Belief Revision

The "Your Actual Belief" Edition


Next week we're going to discuss the very controversial awards season contender, Nate Parker's The Birth of a Nation. Are you planning to see it in theaters? Record and send us a voice memo at or leave us a message at 646-580-1748 and your thoughts might get shared on next week's episode.

A deductive model of belief


Proceedings of the Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Karlsruhe, West Germany, 377-381

Semantical Considerations on Nonmonotonic Logic


In Proceedings of the Eighth IJCAI, pages 272-279. IJCAI, Karlsruhe, West Germany, August, 1983. Volume 1.

A truth maintenance system


To choose their actions, reasoning programs must be able to make assumptions and subsequently revise their beliefs when discoveries contradict these assumptions. The Truth Maintenance System (TMS) is a problem solver subsystem for performing these functions by recording and maintaining the reasons for program beliefs. Such recorded reasons are useful in constructing explanations of program actions and in guiding the course of action of a problem solver. This paper describes (1) the representations and structure of the TMS, (2) the mechanisms used to revise the current set of beliefs, (3) how dependency-directed backtracking changes the current set of assumptions, (4) techniques for summarizing explanations of beliefs, (5) how to organize problem solvers into "dialectically arguing" modules, (6) how to revise models of the belief systems of others, and (7) methods for embedding control structures in patterns of assumptions. We stress the need of problem solvers to choose between alternative systems of beliefs, and outline a mechanism by which a problem solver can employ rules guiding choices of what to believe, what to want, and what to do.Artificial Intelligence 12(3):231-272

Knowledge and belief: an introduction to the logic of the two notions


See also:Теория управления организационными системамиJSTOR: The Journal of Philosophy > Vol. 67, No. 21, Nov. 5, 1970 > Objects of Knowledge...Epistemology without knowledge and without belief, University of New England, 2004Cornell University Press