Creating accurate computational models of human decision making is a vital step towards the realization of socially intelligent systems capable of both predicting and simulating human behavior. In modeling human decision making, a key factor is the psychological phenomenon known as "framing", in which the preferences of a decision maker change in response to contextual changes in decision problems. Existing approaches treat framing as a one-dimensional contextual influence based on the perception of outcomes as either gains or losses. However, empirical studies have shown that framing effects are much more multifaceted than one-dimensional views of framing suggest. To address this limitation, we propose an integrative approach to modeling framing which combines the psychological principles of cognitive appraisal theories and decision-theoretic notions of utility and probability. We show that this approach allows for both the identification and computation of the salient contextual factors in a decision as well as modeling how they ultimately affect the decision process. Furthermore, we show that our multi-dimensional, appraisal-based approach can account for framing effects identified in the empirical literature which cannot be addressed by one-dimensional theories, thereby promising more accurate models of human behavior.

Opponent modeling is a critical mechanism in repeated games. It allows a player to adapt its strategy in order to better respond to the presumed preferences of his opponents. We introduce a new modeling technique that adaptively balances exploitability and risk reduction. An opponent’s strategy is modeled with a set of possible strategies that contain the actual strategy with a high probability. The algorithm is safe as the expected payoff is above the minimax payoff with a high probability, and can exploit the opponents’ preferences when sufficient observations have been obtained. We apply them to normal-form games and stochastic games with a finite number of stages. The performance of the proposed approach is first demonstrated on repeated rock-paper-scissors games. Subsequently, the approach is evaluated in a human-robot table-tennis setting where the robot player learns to prepare to return a served ball. By modeling the human players, the robot chooses a forehand, backhand or middle preparation pose before they serve. The learned strategies can exploit the opponent’s preferences, leading to a higher rate of successful returns.

Automated agents for electricity markets, social networks, and other distributed networks must repeatedly interact with other intelligent agents, often without observing associates' actions or payoffs (i.e., minimal information). Given this reality, our goal is to create algorithms that learn effectively in repeated games played with minimal information. As in other applications of machine learning, the success of a learning algorithm in repeated games depends on its learning bias. To better understand what learning biases are most successful, we analyze the learning biases of previously published multi-agent learning (MAL) algorithms. We then describe a new algorithm that adapts a successful learning bias from the literature to minimal information environments. Finally, we compare the performance of this algorithm with ten other algorithms in repeated games played with minimal information.

The conventional model of coalition formation considers every possible subset of agents as a potential coalition. However, in many real-world applications, there are inherent constraints on feasible coalitions: for instance, certain agents may be prohibited from being in the same coalition, or the coalition structure may be required to consist of coalitions of the same size. In this paper, we present the first systematic study of constrained coalition formation (CCF). We propose a general framework for this problem, and identify an important class of CCF settings, where the constraints specify which groups of agents should/should not work together. We describe a procedure that transforms such constraints into a structured input that allows coalition formation algorithms to identify, without any redundant computations, all the feasible coalitions. We then use this procedure to develop an algorithm for generating an optimal (welfare-maximizing) constrained coalition structure, and show that it outperforms existing state-of-the-art approaches by several orders of magnitude.

We present the initial stage of our research on Learning from Demonstration algorithms. We have implemented an algorithm based on Confident Execution, one of the components of the Confidence-Based Autonomy algorithm developed by Chernova and Veloso. Our preliminary experiments were conducted first in simulation and then using a Sony AIBO ERS-7 robot. So far, our robot has been able to learn crude navigation strategies, despite limited trials. We are currently working on improving our implementation by including additional features that describe more broadly the state of the agent. Our long term goal is to incorporate Learning from Demonstration techniques in our HRTeam (human/multi-robot) framework.

This paper studies how automated agents can persuade humans to behave in certain ways. The motivation behind such agent's behavior resides in the utility function that the agent's designer wants to maximize and which may be different from the user's utility function. Specifically, in the strategic settings studied, the agent provides correct yet partial information about a state of the world that is unknown to the user but relevant to his decision. Persuasion games were designed to study interactions between automated players where one player sends state information to the other to persuade it to behave in a certain way. We show that this game theory based model is not sufficient to model human-agent interactions, since people tend to deviate from the rational choice. We use machine learning to model such deviation in people from this game theory based model. The agent generates a probabilistic description of the world state that maximizes its benefit and presents it to the users. The proposed model was evaluated in an extensive empirical study involving road selection tasks that differ in length, costs and congestion. Results showed that people's behavior indeed deviated significantly from the behavior predicted by the game theory based model. Moreover, the agent developed in our model performed better than an agent that followed the behavior dictated by the game-theoretical models.

An ad hoc team setting is one in which teammates must work together to obtain a common goal, but without any prior agreement regarding how to work together. In this abstract we present a role-based approach for ad hoc teamwork, in which each teammate is inferred to be following a specialized role that accomplishes a specific task or exhibits a particular behavior. In such cases, the role an ad hoc agent should select depends both on its own capabilities and on the roles currently selected by the other team members. We present methods for evaluating the influence of the ad hoc agent's role selection on the team's utility and we examine empirically how to select the best suited method for role assignment in a complex environment. Finally, we show that an appropriate assignment method can be determined from a limited amount of data and used successfully in similar new tasks that the team has not encountered before.

When interacting with computer agents, people make inferences about various characteristics of these agents, such as their reliability and trustworthiness. These perceptions are significant, as they influence people's behavior towards the agents, and may foster or inhibit repeated interactions between them. In this paper we investigate whether computer agents can use the expression of emotion to influence human perceptions of trustworthiness. In particular, we study human-computer interactions within the context of a negotiation game, in which players make alternating offers to decide on how to divide a set of resources. A series of negotiation games between a human and several agents is then followed by a "trust game." In this game people have to choose one among several agents to interact with, as well as how much of their resources they will trust to it. Our results indicate that, among those agents that displayed emotion, those whose expression was in accord with their actions (strategy) during the negotiation game were generally preferred as partners in the trust game over those whose emotion expressions and actions did not mesh. Moreover, we observed that when emotion does not carry useful new information, it fails to strongly influence human decision-making behavior in a negotiation setting.

We consider the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous divisible good among agents with different preferences. Previous work has shown that envy-free allocations, i.e., where each agent prefers its own allocation to any other, may not be efficient, in the sense of maximizing the total value of the agents. Our goal is to pinpoint the most efficient allocations among all envy-free allocations. We provide tractable algorithms for doing so under different assumptions regarding the preferences of the agents.

In multiagent team settings, the agents are often given a protocol for coordinating their actions. When such a protocol is not available, agents must engage in ad hoc teamwork to effectively cooperate with one another. A fully general ad hoc team agent needs to be capable of collaborating with a wide range of potential teammates on a varying set of joint tasks. This paper extends previous research in a new direction with the introduction of an efficient method for reasoning about the value of information.  Then, we show how previous theoretical results can aid ad hoc agents in a set of testbed pursuit domains.