Probability kinematics is a leading paradigm in probabilistic belief change. It is based on the idea that conditional beliefs should be independent from changes of their antecedents' probabilities. In this paper, we propose a re-interpretation of this paradigm for Spohn's ranking functions which we call Generalized Ranking Kinematics as a new principle for iterated belief revision of ranking functions by sets of conditional beliefs. This general setting also covers iterated revision by propositional beliefs. We then present c-revisions as belief change methodology that satisfies Generalized Ranking Kinematics.

We show that a distributed network of robots or other devices which make measurements of each other can collaborate to globally localise via efficient ad-hoc peer to peer communication. Our Robot Web solution is based on Gaussian Belief Propagation on the fundamental non-linear factor graph describing the probabilistic structure of all of the observations robots make internally or of each other, and is flexible for any type of robot, motion or sensor. We define a simple and efficient communication protocol which can be implemented by the publishing and reading of web pages or other asynchronous communication technologies. We show in simulations with up to 1000 robots interacting in arbitrary patterns that our solution convergently achieves global accuracy as accurate as a centralised non-linear factor graph solver while operating with high distributed efficiency of computation and communication. Via the use of robust factors in GBP, our method is tolerant to a high percentage of faults in sensor measurements or dropped communication packets.

In this article, we consider iteration principles for contraction, with the goal of identifying properties for contractions that respect conditional beliefs. Therefore, we investigate and evaluate four groups of iteration principles for contraction which consider the dynamics of conditional beliefs. For all these principles, we provide semantic characterization theorems and provide formulations by postulates which highlight how the change of beliefs and of conditional beliefs is constrained, whenever that is possible. The first group is similar to the syntactic Darwiche-Pearl postulates. As a second group, we consider semantic postulates for iteration of contraction by Chopra, Ghose, Meyer and Wong, and by Konieczny and Pino P\'erez, respectively, and we provide novel syntactic counterparts. Third, we propose a contraction analogue of the independence condition by Jin and Thielscher. For the fourth group, we consider natural and moderate contraction by Nayak. Methodically, we make use of conditionals for contractions, so-called contractionals and furthermore, we propose and employ the novel notion of $ \alpha $-equivalence for formulating some of the new postulates.

Belief revision is the task of modifying a knowledge base when new information becomes available, while also respecting a number of desirable properties. Classical belief revision schemes have been already specialised to \emph{binary decision diagrams} (BDDs), the classical formalism to compactly represent propositional knowledge. These results also apply to \emph{ordered} BDDs (OBDDs), a special class of BDDs, designed to guarantee canonicity. Yet, those revisions cannot be applied to \emph{sentential decision diagrams} (SDDs), a typically more compact but still canonical class of Boolean circuits, which generalizes OBDDs, while not being a subclass of BDDs. Here we fill this gap by deriving a general revision algorithm for SDDs based on a syntactic characterisation of Dalal revision. A specialised procedure for DNFs is also presented. Preliminary experiments performed with randomly generated knowledge bases show the advantages of directly perform revision within SDD formalism.

Intent recognition is the natural language understanding (NLU) task of determining what general goal a user is trying to accomplish (e.g., finding out the weather forecast, booking a table at a restaurant, or adding a song to a playlist). What's tricky is there are many ways users may express an intent. For example, "Turn on the light" and "It's too dark in here; make it brighter" are just two of a plethora of ways of expressing the same "Light on" intent to a smart home device, but the two utterances are completely different on the surface in terms of syntax and vocabulary. A good intent recognizer should map both of those utterances to the same intent. More generally, a well-trained recognizer can account for the many ways people may express their goals in natural language and map them to the correct intent, which then triggers an action or response.

In this paper, we address the problem of finding a correspondence, or matching, between the functions of two programs in binary form, which is one of the most common task in binary diffing. We introduce a new formulation of this problem as a particular instance of a graph edit problem over the call graphs of the programs. In this formulation, the quality of a mapping is evaluated simultaneously with respect to both function content and call graph similarities. We show that this formulation is equivalent to a network alignment problem. We propose a solving strategy for this problem based on max-product belief propagation. Finally, we implement a prototype of our method, called QBinDiff, and propose an extensive evaluation which shows that our approach outperforms state of the art diffing tools.

We look at preference change arising out of an interaction between two elements: the first is an initial preference ranking encoding a pre-existing attitude; the second element is new preference information signaling input from an authoritative source, which may come into conflict with the initial preference. The aim is to adjust the initial preference and bring it in line with the new preference, without having to give up more information than necessary. We model this process using the formal machinery of belief change, along the lines of the well-known AGM approach. We propose a set of fundamental rationality postulates, and derive the main results of the paper: a set of representation theorems showing that preference change according to these postulates can be rationalized as a choice function guided by a ranking on the comparisons in the initial preference order. We conclude by presenting operators satisfying our proposed postulates. Our approach thus allows us to situate preference revision within the larger family of belief change operators.

The AGM postulates by Alchourr\'on, G\"ardenfors, and Makinson continue to represent a cornerstone in research related to belief change. Katsuno and Mendelzon (K&M) adopted the AGM postulates for changing belief bases and characterized AGM belief base revision in propositional logic over finite signatures. We generalize K&M's approach to the setting of (multiple) base revision in arbitrary Tarskian logics, covering all logics with a classical model-theoretic semantics and hence a wide variety of logics used in knowledge representation and beyond. Our generic formulation applies to various notions of "base" (such as belief sets, arbitrary or finite sets of sentences, or single sentences). The core result is a representation theorem showing a two-way correspondence between AGM base revision operators and certain "assignments": functions mapping belief bases to total - yet not transitive - "preference" relations between interpretations. Alongside, we present a companion result for the case when the AGM postulate of syntax-independence is abandoned. We also provide a characterization of all logics for which our result can be strengthened to assignments producing transitive preference relations (as in K&M's original work), giving rise to two more representation theorems for such logics, according to syntax dependence vs. independence.

Over the last couple of decades, there has been a considerable effort devoted to the problem of updating logic programs under the stable model semantics (a.k.a. answer-set programs) or, in other words, the problem of characterising the result of bringing up-to-date a logic program when the world it describes changes. Whereas the state-of-the-art approaches are guided by the same basic intuitions and aspirations as belief updates in the context of classical logic, they build upon fundamentally different principles and methods, which have prevented a unifying framework that could embrace both belief and rule updates. In this paper, we will overview some of the main approaches and results related to answer-set programming updates, while pointing out some of the main challenges that research in this topic has faced.

Is knowledge definable as justified true belief ("JTB")? We argue that one can legitimately answer positively or negatively, depending on whether or not one's true belief is justified by what we call adequate reasons. To facilitate our argument we introduce a simple propositional logic of reason-based belief, and give an axiomatic characterization of the notion of adequacy for reasons. We show that this logic is sufficiently flexible to accommodate various useful features, including quantification over reasons. We use our framework to contrast two notions of JTB: one internalist, the other externalist. We argue that Gettier cases essentially challenge the internalist notion but not the externalist one. Our approach commits us to a form of infallibilism about knowledge, but it also leaves us with a puzzle, namely whether knowledge involves the possession of only adequate reasons, or leaves room for some inadequate reasons. We favor the latter position, which reflects a milder and more realistic version of infallibilism.