Following the recent trend of studying the theory of belief revision under the Horn fragment of propo- sitional logic this paper develops a fully charac- terised Horn contraction which is analogous to the traditional transitively relational partial meet contraction [Alchourron et al., 1985]. This Horn con- traction extends the partial meet Horn contraction studied in [Delgrande and Wassermann, 2010] so that it is guided by a transitive relation that models the ordering of plausibility over sets of beliefs.

As a doxastic counterpart to epistemic logic based on S5 we study the modal logic KSD that can be viewed as an approach to modelling a kind of objective and fair belief. We apply KSD to the problem of minimal belief and develop an alterna- tive approach to nonmonotonic modal logic using a weaker concept of expansion. This corresponds to a certain minimal kind of KSD model and yields a new type of nonmonotonic doxastic reasonin

Despite the importance of propositional logic in artificial intelligence, the notion of language independence in the propositional setting (not to be confound with syntax independence) has not received much attention so far. In this paper, we define language independence for a propositional operator as robustness w.r.t.symbol translation. We provide a number of characterizations results for such translations. We motivate the need to focus on symbol translations of restricted types, and identify several families of interest. We identify the computational complexity of recognizing symbol translations from those families. Finally, as a case study, we investigate the robustness of belief revision/merging operators w.r.t. translations of different types. It turns out that rational belief revision/merging operators are not guaranteed to offer the most basic (yet non-trivial) form of language independence; operators based on the Hamming distance do not suffer from this drawback but are less robust than operators based on the drastic distance.

Existing belief merging operators take advantage of all the models from the bases, including those contradicting the integrity constraints. In this paper, we show that this is not suited to every merging scenario. We study the case when the bases are "rationalized" with respect to the integrity constraints during the merging process. We define in formal terms several independence conditions for merging operators and show how they interact with the standard IC postulates for belief merging. Especially, we give an independence-based axiomatic characterization of a distance-based operator.

Recent years have seen a lot of work towards extending the established AGM belief revision theory with respect to iterating revision, preserving conditional beliefs, and handling sets of propositions as new information. In particular, novel postulates like independence and evidence retainment have been brought forth as new standards for revising epistemic states by (sets of) propositional information. In this paper, we propose a constructive approach for revising epistemic states by sets of (propositional and conditional) beliefs that combines ideas from nonmonotonic reasoning with conditional belief revision. We also propose a novel principle called enforcement that covers both independence and evidence retainment, and we show our revision operator to comply with major postulates from the literature. Moreover, we point out the relevance of our approach for default reasoning.

Learning concepts via instruction and expository texts is an important problem for modeling human learning and for making autonomous AI systems. This paper describes a computational model of the self-explanation effect, whereby conceptual knowledge is repaired by integrating and explaining new material. Our model represents conceptual knowledge with compositional model fragments, which are used to explain new material via model formulation. Preferences are computed over explanations and conceptual knowledge, along several dimensions. These preferences guide knowledge integration and question-answering. Our simulation learns about the human circulatory system, using facts from a circulatory system passage used in a previous cognitive psychology experiment. We analyze the simulation’s performance, showing that individual differences in sequences of models learned by students can be explained by different parameter settings in our model.

This paper investigates belief revision where the underlying logic is that governing Horn clauses. It proves to be the case that classical (AGM) belief revision doesn’t immediately generalise to the Horn case. In particular, a standard construction based on a total preorder over possible worlds may violate the accepted (AGM) postulates. Conversely, Horn revision functions in the obvious extension to the AGM approach are not captured by total preorders over possible worlds. We address these difficulties by first restricting the semantic construction to "well behaved" orderings; and second, by augmenting the revision postulates by an additional postulate. This additional postulate is redundant in the AGM approach but not in the Horn case. In a representation result we show that these two approaches coincide. Arguably this work is interesting for several reasons. It extends AGM revision to inferentially-weaker Horn theories; hence it sheds light on the theoretical underpinnings of belief change, as well as generalising the AGM paradigm. Thus, this work is relevant to revision in areas that employ Horn clauses, such as deductive databases and logic programming, as well as areas in which inference is weaker than classical logic, such as in description logic.

This paper presents an approach to belief revision in which revision is a function from a belief state and a finite set of formulas to a new belief state. In the interesting case, the set for revision S may be inconsistent but individual members of S are consistent. We argue that S will still contain interesting information regarding revision; in particular, maximum consistent subsets of S will determine candidate formulas for the revision process, and the agent's associated faithful ranking will determine the plausibility of such candidate formulas. Postulates and semantic conditions characterizing this approach are given, and representation results are provided. As a consequence of this approach, we argue that revision by a sequence of formulas, usually considered as a problem of iterated revision, is more appropriately regarded as revision by the possibly-inconsistent set of these formulas. Hence we suggest that revision by a sequence of formulas is foremost a problem of (uniterated) set revision.

Multi-context systems (MCS) are a powerful framework for interlinking heterogeneous knowledge sources. They model the flow of information among different reasoning components (called contexts) in a declarative way, using so-called bridge rules, where contexts and bridge rules may be nonmonotonic. We considerably generalize MCS to managed MCS (mMCS): while the original bridge rules can only add information to contexts, our generalization allows arbitrary operations on context knowledge bases to be freely defined, e.g., deletion or revision operators. The paper motivates and introduces the generalized framework and presents several interesting instances. Furthermore, we consider inconsistency management in mMCS and complexity issues.

We address the issue, in cognitive agents, of possible loss of previous information, which later might turn out to be correct when new information becomes available. To this aim, we propose a framework for changing the agent's mind without erasing forever previous information, thus allowing its recovery in case the change turns out to be wrong. In this new framework, a piece of information is represented as an argument which can be more or less accepted depending on the trustworthiness of the agent who proposes it. We adopt possibility theory to represent uncertainty about the information, and to model the fact that information sources can be only partially trusted. The originality of the proposed framework lies in the following two points: (i) argument reinstatement is mirrored in belief reinstatement in order to avoid the loss of previous information; (ii) new incoming information is represented under the form of arguments and it is associated with a plausibility degree depending on the trustworthiness of the information source.