Learned neural solvers have successfully been used to solve combinatorial optimization and decision problems. More general counting variants of these problems, however, are still largely solved with hand-crafted solvers. To bridge this gap, we introduce belief propagation neural networks (BPNNs), a class of parameterized operators that operate on factor graphs and generalize Belief Propagation (BP). In its strictest form, a BPNN layer (BPNN-D) is a learned iterative operator that provably maintains many of the desirable properties of BP for any choice of the parameters. Empirically, we show that by training BPNN-D learns to perform the task better than the original BP: it converges 1.7x faster on Ising models while providing tighter bounds. On challenging model counting problems, BPNNs compute estimates 100's of times faster than state-of-the-art handcrafted methods, while returning an estimate of comparable quality.

The belief revision literature has largely focussed on the issue of how to revise one's beliefs in the light of information regarding matters of fact. Here we turn to an important but comparatively neglected issue: How might one extend a revision operator to handle conditionals as input? Our approach to this question of 'conditional revision' is distinctive insofar as it abstracts from the controversial details of how to revise by factual sentences. We introduce a 'plug and play' method for uniquely extending any iterated belief revision operator to the conditional case. The flexibility of our approach is achieved by having the result of a conditional revision by a Ramsey Test conditional ('arrow') determined by that of a plain revision by its corresponding material conditional ('hook'). It is shown to satisfy a number of new constraints that are of independent interest.

Belief propagation (BP) algorithm is a widely used message-passing method for inference in graphical models. BP on loop-free graphs converges in linear time. But for graphs with loops, BP's performance is uncertain, and the understanding of its solution is limited. To gain a better understanding of BP in general graphs, we derive an interpretable belief propagation algorithm that is motivated by minimization of a localized $\alpha$-divergence. We term this algorithm as $\alpha$ belief propagation ($\alpha$-BP). It turns out that $\alpha$-BP generalizes standard BP. In addition, this work studies the convergence properties of $\alpha$-BP. We prove and offer the convergence conditions for $\alpha$-BP. Experimental simulations on random graphs validate our theoretical results. The application of $\alpha$-BP to practical problems is also demonstrated.

Moores Paradox is a test case for any formal theory of belief. In Knowledge and Belief, Hintikka developed a multimodal logic for statements that express sentences containing the epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. His account purports to offer an explanation of the paradox. In this paper I argue that Hintikkas interpretation of one of the doxastic operators is philosophically problematic and leads to an unnecessarily strong logical system. I offer a weaker alternative that captures in a more accurate way our logical intuitions about the notion of belief without sacrificing the possibility of providing an explanation for problematic cases such as Moores Paradox.

Probability kinematics is a leading paradigm in probabilistic belief change. It is based on the idea that conditional beliefs should be independent from changes of their antecedents' probabilities. In this paper, we propose a re-interpretation of this paradigm for Spohn's ranking functions which we call Generalized Ranking Kinematics as a new principle for iterated belief revision of ranking functions by sets of conditional beliefs. This general setting also covers iterated revision by propositional beliefs. We then present c-revisions as belief change methodology that satisfies Generalized Ranking Kinematics.

Theory of Mind is commonly defined as the ability to attribute mental states (e.g., beliefs, goals) to oneself, and to others. A large body of previous work - from the social sciences to artificial intelligence - has observed that Theory of Mind capabilities are central to providing an explanation to another agent or when explaining that agent's behaviour. In this paper, we build and expand upon previous work by providing an account of explanation in terms of the beliefs of agents and the mechanism by which agents revise their beliefs given possible explanations. We further identify a set of desiderata for explanations that utilize Theory of Mind. These desiderata inform our belief-based account of explanation.

We present the Goal Uncertain Stochastic Shortest Path (GUSSP) problem -- a general framework to model path planning and decision making in stochastic environments with goal uncertainty. The framework extends the stochastic shortest path (SSP) model to dynamic environments in which it is impossible to determine the exact goal states ahead of plan execution. GUSSPs introduce flexibility in goal specification by allowing a belief over possible goal configurations. The unique observations at potential goals helps the agent identify the true goal during plan execution. The partial observability is restricted to goals, facilitating the reduction to an SSP with a modified state space. We formally define a GUSSP and discuss its theoretical properties. We then propose an admissible heuristic that reduces the planning time using FLARES -- a start-of-the-art probabilistic planner. We also propose a determinization approach for solving this class of problems. Finally, we present empirical results on a search and rescue mobile robot and three other problem domains in simulation.

Mathematical proofs are both paradigms of certainty and some of the most explicitly-justified arguments that we have in the cultural record. Their very explicitness, however, leads to a paradox, because their probability of error grows exponentially as the argument expands. Here we show that under a cognitively-plausible belief formation mechanism that combines deductive and abductive reasoning, mathematical arguments can undergo what we call an epistemic phase transition: a dramatic and rapidly-propagating jump from uncertainty to near-complete confidence at reasonable levels of claim-to-claim error rates. To show this, we analyze an unusual dataset of forty-eight machine-aided proofs from the formalized reasoning system Coq, including major theorems ranging from ancient to 21st Century mathematics, along with four hand-constructed cases from Euclid, Apollonius, Spinoza, and Andrew Wiles. Our results bear both on recent work in the history and philosophy of mathematics, and on a question, basic to cognitive science, of how we form beliefs, and justify them to others.

When agents interact with a complex environment, they must form and maintain beliefs about the relevant aspects of that environment. We propose a way to efficiently train expressive generative models in complex environments. We show that a predictive algorithm with an expressive generative model can form stable belief-states in visually rich and dynamic 3D environments. More precisely, we show that the learned representation captures the layout of the environment as well as the position and orientation of the agent. Our experiments show that the model substantially improves data-efficiency on a number of reinforcement learning (RL) tasks compared with strong model-free baseline agents.

Belief propagation is a fundamental message-passing algorithm for probabilistic reasoning and inference in graphical models. While it is known to be exact on trees, in most applications belief propagation is run on graphs with cycles. Understanding the behavior of loopy'' belief propagation has been a major challenge for researchers in machine learning, and several positive convergence results for BP are known under strong assumptions which imply the underlying graphical model exhibits decay of correlations. We show that under a natural initialization, BP converges quickly to the global optimum of the Bethe free energy for Ising models on arbitrary graphs, as long as the Ising model is \emph{ferromagnetic} (i.e. This holds even though such models can exhibit long range correlations and may have multiple suboptimal BP fixed points.