We consider multi-agent systems where agents' preferences are aggregated via sequential majority voting: each decision is taken by performing a sequence of pairwise comparisons where each comparison is a weighted majority vote among the agents. Incompleteness in the agents' preferences is common in many real-life settings due to privacy issues or an ongoing elicitation process. In addition, there may be uncertainty about how the preferences are aggregated. For example, the agenda (a tree whose leaves are labelled with the decisions being compared) may not yet be known or fixed. We therefore study how to determine collectively optimal decisions (also called winners) when preferences may be incomplete, and when the agenda may be uncertain. We show that it is computationally easy to determine if a candidate decision always wins, or may win, whatever the agenda. On the other hand, it is computationally hard to know wheth er a candidate decision wins in at least one agenda for at least one completion of the agents' preferences. These results hold even if the agenda must be balanced so that each candidate decision faces the same number of majority votes. Such results are useful for reasoning about preference elicitation. They help understand the complexity of tasks such as determining if a decision can be taken collectively, as well as knowing if the winner can be manipulated by appropriately ordering the agenda.

Solving multiagent planning problems modeled as DEC-POMDPs is an important challenge.  These models are often solved by using dynamic programming, but the high resource usage of current approaches results in limited scalability.  To improve the efficiency of dynamic programming algorithms, we propose a new backup algorithm that is based on a reachability analysis of the state space.  This method, which we call incremental policy generation, can be used to produce an optimal solution for any possible initial state or further scalability can be achieved by making use of a known start state. When incorporated into the optimal dynamic programming algorithm, our experiments show that planning horizon can be increased due to a marked reduction in resource consumption. This approach also fits nicely with approximate dynamic programming algorithms.  To demonstrate this, we incorporate it into the state-of-the-art PBIP algorithm and show significant performance gains.  The results suggest  that the performance of other dynamic programming algorithms for DEC-POMDPs could be similarly improved by integrating the incremental policy generation approach.

An essential quality of a good partner is her responsiveness to other team members. Recent work in dynamic plan execution exhibits elements of this quality through the ability to adapt to the temporal uncertainties of others agents and the environment. However, a good teammate also has the ability to adapt on-the-fly through task assignment. We generalize the framework of dynamic execution to perform plan execution with dynamic task assignment as well as scheduling. This paper introduces Chaski, a multi-agent executive for scheduling temporal plans with online task assignment. Chaski enables an agent to dynamically update its plan in response to disturbances in task assignment and the schedule of other agents. The agent then uses the updated plan to choose, schedule and execute actions that are guaranteed to be temporally consistent and logically valid within the multi-agent plan. Chaski is made efficient through an incremental algorithm that compactly encodes all scheduling policies for all possible task assignments. We apply Chaski to perform multi-manipulator coordination using two Barrett Arms within the authors' hardware testbed. We empirically demonstrate up to one order of magnitude improvements in execution latency and solution compactness compared to prior art.

Distributed POMDPs provide an expressive framework for modeling multiagent collaboration problems, but NEXP-Complete complexity hinders their scalability and application in real-world domains. This paper introduces a subclass of distributed POMDPs, and TREMOR, an algorithm to solve such distributed POMDPs. The primary novelty of TREMOR is that agents plan individually with a single agent POMDP solver and use social model shaping to implicitly coordinate with other agents. Experiments demonstrate that TREMOR can provide solutions orders of magnitude faster than existing algorithms while achieving comparable, or even superior, solution quality.

Adaptive A* is an incremental version of A* that updates the h-values of the previous A* search to make them more informed and thus future A* searches more focused. In this paper, we show how the A* searches performed by Adaptive A* can reuse part of the path of the previous search and terminate before they expand a goal state, resulting in Path-Adaptive A*. We demonstrate experimentally that Path-Adaptive A* expands fewer states per search and runs faster than Adaptive A* when solving path-planning problems in initially unknown terrain.

