Adjustable autonomy refers to entities dynamically varying their own autonomy, transferring decision-making control to other entities (typically agents transferring control to human users) in key situations. Determining whether and when such transfers-of-control should occur is arguably the fundamental research problem in adjustable autonomy. Previous work has investigated various approaches to addressing this problem but has often focused on individual agent-human interactions. Unfortunately, domains requiring collaboration between teams of agents and humans reveal two key shortcomings of these previous approaches. First, these approaches use rigid one-shot transfers of control that can result in unacceptable coordination failures in multiagent settings. Second, they ignore costs (e.g., in terms of time delays or effects on actions) to an agent's team due to such transfers-of-control. To remedy these problems, this article presents a novel approach to adjustable autonomy, based on the notion of a transfer-of-control strategy. A transfer-of-control strategy consists of a conditional sequence of two types of actions: (i) actions to transfer decision-making control (e.g., from an agent to a user or vice versa) and (ii) actions to change an agent's pre-specified coordination constraints with team members, aimed at minimizing miscoordination costs. The goal is for high-quality individual decisions to be made with minimal disruption to the coordination of the team. We present a mathematical model of transfer-of-control strategies. The model guides and informs the operationalization of the strategies using Markov Decision Processes, which select an optimal strategy, given an uncertain environment and costs to the individuals and teams. The approach has been carefully evaluated, including via its use in a real-world, deployed multi-agent system that assists a research group in its daily activities.

There is an increasing need for automated support for humans monitoring the activity of distributed teams of cooperating agents, both human and machine. We characterize the domain-independent challenges posed by this problem, and describe how properties of domains influence the challenges and their solutions. We will concentrate on dynamic, data-rich domains where humans are ultimately responsible for team behavior. Thus, the automated aid should interactively support effective and timely decision making by the human. We present a domain-independent categorization of the types of alerts a plan-based monitoring system might issue to a user, where each type generally requires different monitoring techniques. We describe a monitoring framework for integrating many domain-specific and task-specific monitoring techniques and then using the concept of value of an alert to avoid operator overload. We use this framework to describe an execution monitoring approach we have used to implement Execution Assistants (EAs) in two different dynamic, data-rich, real-world domains to assist a human in monitoring team behavior. One domain (Army small unit operations) has hundreds of mobile, geographically distributed agents, a combination of humans, robots, and vehicles. The other domain (teams of unmanned ground and air vehicles) has a handful of cooperating robots. Both domains involve unpredictable adversaries in the vicinity. Our approach customizes monitoring behavior for each specific task, plan, and situation, as well as for user preferences. Our EAs alert the human controller when reported events threaten plan execution or physically threaten team members. Alerts were generated in a timely manner without inundating the user with too many alerts (less than 10 percent of alerts are unwanted, as judged by domain experts).

Much work in AI deals with the selection of proper actions in a given (known or unknown) environment. However, the way to select a proper action when facing other agents is quite unclear. Most work in AI adopts classical game-theoretic equilibrium analysis to predict agent behavior in such settings. This approach however does not provide us with any guarantee for the agent. In this paper we introduce competitive safety analysis. This approach bridges the gap between the desired normative AI approach, where a strategy should be selected in order to guarantee a desired payoff, and equilibrium analysis. We show that a safety level strategy is able to guarantee the value obtained in a Nash equilibrium, in several classical computer science settings. Then, we discuss the concept of competitive safety strategies, and illustrate its use in a decentralized load balancing setting, typical to network problems. In particular, we show that when we have many agents, it is possible to guarantee an expected payoff which is a factor of 8/9 of the payoff obtained in a Nash equilibrium. Our discussion of competitive safety analysis for decentralized load balancing is further developed to deal with many communication links and arbitrary speeds. Finally, we discuss the extension of the above concepts to Bayesian games, and illustrate their use in a basic auctions setup.

There has been significant recent interest in game-theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game model. Among the major applications are the ARMOR program deployed at LAX Airport and the IRIS program in use by the US Federal Air Marshals (FAMS). The foundational assumption for using Stackelberg games is that security forces (leaders), acting first, commit to a randomized strategy; while their adversaries (followers) choose their best response after surveillance of this randomized strategy. Yet, in many situations, a leader may face uncertainty about the followers surveillance capability. Previous work fails to address how a leader should compute her strategy given such uncertainty. We provide five contributions in the context of a general class of security games. First, we show that the Nash equilibria in security games are interchangeable, thus alleviating the equilibrium selection problem. Second, under a natural restriction on security games, any Stackelberg strategy is also a Nash equilibrium strategy; and furthermore, the solution is unique in a class of security games of which ARMOR is a key exemplar. Third, when faced with a follower that can attack multiple targets, many of these properties no longer hold. Fourth, we show experimentally that in most (but not all) games where the restriction does not hold, the Stackelberg strategy is still a Nash equilibrium strategy, but this is no longer true when the attacker can attack multiple targets. Finally, as a possible direction for future research, we propose an extensive-form game model that makes the defenders uncertainty about the attackers ability to observe explicit.

