Robotics projects coupled with agent-oriented trends in artificial intelligence education have the potential to make introductory AI courses at liberal arts schools the gateway for a large new generation of AI practitioners. However, this vision's achievement requires programming libraries and low-cost platforms that are readily accessible to undergraduates and easily maintainable by instructors at sites with few dedicated resources. This article presents and evaluates one contribution toward implementing this vision: the RCXLisp library. The library was designed to support programming of the Lego Mindstorms platform in AI courses with the goal of using introductory robotics to motivate undergraduates' understanding of AI concepts within the agent-design paradigm. The library's evaluation reflects four years of student feedback on its use in a liberal-arts AI course whose audience covers a wide variety of majors. To help establish a context for judging RCXLisp's effectiveness this article also provides a sketch of the Mindstormsbased laboratory in which the library is used.

(MAICS 2006). AISB'06 Symposium on Exploration Antecedents and Consequences of Versus Exploitation in Naturally Inspired Emotion. (IIS 2006). (ASM 2006). Please Help Us Celebrate 50 Years of AI at IAAI-06 Join Us in Boston!

Utrecht is more than 1,300 years old and located in the center of the Netherlands, about 40 minutes by train from Amsterdam. School (EASSS 2005) for about 120 students, which was organized by Europe's coordination network for agent systems (AgentLink) and was as successful as previous summer schools in Utrecht, Saarbruecken, Prague, Barcelona, Bologna, and Liverpool. Overall, in the theory and practice of AAMAS 2005 had 778 academic and autonomous agents and multiagent industrial participants from 44 countries systems. AAMAS 2005 is the fourth on six continents. The main room of this can with some justification AAMAS 2005 was held on July building, in which the Treaty of claim to be one of the most active.

This article introduces Pyro, an open-source Python robotics toolkit for exploring topics in AI and robotics. We present key abstractions that allow Pyro controllers to run unchanged on a variety of real and simulated robots. We demonstrate Pyro's use in a set of curricular modules. We then describe how Pyro can provide a smooth transition for the student from symbolic agents to real-world robots, which significantly reduces the cost of learning to use robots. Finally we show how Pyro has been successfully integrated into existing AI and robotics courses.

This agent receives on-the-fiy requests from other (human) agents for tasks such as: bring copies of paper to David today, bring a book to George this afternoon, or warn Ronny immediately that a meeting is postponed. Each task requires a sequence of actions, such as: go to the location of the paper, get the paper, take the paper to the copy room, etc. The agent must plan its actions in real time in order to react effectively to the incoming stream of requested tasks.

We propose a new set of criteria for learning algorithms in multi-agent systems, one that is more stringent and (we argue) better justified than previous proposed criteria. Our criteria, which apply most straightforwardly in repeated games with average rewards, consist of three requirements: (a) against a specified class of opponents (this class is a parameter of the criterion) the algorithm yield a payoff that approaches the payoff of the best response, (b) against other opponents the algorithm's payoff at least approach (and possibly exceed) the security level payoff (or maximin value), and (c) subject to these requirements, the algorithm achieve a close to optimal payoff in self-play. We furthermore require that these average payoffs be achieved quickly. We then present a novel algorithm, and show that it meets these new criteria for a particular parameter class, the class of stationary opponents. Finally, we show that the algorithm is effective not only in theory, but also empirically. Using a recently introduced comprehensive game theoretic test suite, we show that the algorithm almost universally outperforms previous learning algorithms.

We consider multi-agent systems whose agents compete for resources by striving to be in the minority group. The agents adapt to the environment by reinforcement learning of the preferences of the policies they hold. Diversity of preferences of policies is introduced by adding random biases to the initial cumulative payoffs of their policies. We explain and provide evidence that agent cooperation becomes increasingly important when diversity increases. Analyses of these mechanisms yield excellent agreement with simulations over nine decades of data.

Learning in a multiagent system is a challenging problem due to two key factors. First, if other agents are simultaneously learning then the environment is no longer stationary, thus undermining convergence guarantees. Second, learning is often susceptible to deception, where the other agents may be able to exploit a learner's particular dynamics. In the worst case, this could result in poorer performance than if the agent was not learning at all. These challenges are identifiable in the two most common evaluation criteria for multiagent learning algorithms: convergence and regret.

Online mechanism design (OMD) addresses the problem of sequential decision making in a stochastic environment with multiple self-interested agents. The goal in OMD is to make value-maximizing decisions despite this self-interest. In previous work we presented a Markov decision process (MDP)-based approach to OMD in large-scale problem domains. In practice the underlying MDP needed to solve OMD is too large and hence the mechanism must consider approximations. This raises the possibility that agents may be able to exploit the approximation for selfish gain. We adopt sparse-sampling-based MDP algorithms to implement ɛ- efficient policies, and retain truth-revelation as an approximate Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Our approach is empirically illustrated in the context of the dynamic allocation of WiFi connectivity to users in a coffeehouse.

Online mechanism design (OMD) addresses the problem of sequential decision making in a stochastic environment with multiple self-interested agents. The goal in OMD is to make value-maximizing decisions despite this self-interest. In previous work we presented a Markov decision process (MDP)-based approach to OMD in large-scale problem domains. In practice the underlying MDP needed to solve OMD is too large and hence the mechanism must consider approximations. This raises the possibility that agents may be able to exploit the approximation for selfish gain. We adopt sparse-sampling-based MDP algorithms to implement ɛ- efficient policies, and retain truth-revelation as an approximate Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Our approach is empirically illustrated in the context of the dynamic allocation of WiFi connectivity to users in a coffeehouse.