Utilizing Vision-Language Models as Action Models for Intent Recognition and Assistance (Extended Abstract) Cesar Alan Contreras 1, Manolis Chiou 2, Alireza Rastegarpanah 3, Michal Szulik 4, Rustam Stolkin 1 1 School of Metallurgy & Materials, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2SE, United Kingdom 2 School of Electronic Engineering and Computer Science, Queen Mary University of London, London E14 4NS, United Kingdom 3 School of Computer Science and Digital Technologies, Aston University, Birmingham B4 7ET, United Kingdom 4 United Kingdom National Nuclear Laboratory Ltd., Warrington W A3 6AE, United Kingdom Abstract --Human-robot collaboration requires robots to quickly infer user intent, provide transparent reasoning, and assist users in achieving their goals. Our recent work introduced GUIDER, our framework for inferring navigation and manipulation intents. We propose augmenting GUIDER with a vision-language model (VLM) and a text-only language model (LLM) to form a semantic prior that filters objects and locations based on the mission prompt. A vision pipeline (YOLO for object detection and the Segment Anything Model for instance segmentation) feeds candidate object crops into the VLM, which scores their relevance given an operator prompt; in addition, the list of detected object labels is ranked by a text-only LLM. Once the combined belief exceeds a threshold, autonomy changes occur, enabling the robot to navigate to the desired area and retrieve the desired object, while adapting to any changes in the operator's intent.

What nodes and edges should be included in the augmented region graph?

In multi-agent environments, effective interaction hinges on understanding the beliefs and intentions of other agents. While prior work on goal recognition has largely treated the observer as a passive reasoner, Active Goal Recognition (AGR) focuses on strategically gathering information to reduce uncertainty. We adopt a probabilistic framework for Active Goal Recognition and propose an integrated solution that combines a joint belief update mechanism with a Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) algorithm, allowing the observer to plan efficiently and infer the actor's hidden goal without requiring domain-specific knowledge. Through comprehensive empirical evaluation in a grid-based domain, we show that our joint belief update significantly outperforms passive goal recognition, and that our domain-independent MCTS performs comparably to our strong domain-specific greedy baseline. These results establish our solution as a practical and robust framework for goal inference, advancing the field toward more interactive and adaptive multi-agent systems.

With the remarkable advancement of AI agents, the number of their equipped tools is increasing rapidly. However, integrating all tool information into the limited model context becomes impractical, highlighting the need for efficient tool retrieval methods. In this regard, dominant methods primarily rely on semantic similarities between tool descriptions and user queries to retrieve relevant tools. However, they often consider each tool independently, overlooking dependencies between tools, which may lead to the omission of prerequisite tools for successful task execution. To deal with this defect, in this paper, we propose Tool Graph Retriever (TGR), which exploits the dependencies among tools to learn better tool representations for retrieval. First, we construct a dataset termed TDI300K to train a discriminator for identifying tool dependencies. Then, we represent all candidate tools as a tool dependency graph and use graph convolution to integrate the dependencies into their representations. Finally, these updated tool representations are employed for online retrieval. Experimental results on several commonly used datasets show that our TGR can bring a performance improvement to existing dominant methods, achieving SOTA performance. Moreover, in-depth analyses also verify the importance of tool dependencies and the effectiveness of our TGR.

Belief systems are often treated as globally consistent sets of propositions or as scalar-valued probability distributions. Such representations tend to obscure the internal structure of belief, conflate external credibility with internal coherence, and preclude the modeling of fragmented or contradictory epistemic states. This paper introduces a minimal formalism for belief systems as directed, weighted graphs. In this framework, nodes represent individual beliefs, edges encode epistemic relationships (e.g., support or contradiction), and two distinct functions assign each belief a credibility (reflecting source trust) and a confidence (derived from internal structural support). Unlike classical probabilistic models, our approach does not assume prior coherence or require belief updating. Unlike logical and argumentation-based frameworks, it supports fine-grained structural representation without committing to binary justification status or deductive closure. The model is purely static and deliberately excludes inference or revision procedures. Its aim is to provide a foundational substrate for analyzing the internal organization of belief systems, including coherence conditions, epistemic tensions, and representational limits. By distinguishing belief structure from belief strength, this formalism enables a richer classification of epistemic states than existing probabilistic, logical, or argumentation-based approaches.