The study of opinions, their formation and change, is one of the defining topics addressed by social psychology, but in recent years other disciplines, like computer science and complexity, have tried to deal with this issue. Despite the flourishing of different models and theories in both fields, several key questions still remain unanswered. The understanding of how opinions change and the way they are affected by social influence are challenging issues requiring a thorough analysis of opinion per se but also of the way in which they travel between agents' minds and are modulated by these exchanges. To account for the two-faceted nature of opinions, which are mental entities undergoing complex social processes, we outline a preliminary model in which a cognitive theory of opinions is put forward and it is paired with a formal description of them and of their spreading among minds. Furthermore, investigating social influence also implies the necessity to account for the way in which people change their minds, as a consequence of interacting with other people, and the need to explain the higher or lower persistence of such changes.

The study of opinions, their formation and change, is one of the defining topics addressed by social psychology, but in recent years other disciplines, as computer science and complexity, have addressed this challenge. Despite the flourishing of different models and theories in both fields, several key questions still remain unanswered. The aim of this paper is to challenge the current theories on opinion by putting forward a cognitively grounded model where opinions are described as specific mental representations whose main properties are put forward. A comparison with reputation will be also presented.

The relation between self awareness and intelligence is an open problem these days. Despite the fact that self awarness is usually related to Emotional Intelligence, this is not the case here. The problem described in this paper is how to model an agent which knows (Cognitive) Binary Logic and which is also able to pass (without any mistake) a certain family of Turing Tests designed to verify its knowledge and its discourse about the modal states of truth corresponding to well-formed formulae within the language of Propositional Binary Logic.

Recent years are seeing an increasing need for on-line monitoring of teams of cooperating agents, e.g., for visualization, or performance tracking. However, in monitoring deployed teams, we often cannot rely on the agents to always communicate their state to the monitoring system. This paper presents a non-intrusive approach to monitoring by 'overhearing', where the monitored team's state is inferred (via plan-recognition) from team-members' routine communications, exchanged as part of their coordinated task execution, and observed (overheard) by the monitoring system. Key challenges in this approach include the demanding run-time requirements of monitoring, the scarceness of observations (increasing monitoring uncertainty), and the need to scale-up monitoring to address potentially large teams. To address these, we present a set of complementary novel techniques, exploiting knowledge of the social structures and procedures in the monitored team: (i) an efficient probabilistic plan-recognition algorithm, well-suited for processing communications as observations; (ii) an approach to exploiting knowledge of the team's social behavior to predict future observations during execution (reducing monitoring uncertainty); and (iii) monitoring algorithms that trade expressivity for scalability, representing only certain useful monitoring hypotheses, but allowing for any number of agents and their different activities to be represented in a single coherent entity. We present an empirical evaluation of these techniques, in combination and apart, in monitoring a deployed team of agents, running on machines physically distributed across the country, and engaged in complex, dynamic task execution. We also compare the performance of these techniques to human expert and novice monitors, and show that the techniques presented are capable of monitoring at human-expert levels, despite the difficulty of the task.

We consider the problem of designing the the utility functions of the utility-maximizing agents in a multi-agent system so that they work synergistically to maximize a global utility. The particular problem domain we explore is the control of network routing by placing agents on all the routers in the network. Conventional approaches to this task have the agents all use the Ideal Shortest Path routing Algorithm (ISPA). We demonstrate that in many cases, due to the side-effects of one agent's actions on another agent's performance, having agents use ISPA's is suboptimal as far as global aggregate cost is concerned, even when they are only used to route infinitesimally small amounts of traffic. The utility functions of the individual agents are not "aligned" with the global utility, intuitively speaking. As a particular example of this we present an instance of Braess' paradox in which adding new links to a network whose agents all use the ISPA results in a decrease in overall throughput. We also demonstrate that load-balancing, in which the agents' decisions are collectively made to optimize the global cost incurred by all traffic currently being routed, is suboptimal as far as global cost averaged across time is concerned. This is also due to 'side-effects', in this case of current routing decision on future traffic. The mathematics of Collective Intelligence (COIN) is concerned precisely with the issue of avoiding such deleterious side-effects in multi-agent systems, both over time and space. We present key concepts from that mathematics and use them to derive an algorithm whose ideal version should have better performance than that of having all agents use the ISPA, even in the infinitesimal limit. We present experiments verifying this, and also showing that a machine-learning-based version of this COIN algorithm in which costs are only imprecisely estimated via empirical means (a version potentially applicable in the real world) also outperforms the ISPA, despite having access to less information than does the ISPA. In particular, this COIN algorithm almost always avoids Braess' paradox.

Imitation can be viewed as a means of enhancing learning in multiagent environments. It augments an agent's ability to learn useful behaviors by making intelligent use of the knowledge implicit in behaviors demonstrated by cooperative teachers or other more experienced agents. We propose and study a formal model of implicit imitation that can accelerate reinforcement learning dramatically in certain cases. Roughly, by observing a mentor, a reinforcement-learning agent can extract information about its own capabilities in, and the relative value of, unvisited parts of the state space. We study two specific instantiations of this model, one in which the learning agent and the mentor have identical abilities, and one designed to deal with agents and mentors with different action sets. We illustrate the benefits of implicit imitation by integrating it with prioritized sweeping, and demonstrating improved performance and convergence through observation of single and multiple mentors. Though we make some stringent assumptions regarding observability and possible interactions, we briefly comment on extensions of the model that relax these restricitions.