In this paper we look at the problem of composing services that export their behavior in terms of a transition system, characterizing the choices of actions given to a client at each point in time. The composition consists of synthesizing an orchestrator that coordinates the available services so as to mimic the desired target service asked by the client. Specifically, in this paper we study the "conformant form" of the problem, where available services are partially controllable and partially observable, and hence, the orchestrator has to make its decisions exploiting the observations made so far only. We give a sound and complete procedure to synthesize the orchestrator in such case, and characterize the computational complexity of the problem. The procedure is based on working with belief (or knowledge) states, a standard technique to tackle conformant planning. Moreover we show that, although in general unavoidable, the powerset construction at the base of the belief state approach can be delegated to the symbolic manipulations of the game-structure model checking tool (TLV), which can be used to efficiently implement the orchestrator synthesis procedure.

Conformant planning is the problem of finding a sequence of actions for achieving a goal in the presence of uncertainty in the initial state or action effects. The problem has been approached as a path-finding problem in belief space where good belief representations and heuristics are critical for scaling up. In this work, a different formulation is introduced for conformant problems with deterministic actions where they are automatically converted into classical ones and solved by an off-the-shelf classical planner. The translation maps literals L and sets of assumptions t about the initial situation, into new literals KL/t that represent that L must be true if t is initially true. We lay out a general translation scheme that is sound and establish the conditions under which the translation is also complete. We show that the complexity of the complete translation is exponential in a parameter of the problem called the conformant width, which for most benchmarks is bounded. The planner based on this translation exhibits good performance in comparison with existing planners, and is the basis for T0, the best performing planner in the Conformant Track of the 2006 International Planning Competition.

The problem of revising an ontology consistently is closely related to the problem of belief revision which has been widely discussed in the literature. Some syntax-based belief revision operators have been adapted to revise ontologies in Description Logics (DLs). However, these operators remove the whole axioms to resolve logical contradictions and thus are not fine-grained. In this paper, we propose three model-based revision operators to revise terminologies in DLs. We show that one of them is more rational than others by comparing their logical properties. Therefore, we focus on this revision operator. We also consider the problem of computing the result of revision by our operator with the help of the notion of concept forgetting. Finally, we analyze the computational complexity of our revision operator.

Standard belief contraction assumes an underlying logic containing full classical propositional logic, but there are good reasons for considering contraction in less expressive logics. In this paper we focus on Horn logic. In addition to being of interest in its own right, our choice is motivated by the use of Horn logic in several areas, including ontology reasoning in description logics. We consider three versions of contraction: entailment-based and inconsistency-basedcontraction (e-contraction and i-contraction, resp.), introduced by Delgrande for Horn logic, and package contraction (p-contraction), studied by Fuhrmann and Hansson for the classical case. We show that the standard basic form of contraction, partial meet, is too strong in the Horn case. We define more appropriate notions of basic contraction for all three types above, and provide associated representation results in terms of postulates. Our results stand in contrast to Delgrande's conjectures that orderly maxichoice is the appropriate contraction for both e- and i-contraction. Our interest in p-contraction stems from its relationship with an important reasoning task in ontological reasoning:repairing the subsumption hierarchy in EL. This is closely related to p-contraction with sets of basic Horn clauses (Horn clauses of the form p -> q). We show that this restricted version of p-contraction can also be represented as i-contraction.

Thanks to recent advances, AI Planning has become the underlying technique for several applications. Figuring prominently among these is automated Web Service Composition (WSC) at the "capability" level, where services are described in terms of preconditions and effects over ontological concepts. A key issue in addressing WSC as planning is that ontologies are not only formal vocabularies; they also axiomatize the possible relationships between concepts. Such axioms correspond to what has been termed "integrity constraints" in the actions and change literature, and applying a web service is essentially a belief update operation. The reasoning required for belief update is known to be harder than reasoning in the ontology itself. The support for belief update is severely limited in current planning tools. Our first contribution consists in identifying an interesting special case of WSC which is both significant and more tractable. The special case, which we term "forward effects", is characterized by the fact that every ramification of a web service application involves at least one new constant generated as output by the web service. We show that, in this setting, the reasoning required for belief update simplifies to standard reasoning in the ontology itself. This relates to, and extends, current notions of "message-based" WSC, where the need for belief update is removed by a strong (often implicit or informal) assumption of "locality" of the individual messages. We clarify the computational properties of the forward effects case, and point out a strong relation to standard notions of planning under uncertainty, suggesting that effective tools for the latter can be successfully adapted to address the former. Furthermore, we identify a significant sub-case, named "strictly forward effects", where an actual compilation into planning under uncertainty exists. This enables us to exploit off-the-shelf planning tools to solve message-based WSC in a general form that involves powerful ontologies, and requires reasoning about partial matches between concepts. We provide empirical evidence that this approach may be quite effective, using Conformant-FF as the underlying planner.

In this paper we present a syntactical way to develop the adaptation capability in logical-based intelligent agents. We use prime implicants to represent the beliefs of an agent and present how syntactical belief update operators can be obtained by correlating models and prime implicants. Using prime implicants allows the introdution a new notion of belief update. We characterize this new operator both in terms of postulates and in terms of explicit operators.

Belief revision always results in trusting new evidence, so it may admit an unreliable one and discard a more confident one. We therefore use belief change instead of belief revision to remedy this weakness. By introducing  epistemic states, we take into account of the strength of evidence that influences the change of belief. In this paper, we present a set of postulates to characterize belief change by epistemic states and establish representation  theorems to characterize those postulates. We show that from an epistemic state, a corresponding ordinal conditional function by Spohn can be derived and the result of combining two epistemic states is thus reduced to the result from combining two corresponding ordinal conditional functions proposed by Laverny and Lang. Furthermore, when reduced to the belief revision situation, we prove that our results induce all the Darwiche and Pearl's postulates.

Augmenting probabilities to conditional logic yields an expressive mechanism for representing uncertainty. The principle of optimum entropy allows one to reason in probabilistic logic in an information-theoretic optimal way by completing the given information as unbiasedly as possible. In this paper, we introduce the MEcore system that realises the core functionalities for an intelligent agent reasoning at optimum entropy and that provides powerful mechanisms for belief management operations like revision, update, diagnosis, or hypothetical what-if-analysis.

Selecting extended logic programming with the answer-set semantics as a "generic" nonmonotonic logic, we show how that logic defines preferred belief sets and how preferred belief sets allow us to represent and interpret normative statements. Conflicts among program rules (more generally, defaults) give rise to alternative preferred belief sets. Finally, we comment on formalisms which explicitly represent preferences on properties of belief sets. Such formalisms either build preference information directly into rules and modify the semantics of the logic appropriately, or specify preferences on belief sets independently of the mechanism to define them.

We give an overview of the multifaceted relationship between nonmonotonic logics and preferences. We discuss how the nonmonotonicity of reasoning itself is closely tied to preferences reasoners have on models of the world or, as we often say here, possible belief sets. Selecting extended logic programming with the answer-set semantics as a "generic" nonmonotonic logic, we show how that logic defines preferred belief sets and how preferred belief sets allow us to represent and interpret normative statements. Conflicts among program rules (more generally, defaults) give rise to alternative preferred belief sets. We discuss how such conflicts can be resolved based on implicit specificity or on explicit rankings of defaults. Finally, we comment on formalisms which explicitly represent preferences on properties of belief sets. Such formalisms either build preference information directly into rules and modify the semantics of the logic appropriately, or specify preferences on belief sets independently of the mechanism to define them.