Robot-assisted surgery has revolutionized the healthcare industry by providing surgeons with greater precision, reducing invasiveness, and improving patient outcomes. However, the success of these surgeries depends heavily on the robotic system ability to accurately interpret the intentions of the surgical trainee or even surgeons. One critical factor impacting intent recognition is the cognitive workload experienced during the procedure. In our recent research project, we are building an intelligent adaptive system to monitor cognitive workload and improve learning outcomes in robot-assisted surgery. The project will focus on achieving a semantic understanding of surgeon intents and monitoring their mental state through an intelligent multi-modal assistive framework. This system will utilize brain activity, heart rate, muscle activity, and eye tracking to enhance intent recognition, even in mentally demanding situations. By improving the robotic system ability to interpret the surgeons intentions, we can further enhance the benefits of robot-assisted surgery and improve surgery outcomes.

Intelligence-biological, artificial, or collective-requires structural coherence across recursive reasoning processes to scale effectively. As complex systems grow, coherence becomes fragile unless a higher-order structure ensures semantic consistency. This paper introduces the Recursive Coherence Principle (RCP): a foundational constraint stating that for any reasoning system of order N, composed of systems operating over conceptual spaces of order N-1, semantic coherence is preserved only by a recursively evaluable generalization operator that spans and aligns those lower-order conceptual spaces. Crucially, this coherence enables structural alignment. Without recursive coherence, no system can reliably preserve goals, meanings, or reasoning consistency at scale. We formally define the Functional Model of Intelligence (FMI) as the only known operator capable of satisfying the RCP at any scale. The FMI is a minimal, composable architecture with internal functions (evaluation, modeling, adaptation, stability, decomposition, bridging) and external functions (storage, recall, System 1 and System 2 reasoning) vital for preserving semantic structure across inference and coordination layers. We prove that any system lacking the FMI will experience recursive coherence breakdown as it scales, arguing that common AI issues like misalignment, hallucination, and instability are symptoms of this structural coherence loss. Unlike other foundational principles, RCP uniquely captures the internal, recursive dynamics needed for coherent, alignable intelligence, modeling semantic coherence under recursion. This work significantly impacts AI alignment, advocating a shift from behavioral constraints to structural coherence, and offers a pathway for safely generalizable, robustly coherent AI at scale.

Dialectical systems are a mathematical formalism for modeling an agent updating a knowledge base seeking consistency. Introduced in the 1970s by Roberto Magari, they were originally conceived to capture how a working mathematician or a research community refines beliefs in the pursuit of truth. Dialectical systems also serve as natural models for the belief change of an automated agent, offering a unifying, computable framework for dynamic belief management. The literature distinguishes three main models of dialectical systems: (d-)dialectical systems based on revising beliefs when they are seen to be inconsistent, p-dialectical systems based on revising beliefs based on finding a counterexample, and q-dialectical systems which can do both. We answer an open problem in the literature by proving that q-dialectical systems are strictly more powerful than p-dialectical systems, which are themselves known to be strictly stronger than (d-)dialectical systems. This result highlights the complementary roles of counterexample and contradiction in automated belief revision, and thus also in the reasoning processes of mathematicians and research communities.

Within the formal setting of the Lockean thesis, an agent belief set is defined in terms of degrees of confidence and these are described in probabilistic terms. This approach is of established interest, notwithstanding some limitations that make its use troublesome in some contexts, like, for instance, in belief change theory. Precisely, Lockean belief sets are not generally closed under (classical) logical deduction. The aim of the present paper is twofold: on one side we provide two characterizations of those belief sets that are closed under classical logic deduction, and on the other we propose an approach to probabilistic update that allows us for a minimal revision of those beliefs, i.e., a revision obtained by making the fewest possible changes to the existing belief set while still accommodating the new information. In particular, we show how we can deductively close a belief set via a minimal revision.

The belief revision field is opulent in new proposals and indigent in analyses of existing approaches. Much work hinge on postulates, employed as syntactic characterizations: some revision mechanism is equivalent to some properties. Postulates constraint specific revision instances: certain revisions update certain beliefs in a certain way. As an example, if the revision is consistent with the current beliefs, it is incorporated with no other change. A postulate like this tells what revisions must do and neglect what they can do. Can they reach a certain state of beliefs? Can they reach all possible states of beliefs? Can they reach all possible states of beliefs from no previous belief? Can they reach a dogmatic state of beliefs, where everything not believed is impossible? Can they make two conditions equally believed? An application where every possible state of beliefs is sensible requires each state of beliefs to be reachable. An application where conditions may be equally believed requires such a belief state to be reachable. An application where beliefs may become dogmatic requires a way to make them dogmatic. Such doxastic states need to be reached in a way or another. Not in specific way, as dictated by a typical belief revision postulate. This is an ability, not a constraint: the ability of being plastic, equating, dogmatic. Amnesic, correcting, believer, damascan, learnable are other abilities. Each revision mechanism owns some of these abilities and lacks the others: lexicographic, natural, restrained, very radical, full meet, radical, severe, moderate severe, deep severe, plain severe and deep severe revisions, each of these revisions is proved to possess certain abilities.