The combined approach of the Qualitative Reasoning and Probabilistic Functions for the knowledge representation is proposed. The method aims at represent uncertain, qualitative knowledge that is essential for the moving blocks task's execution. The attempt to formalize the commonsense knowledge is performed with the Situation Calculus language for reasoning and robot's beliefs representation. The method is implemented in the Prolog programming language and tested for a specific simulated scenario. In most cases the implementation enables us to solve a given task, i.e., move blocks to desired positions. The example of robot's reasoning and main parts of the implemented program's code are presented.

Judging by the increasing impact of machine learning on large-scale data analysis in the last decade, one can anticipate a substantial growth in diversity of the machine learning applications for "big data" over the next decade. This exciting new opportunity, however, also raises many challenges. One of them is scaling inference within and training of graphical models. Typical ways to address this scaling issue are inference by approximate message passing, stochastic gradients, and MapReduce, among others. Often, we encounter inference and training problems with symmetries and redundancies in the graph structure. It has been shown that inference and training can indeed benefit from exploiting symmetries, for example by lifting loopy belief propagation (LBP).% can be lifted. That is, a model is compressed by grouping nodes together that send and receive identical messages so that a modified LBP running on the lifted graph yields the same marginals as LBP on the original one, but often in a fraction of time. By establishing a link between lifting and radix sort, we show that lifting is MapReduce-able and thus combine the two orthogonal approaches to scaling inference, namely exploiting symmetries and employing parallel computations.

Graphical models have gained a lot of attention recently as a tool for learning and representing dependencies among variables in multivariate data. Often, domain scientists are looking specifically for differences among the dependency networks of different conditions or populations (e.g. differences between regulatory networks of different species, or differences between dependency networks of diseased versus healthy populations). The standard method for finding these differences is to learn the dependency networks for each condition independently and compare them. We show that this approach is prone to high false discovery rates (low precision) that can render the analysis useless. We then show that by imposing a bias towards learning similar dependency networks for each condition the false discovery rates can be reduced to acceptable levels, at the cost of finding a reduced number of differences. Algorithms developed in the transfer learning literature can be used to vary the strength of the imposed similarity bias and provide a natural mechanism to smoothly adjust this differential precision-recall tradeoff to cater to the requirements of the analysis conducted. We present real case studies (oncological and neurological) where domain experts use the proposed technique to extract useful differential networks that shed light on the biological processes involved in cancer and brain function.

The intuitive notion of evidence has both semantic and syntactic features. In this paper, we develop an {\em evidence logic} for epistemic agents faced with possibly contradictory evidence from different sources. The logic is based on a neighborhood semantics, where a neighborhood $N$ indicates that the agent has reason to believe that the true state of the world lies in $N$. Further notions of relative plausibility between worlds and beliefs based on the latter ordering are then defined in terms of this evidence structure, yielding our intended models for evidence-based beliefs. In addition, we also consider a second more general flavor, where belief and plausibility are modeled using additional primitive relations, and we prove a representation theorem showing that each such general model is a $p$-morphic image of an intended one. This semantics invites a number of natural special cases, depending on how uniform we make the evidence sets, and how coherent their total structure. We give a structural study of the resulting `uniform' and `flat' models. Our main result are sound and complete axiomatizations for the logics of all four major model classes with respect to the modal language of evidence, belief and safe belief. We conclude with an outlook toward logics for the dynamics of changing evidence, and the resulting language extensions and connections with logics of plausibility change.