We propose an online algorithm for planning under uncertainty in multi-agent settings modeled as DEC-POMDPs. The algorithm helps overcome the high computational complexity of solving such problems off-line. The key challenge is to produce coordinated behavior using little or no communication. When communication is allowed but constrained, the challenge is to produce high value with minimal communication. The algorithm addresses these challenges by communicating only when history inconsistency is detected, allowing communication to be postponed if necessary. Moreover, it bounds the memory usage at each step and can be applied to problems with arbitrary horizons. The experimental results confirm that the algorithm can solve problems that are too large for the best existing off-line planning algorithms and it outperforms the best online method, producing higher value with much less communication in most cases.

We describe in this article a multiagent urban traffic simulation, as we believe individual-based modeling is necessary to encompass the complex influence the actions of an individual vehicle can have on the overall flow of vehicles. We first describe how we build a graph description of the network from purely geometric data, ESRI shapefiles. We then explain how we include traffic related data to this graph. We go on after that with the model of the vehicle agents: origin and destination, driving behavior, multiple lanes, crossroads, and interactions with the other vehicles in day-to-day, ?ordinary? traffic. We conclude with the presentation of the resulting simulation of this model on the Rouen agglomeration.

In this paper, we investigate knowledge reasoning within a simple framework called knowledge structure. We use variable forgetting as a basic operation for one agent to reason about its own or other agents\' knowledge. In our framework, two notions namely agents\' observable variables and the weakest sufficient condition play important roles in knowledge reasoning. Given a background knowledge base and a set of observable variables for each agent, we show that the notion of an agent knowing a formula can be defined as a weakest sufficient condition of the formula under background knowledge base. Moreover, we show how to capture the notion of common knowledge by using a generalized notion of weakest sufficient condition. Also, we show that public announcement operator can be conveniently dealt with via our notion of knowledge structure. Further, we explore the computational complexity of the problem whether an epistemic formula is realized in a knowledge structure. In the general case, this problem is PSPACE-hard; however, for some interesting subcases, it can be reduced to co-NP. Finally, we discuss possible applications of our framework in some interesting domains such as the automated analysis of the well-known muddy children puzzle and the verification of the revised Needham-Schroeder protocol. We believe that there are many scenarios where the natural presentation of the available information about knowledge is under the form of a knowledge structure. What makes it valuable compared with the corresponding multi-agent S5 Kripke structure is that it can be much more succinct.

We study the complexity of influencing elections through bribery: How computationally complex is it for an external actor to determine whether by paying certain voters to change their preferences a specified candidate can be made the elections winner? We study this problem for election systems as varied as scoring protocols and Dodgson voting, and in a variety of settings regarding homogeneous-vs.-nonhomogeneous electorate bribability, bounded-size-vs.-arbitrary-sized candidate sets, weighted-vs.-unweighted voters, and succinct-vs.-nonsuccinct input specification. We obtain both polynomial-time bribery algorithms and proofs of the intractability of bribery, and indeed our results show that the complexity of bribery is extremely sensitive to the setting. For example, we find settings in which bribery is NP-complete but manipulation (by voters) is in P, and we find settings in which bribing weighted voters is NP-complete but bribing voters with individual bribe thresholds is in P. For the broad class of elections (including plurality, Borda, k-approval, and veto) known as scoring protocols, we prove a dichotomy result for bribery of weighted voters: We find a simple-to-evaluate condition that classifies every case as either NP-complete or in P.

A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the \emph{core}--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using external payments. We consider a scenario where an external party, which is interested in having the players work together, offers a supplemental payment to the grand coalition (or, more generally, a particular coalition structure). This payment is conditional on players not deviating from their coalition(s). The sum of this payment plus the actual gains of the coalition(s) may then be divided among the agents so as to promote stability. We define the \emph{cost of stability (CoS)} as the minimal external payment that stabilizes the game. We provide general bounds on the cost of stability in several classes of games, and explore its algorithmic properties. To develop a better intuition for the concepts we introduce, we provide a detailed algorithmic study of the cost of stability in weighted voting games, a simple but expressive class of games which can model decision-making in political bodies, and cooperation in multiagent settings. Finally, we extend our model and results to games with coalition structures.