We recently described a formalism for reasoning with if-then rules that re expressed with different levels of firmness [18]. The formalism interprets these rules as extreme conditional probability statements, specifying orders of magnitude of disbelief, which impose constraints over possible rankings of worlds. It was shown that, once we compute a priority function Z+ on the rules, the degree to which a given query is confirmed or denied can be computed in O(log n`) propositional satisfiability tests, where n is the number of rules in the knowledge base. In this paper, we show that computing Z+ requires O(n2 X log n) satisfiability tests, not an exponential number as was conjectured in [18], which reduces to polynomial complexity in the case of Horn expressions. We also show how reasoning with imprecise observations can be incorporated in our formalism and how the popular notions of belief revision and epistemic entrenchment are embodied naturally and tractably.

Data fusion allows the elaboration and the evaluation of a situation synthesized from low level informations provided by different kinds of sensors. The fusion of the collected data will result in fewer and higher level informations more easily assessed by a human operator and that will assist him effectively in his decision process. In this paper we present the suitability and the advantages of using a Possibilistic Assumption based Truth Maintenance System (0-ATMS) in a data fusion military application. We first describe the problem, the needed knowledge representation formalisms and problem solving paradigms. Then we remind the reader of the basic concepts of ATMSs, Possibilistic Logic and Il-ATMSs. Finally we detail the solution to the given data fusion problem and conclude with the results and comparison with a non-possibilistic solution.

Possibilistic logic has been proposed as a numerical formalism for reasoning with uncertainty. There has been interest in developing qualitative accounts of possibility, as well as an explanation of the relationship between possibility and modal logics. We present two modal logics that can be used to represent and reason with qualitative statements of possibility and necessity. Within this modal framework, we are able to identify interesting relationships between possibilistic logic, beliefs and conditionals. In particular, the most natural conditional definable via possibilistic means for default reasoning is identical to Pearl's conditional for e-semantics.

The classical propositional assumption-based model is extended to incorporate probabilities for the assumptions. Then it is placed into the framework of evidence theory. Several authors like Laskey, Lehner (1989) and Provan (1990) already proposed a similar point of view, but the first paper is not as much concerned with mathematical foundations, and Provan's paper develops into a different direction. Here we thoroughly develop and present the mathematical foundations of this theory, together with computational methods adapted from Reiter, De Kleer (1987) and Inoue (1992). Finally, recently proposed techniques for computing degrees of support are presented.

We present a semantics for adding uncertainty to conditional logics for default reasoning and belief revision. We are able to treat conditional sentences as statements of conditional probability, and express rules for revision such as "If A were believed, then B would be believed to degree p." This method of revision extends conditionalization by allowing meaningful revision by sentences whose probability is zero. This is achieved through the use of counterfactual probabilities. Thus, our system accounts for the best properties of qualitative methods of update (in particular, the AGM theory of revision) and probabilistic methods. We also show how our system can be viewed as a unification of probability theory and possibility theory, highlighting their orthogonality and providing a means for expressing the probability of a possibility. We also demonstrate the connection to Lewis's method of imaging.

The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. Roughly, revision treats a surprising observation as a sign that previous beliefs were wrong, while update treats a surprising observation as an indication that the world has changed. In general, we would expect that an agent making an observation may both want to revise some earlier beliefs and assume that some change has occurred in the world. We define a novel approach to belief change that allows us to do this, by applying ideas from probability theory in a qualitative setting. The key idea is to use a qualitative Markov assumption, which says that state transitions are independent. We show that a recent approach to modeling qualitative uncertainty using plausibility measures allows us to make such a qualitative Markov assumption in a relatively straightforward way, and show how the Markov assumption can be used to provide an attractive belief-change model.

This paper discusses belief revision under uncertain inputs in the framework of possibility theory. Revision can be based on two possible definitions of the conditioning operation, one based on min operator which requires a purely ordinal scale only, and another based on product, for which a richer structure is needed, and which is a particular case of Dempster's rule of conditioning. Besides, revision under uncertain inputs can be understood in two different ways depending on whether the input is viewed, or not, as a constraint to enforce. Moreover, it is shown that M.A. Williams' transmutations, originally defined in the setting of Spohn's functions, can be captured in this framework, as well as Boutilier's natural revision.

A nonmonotonic logic of thresholded generalizations is presented. Given propositions A and B from a language L and a positive integer k, the thresholded generalization A=>B{k} means that the conditional probability P(B|A) falls short of one by no more than c*d^k. A two-level probability structure is defined. At the lower level, a model is defined to be a probability function on L. At the upper level, there is a probability distribution over models. A definition is given of what it means for a collection of thresholded generalizations to entail another thresholded generalization. This nonmonotonic entailment relation, called "entailment in probability", has the feature that its conclusions are "probabilistically trustworthy" meaning that, given true premises, it is improbable that an entailed conclusion would be false. A procedure is presented for ascertaining whether any given collection of premises entails any given conclusion. It is shown that entailment in probability is closely related to Goldszmidt and Pearl's System-Z^+, thereby demonstrating that the conclusions of System-Z^+ are probabilistically trustworthy.

Poole has shown that nonmonotonic logics do not handle the lottery paradox correctly. In this paper we will show that Pollock's theory of defeasible reasoning fails for the same reason: defeasible reasoning is incompatible with the skeptical notion of derivability.

This paper relates comparative belief structures and a general view of belief management in the setting of deductively closed logical representations of accepted beliefs. We show that the range of compatibility between the classical deductive closure and uncertain reasoning covers precisely the nonmonotonic 'preferential' inference system of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor and nothing else. In terms of uncertain reasoning any possibility or necessity measure gives birth to a structure of accepted beliefs. The classes of probability functions and of Shafer's belief functions which yield belief sets prove to be very special ones.