Logic programs under the stable model semantics, or answer-set programs, provide an expressive rule-based knowledge representation framework, featuring a formal, declarative and well-understood semantics. However, handling the evolution of rule bases is still a largely open problem. The AGM framework for belief change was shown to give inappropriate results when directly applied to logic programs under a non-monotonic semantics such as the stable models. The approaches to address this issue, developed so far, proposed update semantics based on manipulating the syntactic structure of programs and rules. More recently, AGM revision has been successfully applied to a significantly more expressive semantic characterisation of logic programs based on SE-models. This is an important step, as it changes the focus from the evolution of a syntactic representation of a rule base to the evolution of its semantic content. In this paper, we borrow results from the area of belief update to tackle the problem of updating (instead of revising) answer-set programs. We prove a representation theorem which makes it possible to constructively define any operator satisfying a set of postulates derived from Katsuno and Mendelzon's postulates for belief update. We define a specific operator based on this theorem, examine its computational complexity and compare the behaviour of this operator with syntactic rule update semantics from the literature. Perhaps surprisingly, we uncover a serious drawback of all rule update operators based on Katsuno and Mendelzon's approach to update and on SE-models.

This different outlook makes Dependence Logic a most suitable framework for the formal study, in a first-order setting, of functional dependence itself; and, furthermore, this logic is readily adaptable to the analysis of other, nonfunctional notions of dependence or independence [11, 6, 8]. Like other logics of imperfect information, Dependence Logic admits both a Game Theoretic Semantics, an imperfect information variant of the one for First Order Logic, and a Team Semantics, a compositional semantics which is a natural adaptation of Hodges' Trump Semantics [15]. One striking peculiarity of the current state of the art of the research in Dependence Logic and its extensions is a willingness to take Team Semantics - and not Game Theoretic Semantics, as for the case of much IF Logic research - as the fundamental semantic framework; and this different approach is at the root of many recent technical developments in the field, such as, for example, the characterizations of team class definability of [17], [16] and [8], the hierarchy results of [4], and the study of notions of generalized quantification of [6] and [5]. This paper is a detailed account of a doxastic interpretation for Team Semantics, according to which formulas are to be interpreted as assertions about beliefs and belief updates. This is not a novel idea: as a matter of fact, it is already implicit in the equivalence proof between Trump Semantics and Game Theoretic Semantics of [15].

Considerable attention has been given to the problem of non-monotonic reasoning in a belief function framework. Earlier work (M. Ginsberg) proposed solutions introducing meta-rules which recognized conditional independencies in a probabilistic sense. More recently an e-calculus formulation of default reasoning (J. Pearl) shows that the application of Dempster's rule to a non-monotonic situation produces erroneous results. This paper presents a new belief function interpretation of the problem which combines the rules in a way which is more compatible with probabilistic results and respects conditions of independence necessary for the application of Dempster's combination rule. A new general framework for combining conflicting evidence is also proposed in which the normalization factor becomes modified. This produces more intuitively acceptable results.

In this paper, we will review the process of evidence accumulation in the PSEIKI system for expectation-driven interpretation of images of 3-D scenes. Expectations are presented to PSEIKI as a geometrical hierarchy of abstractions. PSEIKI's job is then to construct abstraction hierarchies in the perceived image taking cues from the abstraction hierarchies in the expectations. The Dempster-Shafer formalism is used for associating belief values with the different possible labels for the constructed abstractions in the perceived image. This system has been used successfully for autonomous navigation of a mobile robot in indoor environments.

Unaided human decision making appears to systematically violate consistency constraints imposed by normative theories; these biases in turn appear to justify the application of formal decision-analytic models. It is argued that both claims are wrong. In particular, we will argue that the "confirmation bias" is premised on an overly narrow view of how conflicting evidence is and ought to be handled. Effective decision aiding should focus on supporting the contral processes by means of which knowledge is extended into novel situations and in which assumptions are adopted, utilized, and revised. The Non- Monotonic Probabilist represents initial work toward such an aid.

Two major difficulties in using default logics are their intractability and the problem of selecting among multiple extensions. We propose an approach to these problems based on integrating nommonotonic reasoning with plausible reasoning based on triangular norms. A previously proposed system for reasoning with uncertainty (RUM) performs uncertain monotonic inferences on an acyclic graph. We have extended RUM to allow nommonotonic inferences and cycles within nonmonotonic rules. By restricting the size and complexity of the nommonotonic cycles we can still perform efficient inferences. Uncertainty measures provide a basis for deciding among multiple defaults. Different algorithms and heuristics for finding the optimal defaults are discussed.