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 Belief Revision


Deep Salience: Visual Salience Modeling via Deep Belief Propagation

AAAI Conferences

Visual salience is an intriguing phenomenon observed in biological neural systems. Numerous attempts have been made to model visual salience mathematically using various feature contrasts, either locally or globally. However, these algorithmic models tend to ignore the problem’s biological solutions, in which visual salience appears to arise during the propagation of visual stimuli along the visual cortex. In this paper, inspired by the conjecture that salience arises from deep propagation along the visual cortex, we present a Deep Salience model where a multi-layer model based on successive Markov random fields (sMRF) is proposed to analyze the input image successively through its deep belief propagation. As a result, the foreground object can be automatically separated from the background in a fully unsupervised way. Experimental evaluation on the benchmark dataset validated that our Deep Salience model can consistently outperform many state-of-the-art salience models, yielding the higher rates in the precision-recall tests and attaining the better scores in F-measure and mean-square error tests.


Contraction and Revision over DL-Lite TBoxes

AAAI Conferences

Two essential tasks in managing Description Logic (DL) ontologies are eliminating problematic axioms and incorporating newly formed axioms. Such elimination and incorporation are formalised as the operations of contraction and revision in belief change.In this paper, we deal with contraction and revision for the DL-Lite family through a model-theoretic approach.Standard DL semantics yields infinite numbers of models for DL-Lite TBoxes, thus it is not practical to develop algorithms for contraction and revision that involve DL models. The key to our approach is the introduction of an alternative semantics called type semantics which is more succinct than DL semantics. More importantly, with a finite signature, type semantics always yields finite humber of models.We then define model-based contraction and revision for DL-Lite TBoxesunder type semantics and provide representation theorems for them.Finally, the succinctness of type semantics allows us to develop tractable algorithms for both operations.


A New Rational Algorithm for View Updating in Relational Databases

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

The dynamics of belief and knowledge is one of the major components of any autonomous system that should be able to incorporate new pieces of information. In order to apply the rationality result of belief dynamics theory to various practical problems, it should be generalized in two respects: first it should allow a certain part of belief to be declared as immutable; and second, the belief state need not be deductively closed. Such a generalization of belief dynamics, referred to as base dynamics, is presented in this paper, along with the concept of a generalized revision algorithm for knowledge bases (Horn or Horn logic with stratified negation). We show that knowledge base dynamics has an interesting connection with kernel change via hitting set and abduction. In this paper, we show how techniques from disjunctive logic programming can be used for efficient (deductive) database updates. The key idea is to transform the given database together with the update request into a disjunctive (datalog) logic program and apply disjunctive techniques (such as minimal model reasoning) to solve the original update problem. The approach extends and integrates standard techniques for efficient query answering and integrity checking. The generation of a hitting set is carried out through a hyper tableaux calculus and magic set that is focused on the goal of minimality. Keyword: AGM, Belief Revision, Knowledge Base Dynamics, Kernel Change, Abduction, Hyber Tableaux, Magic Set, View update, Update Propagation.


Minimal Change in AGM Revision for Non-Classical Logics

AAAI Conferences

In this paper, we address the problem of applying AGM-style belief revision  to non-classical logics. We discuss the idea of minimal change in revision and show that for non-classical logics, some sort of minimality postulate has to be explicitly introduced. We also present two constructions for revision which satisfy the AGM postulates and prove the representation theorems including minimality postulates.


Belief Revision in the Propositional Closure of a Qualitative Algebra

AAAI Conferences

Belief revision is an operation that aims at modifying old beliefs so that they become consistent with new ones. The issue of belief revision has been studied in various formalisms, in particular, in qualitative algebras (QAs) in which the result is a disjunction of belief bases that is not necessarily representable in a QA. This motivates the study of belief revision in formalisms extending QAs, namely, their propositional closures: in such a closure, the result of belief revision belongs to the formalism. Moreover, this makes it possible to define a contraction operator thanks to the Harper identity. Belief revision in the propositional closure of QAs is studied, an algorithm for a family of revision operators is designed, and an open-source implementation is made freely available on the web.


