, which says that the outcome of a negotiation is the result of mutual belief revision. Finally, we define various decision problems in relation to our bargaining model and study their computational complexity.


Action Theory Evolution

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Like any other logical theory, domain descriptions in reasoning about actions may evolve, and thus need revision methods to adequately accommodate new information about the behavior of actions. The present work is about changing action domain descriptions in propositional dynamic logic. Its contribution is threefold: first we revisit the semantics of action theory contraction that has been done in previous work, giving more robust operators that express minimal change based on a notion of distance between Kripke-models. Second we give algorithms for syntactical action theory contraction and establish their correctness w.r.t. our semantics. Finally we state postulates for action theory contraction and assess the behavior of our operators w.r.t. them. Moreover, we also address the revision counterpart of action theory change, showing that it benefits from our semantics for contraction.


Compositional Belief Update

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

In this paper we explore a class of belief update operators, in which the definition of the operator is compositional with respect to the sentence to be added. The goal is to provide an update operator that is intuitive, in that its definition is based on a recursive decomposition of the update sentence's structure, and that may be reasonably implemented. In addressing update, we first provide a definition phrased in terms of the models of a knowledge base. While this operator satisfies a core group of the benchmark Katsuno-Mendelzon update postulates, not all of the postulates are satisfied. Other Katsuno-Mendelzon postulates can be obtained by suitably restricting the syntactic form of the sentence for update, as we show. In restricting the syntactic form of the sentence for update, we also obtain a hierarchy of update operators with Winslett's standard semantics as the most basic interesting approach captured. We subsequently give an algorithm which captures this approach; in the general case the algorithm is exponential, but with some not-unreasonable assumptions we obtain an algorithm that is linear in the size of the knowledge base. Hence the resulting approach has much better complexity characteristics than other operators in some situations. We also explore other compositional belief change operators: erasure is developed as a dual operator to update; we show that a forget operator is definable in terms of update; and we give a definition of the compositional revision operator. We obtain that compositional revision, under the most natural definition, yields the Satoh revision operator.