Recent work has considered the problem of extending to the case of iterated belief change the so-called `Harper Identity' (HI), which defines single-shot contraction in terms of single-shot revision. The present paper considers the prospects of providing a similar extension of the Levi Identity (LI), in which the direction of definition runs the other way. We restrict our attention here to the three classic iterated revision operators--natural, restrained and lexicographic, for which we provide here the first collective characterisation in the literature, under the appellation of `elementary' operators. We consider two prima facie plausible ways of extending (LI). The first proposal involves the use of the rational closure operator to offer a `reductive' account of iterated revision in terms of iterated contraction. The second, which doesn't commit to reductionism, was put forward some years ago by Nayak et al. We establish that, for elementary revision operators and under mild assumptions regarding contraction, Nayak's proposal is equivalent to a new set of postulates formalising the claim that contraction by $\neg A$ should be considered to be a kind of `mild' revision by $A$. We then show that these, in turn, under slightly weaker assumptions, jointly amount to the conjunction of a pair of constraints on the extension of (HI) that were recently proposed in the literature. Finally, we consider the consequences of endorsing both suggestions and show that this would yield an identification of rational revision with natural revision. We close the paper by discussing the general prospects for defining iterated revision in terms of iterated contraction.

Public debate forums provide a common platform for exchanging opinions on a topic of interest. While recent studies in natural language processing (NLP) have provided empirical evidence that the language of the debaters and their patterns of interaction play a key role in changing the mind of a reader, research in psychology has shown that prior beliefs can affect our interpretation of an argument and could therefore constitute a competing alternative explanation for resistance to changing one's stance. To study the actual effect of language use vs. prior beliefs on persuasion, we provide a new dataset and propose a controlled setting that takes into consideration two reader level factors: political and religious ideology. We find that prior beliefs affected by these reader level factors play a more important role than language use effects and argue that it is important to account for them in NLP studies of persuasion.

When agents interact with a complex environment, they must form and maintain beliefs about the relevant aspects of that environment. We propose a way to efficiently train expressive generative models in complex environments. We show that a predictive algorithm with an expressive generative model can form stable belief-states in visually rich and dynamic 3D environments. More precisely, we show that the learned representation captures the layout of the environment as well as the position and orientation of the agent. Our experiments show that the model substantially improves data-efficiency on a number of reinforcement learning (RL) tasks compared with strong model-free baseline agents. We find that predicting multiple steps into the future (overshooting), in combination with an expressive generative model, is critical for stable representations to emerge. In practice, using expressive generative models in RL is computationally expensive and we propose a scheme to reduce this computational burden, allowing us to build agents that are competitive with model-free baselines.

Probabilistic epistemic argumentation allows for reasoning about argumentation problems in a way that is well founded by probability theory. Epistemic states are represented by probability functions over possible worlds and can be adjusted to new beliefs using update operators. While the use of probability functions puts this approach on a solid foundational basis, it also causes computational challenges as the amount of data to process depends exponentially on the number of arguments. This leads to bottlenecks in applications such as modelling opponent's beliefs for persuasion dialogues. We show how update operators over probability functions can be related to update operators over much more compact representations that allow polynomial-time updates. We discuss the cognitive and probabilistic-logical plausibility of this approach and demonstrate its applicability in computational persuasion.

The analysis of Belief Propagation and other algorithms for the {\em reconstruction problem} plays a key role in the analysis of community detection in inference on graphs, phylogenetic reconstruction in bioinformatics, and the cavity method in statistical physics. We prove a conjecture of Evans, Kenyon, Peres, and Schulman (2000) which states that any bounded memory message passing algorithm is statistically much weaker than Belief Propagation for the reconstruction problem. More formally, any recursive algorithm with bounded memory for the reconstruction problem on the trees with the binary symmetric channel has a phase transition strictly below the Belief Propagation threshold, also known as the Kesten-Stigum bound. The proof combines in novel fashion tools from recursive reconstruction, information theory, and optimal transport, and also establishes an asymptotic normality result for BP and other message-passing algorithms near the critical threshold.

Belief propagation is a fundamental message-passing algorithm for probabilistic reasoning and inference in graphical models. While it is known to be exact on trees, in most applications belief propagation is run on graphs with cycles. Understanding the behavior of "loopy" belief propagation has been a major challenge for researchers in machine learning, and positive convergence results for BP are known under strong assumptions which imply the underlying graphical model exhibits decay of correlations. We show that under a natural initialization, BP converges quickly to the global optimum of the Bethe free energy for Ising models on arbitrary graphs, as long as the Ising model is \emph{ferromagnetic} (i.e. neighbors prefer to be aligned). This holds even though such models can exhibit long range correlations and may have multiple suboptimal BP fixed points. We also show an analogous result for iterating the (naive) mean-field equations; perhaps surprisingly, both results are dimension-free in the sense that a constant number of iterations already provides a good estimate to the Bethe/mean-field free energy.

While research on iterated revision is predominant in the field of iterated belief change, the class of iterated contraction operators received more attention in recent years. In this article, we examine a non-prioritized generalisation of iterated contraction. In particular, the class of weak decrement operators is introduced, which are operators that by multiple steps achieve the same as a contraction. Inspired by Darwiche and Pearl's work on iterated revision the subclass of decrement operators is defined. For both, decrement and weak decrement operators, postulates are presented and for each of them a representation theorem in the framework of total preorders is given. Furthermore, we present two types of decrement operators which have a unique representative.

In some approaches, the input information is simply the whole Belief revision (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson epistemic as in (Benferhat et al. 2000). In this paper, the 1985; Williams 1995; Williams and Rott 2001), is an important new information will be represented by a consistent set of field of research in artificial intelligence and knowledge weighted propositional logic formulas.

Forgetting as a knowledge management operation has received much less attention than operations like inference, or revision. It was mainly in the area of logic programming that techniques and axiomatic properties have been studied systematically. However, at least from a cognitive view, forgetting plays an important role in restructuring and reorganizing a human's mind, and it is closely related to notions like relevance and independence which are crucial to knowledge representation and reasoning. In this paper, we propose axiomatic properties of (intentional) forgetting for general epistemic frameworks which are inspired by those for logic programming, and we evaluate various forgetting operations which have been proposed recently by Beierle et al. according to them. The general aim of this paper is to advance formal studies of (intentional) forgetting operators while capturing the many facets of forgetting in a unifying framework in which different forgetting operators can be contrasted and distinguished by means of formal properties.

Two different dynamic models for belief change during evidence monitoring were evaluated: Markov and quantum. They were empirically tested with an experiment in which participants monitored evidence for an initial period of time, made a probability rating, then monitored more evidence, before making a second rating. The models were qualitatively tested by manipulating the time intervals in a manner that provided a test for interference effects of the first rating on the second. The Markov model predicted no interference whereas the quantum model predicted interference. A quantitative comparison of the two models was also carried out using a generalization criterion method: the parameters were fit to data from one set of time intervals, and then these same parameters were used to predict data from another set of time intervals. The results indicated that some features of both Markov and quantum models are needed to accurately account for the results.