Forgetting in Action

AAAI Conferences

In this paper we develop a general framework that allows for both knowledge acquisition and forgetting in the Situation Calculus. Based on the Scherl and Levesque (Scherl and Levesque 1993) possible worlds approach to knowledge in the Situation Calculus, we allow for both sensing as well as explicit forgetting actions. This model of forgetting is then compared to existing frameworks. In particular we show that forgetting is well-behaved with respect to the contraction operator of the well-known AGM theory of belief revision (Alchourron, Gardenfors, and Makinson 1985) but that knowledge forgetting is distinct from the more commonly known notion of logical forgetting (Lin and Reiter 1994).


Belief Change and Semiorders

AAAI Conferences

A central result in the AGM framework for belief revision is the construction of revisionfunctions in terms of total preorders on possible worlds. These preorders encode comparative plausibility: r<r' states that the world r is at least as plausible as r'. Indifference in the plausibility of two worlds, r, r', denoted r~r', is defined as the absence of a preference between r and r'. Herein we take a closer look at plausibility indifference. We contend that the transitivity of indifference assumed in the AGM framework is not always a desirable property for comparative plausibility. Our argument originates from similar concerns in preference modelling, where a structure weaker than a total preorder, called a semiorder, is widely consider to be a more adequate model of preference. In this paper we essentially re-construct revision functions using semiorders instead of total preorders. We formulate postulates to characterisethis new, wider, class of revision functions, and prove that the postulates are sound and complete with respect to the semiorder-based construction. The corresponding class of contraction functions (via theLevi and Harper Identities) is also characterised axiomatically.


Belief Change and Base Dependence

AAAI Conferences

A strong intuition for AGM belief change operations, Gärdenfors suggests, is that formulas that are independent of a change should remain intact. Based on this intuition, Fariñas and Herzig axiomatize a dependence relation w.r.t. a belief set, and formalize the connection between dependence and belief change. In this paper, we introduce base dependence as a relation between formulas w.r.t. a belief base. After an axiomatization of base dependence, we formalize the connection between base dependence and a particular belief base change operation, saturated kernel contraction. Moreover, we prove that base dependence is a reversible generalization of Fariñas and Herzig’s dependence. That is, in the special case when the underlying belief base is deductively closed (i.e., it is a belief set), base dependence reduces to dependence. Finally, an intriguing feature of Fariñas and Herzig’s formalism is that it meets other criteria for dependence, namely, Keynes’ conjunction criterion for dependence (CCD) and Gärdenfors’ conjunction criterion for independence (CCI). We show that our base dependence formalism also meets these criteria. More interestingly, we offer a more specific criterion that implies both CCD and CCI, and show our base dependence formalism also meets this new criterion.


On Egalitarian Belief Merging

AAAI Conferences

Belief merging aims at defining the beliefs of a group of agents from the beliefs of each member of the group. It is related to more general notions of aggregation from economics (social choice theory). Two main subclasses of belief merging operators exist: majority operators which are related to utilitarianism, and arbitration operators which are related to egalitarianism. Though utilitarian (majority) operators have been extensively studied so far, there is much less work on egalitarian operators. In order to fill the gap, we investigate possible translations in a belief merging framework of some egalitarian properties and concepts coming from social choice theory, such as Sen-Hammond equity, Pigou- Dalton property, median, and Lorenz curves. We study how these properties interact with the standard rationality conditions considered in belief merging. Among other results, we show that the distance-based merging operators satisfying Sen-Hammond equity are mainly those for which leximax is used as the aggregation function.


On the Revision of Argumentation Systems: Minimal Change of Arguments Statuses

AAAI Conferences

In this paper, we investigate the revision of argumentation systems à la Dung. We focus on revision as minimal change of the arguments status. Contrarily to most of the previous works on the topic, the addition of new arguments is not allowed in the revision process, so that the revised system has to be obtained by modifying the attack relation only. We introduce a language of revision formulae which is expressive enough for enabling the representation of complex conditions on the acceptability of arguments in the revised system. We show how AGM belief revision postulates can be translated to the case of argumentation systems. We provide a corresponding representation theorem in terms of minimal change of the arguments statuses. Several distance-based revision operators satisfying the postulates are also pointed out, along with some methods to build revised argumentation systems. We also discuss some computational aspects of those methods.