A strong intuition for AGM belief change operations, Gärdenfors suggests, is that formulas that are independent of a change should remain intact. Based on this intuition, Fariñas and Herzig axiomatize a dependence relation w.r.t. a belief set, and formalize the connection between dependence and belief change. In this paper, we introduce base dependence as a relation between formulas w.r.t. a belief base. After an axiomatization of base dependence, we formalize the connection between base dependence and a particular belief base change operation, saturated kernel contraction. Moreover, we prove that base dependence is a reversible generalization of Fariñas and Herzig's dependence. That is, in the special case when the underlying belief base is deductively closed (i.e., it is a belief set), base dependence reduces to dependence. Finally, an intriguing feature of Fariñas and Herzig's formalism is that it meets other criteria for dependence, namely, Keynes' conjunction criterion for dependence (CCD) and Gärdenfors' conjunction criterion for independence (CCI). We show that our base dependence formalism also meets these criteria. More interestingly, we offer a more specific criterion that implies both CCD and CCI, and show our base dependence formalism also meets this new criterion.

In this paper, we investigate the revision of argumentation systems à la Dung. We focus on revision as minimal change of the arguments status. Contrarily to most of the previous works on the topic, the addition of new arguments is not allowed in the revision process, so that the revised system has to be obtained by modifying the attack relation only. We introduce a language of revision formulae which is expressive enough for enabling the representation of complex conditions on the acceptability of arguments in the revised system. We show how AGM belief revision postulates can be translated to the case of argumentation systems. We provide a corresponding representation theorem in terms of minimal change of the arguments statuses. Several distance-based revision operators satisfying the postulates are also pointed out, along with some methods to build revised argumentation systems. We also discuss some computational aspects of those methods.

This paper tackles the problem of evaluating the degree of inconsistency in spatial and temporal qualitative reasoning. We first introduce postulates to propose a formal framework for measuring inconsistency in this context. Then, we provide two inconsistency measures that can be useful in various AI applications. The first one is based on the number of constraints that we need to relax to get a consistent qualitative constraint network. The second inconsistency measure is based on variable restrictions to restore consistency. It is defined from the minimum number of variables that we need to ignore to recover consistency. We show that our proposed measures satisfy required postulates and other appropriate properties. Finally, we discuss the impact of our inconsistency measures on belief merging in qualitative reasoning.

Formalizing dynamics of argumentation has received increasing attention over the last years. While AGM-like representation results for revision of argumentation frameworks (AFs) are now available, similar results for the problem of merging are still missing. In this paper, we close this gap and adapt model-based propositional belief merging to define extension-based merging operators for AFs. We state an axiomatic and a constructive characterization of merging operators through a family of rationality postulates and a representation theorem. Then we exhibit merging operators which satisfy the postulates. In contrast to the case of revision, we observe that obtaining a single framework as result of merging turns out to be a more subtle issue. Finally, we establish links between our new results and previous approaches to merging of AFs, which mainly relied on axioms from Social Choice Theory, but lacked AGM-like representation theorems.

Belief propagation over Markov random fields has been successfully used in many AI applications since it yields accurate inference results by iteratively updating messages between nodes. However, its high computation costs are a barrier to practical use. This paper presents an efficient approach to belief propagation. Our approach, Quiet, dynamically detects converged messages to skip unnecessary updates in each iteration while it theoretically guarantees to output the same results as the standard approach used to implement belief propagation. Experiments show that our approach is significantly faster than existing approaches without sacrificing inference quality.

The AGM theory of belief revision is based on propositional belief sets. In this paper we develop a logic for revision of temporal belief bases, containing expressions about temporal propositions (tomorrow it will rain), possibility (it may rain tomorrow), actions (the robot enters the room) and pre- and post-conditions of these actions. We prove the Katsuno-Mendelzon and the Darwiche-Pearl representation theorems by restricting the logic to formulas representing beliefs up to certain time. We illustrate our belief change model through several examples.

A formal framework is given for the postulate characterizability of a class of belief revision operators, obtained from a class of partial preorders using minimization. It is shown that for classes of posets characterizability is equivalent to a special kind of definability in monadic second-order logic, which turns out to be incomparable to first-order definability. Several examples are given of characterizable and non-characterizable classes. For example, it is shown that the class of revision operators obtained from posets which are not total is not characterizable.

The AGM paradigm of belief change studies the dynamics of belief states in light of new information. Finding, or even approximating, dependent or relevant beliefs to a change is valuable because, for example, it can narrow the set of beliefs considered during belief change operations. Gärdenfors' preservation criterion (GPC) suggests that formulas independent of a belief change should remain intact. GPC allows to build dependence relations that are theoretically linked with belief change. Such dependence relations can in turn be used as a theoretical benchmark against which to evaluate other approximate dependence or relevance relations.

When a belief state is represented as a probability function P, the resulting belief state of the contraction of a sentence (belief) from the original belief state P can be given by the probabilistic version of the Harper Identity. Specifically, the result of contracting P by a sentence h is taken to be the mixture of two states: the original state P, and the resultant state P* h of revising P by the negation of h. What proportion of P and P* h should be used in this mixture remains an open issue and is largely ignored in literature. In this paper, we first classify different belief states by their stability, and then exploit the quantitative nature of probabilities and combine it with the basic ideas of argumentation theory to determine the mixture proportions. We, therefore, propose a novel approach to probabilistic belief contraction using argumentation.

Belief revision consists in modifying an epistemic state in the light of a new information. In this paper, we focus on the so-called multiple iterated belief revision process called c-revision. Epistemic states are represented in terms of penalty knowledge bases. The input is also a set of consistent weighted formulas. We show that crevision has a very natural counterpart in penalty logic.