Sustainable energy systems of the future will no longer be able to rely on the current paradigm that energy supply follows demand. Many of the renewable energy resources do not produce power on demand, and therefore there is a need for new market structures that motivate sustainable behaviors by participants. The Power Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC) is a new annual competition that focuses on the design and operation of future retail power markets, specifically in smart grid environments with renewable energy production, smart metering, and autonomous agents acting on behalf of customers and retailers. It uses a rich, open-source simulation platform that is based on real-world data and state-of-the-art customer models. Its purpose is to help researchers understand the dynamics of customer and retailer decision-making, as well as the robustness of proposed market designs. This paper introduces TacTex'13, the champion agent from the inaugural competition in 2013. TacTex'13 learns and adapts to the environment in which it operates, by heavily relying on reinforcement learning and prediction methods. This paper describes the constituent components of TacTex'13 and examines its success through analysis of competition results and subsequent controlled experiments.

The fair division of indivisible goods has long been an important topic in economics and, more recently, computer science. We investigate the existence of envy-free allocations of indivisible goods, that is, allocations where each player values her own allocated set of goods at least as highly as any other player's allocated set of goods. Under additive valuations, we show that even when the number of goods is larger than the number of agents by a linear fraction, envy-free allocations are unlikely to exist. We then show that when the number of goods is larger by a logarithmic factor, such allocations exist with high probability. We support these results experimentally and show that the asymptotic behavior of the theory holds even when the number of goods and agents is quite small. We demonstrate that there is a sharp phase transition from nonexistence to existence of envy-free allocations, and that on average the computational problem is hardest at that transition.

Examples range from multiagent planning, That is, we look for the most representative voter and return to crowdsourcing and human computation, to collaborative her ballot as the outcome. In our example, a natural choice filtering for recommender systems, to rank aggregation would be any of the voters voting (0, 1, 1). The distance of for search engines, to coordination and resource allocation this choice to the individual ballots is 42 (21 voters disagree in multiagent systems. Several frameworks have been on 2 issues each), i.e., this solution is only marginally worse proposed in the literature on computational social choice than the solution returned by the distance-based rule--and it (Chevaleyre et al. 2007; Brandt, Conitzer, and Endriss 2013) is optimal in case (1, 1, 1) is infeasible.

We investigate synergy, or lack thereof, between agents in cooperative games, building on the popular notion of Shapley value. We think of a pair of agents as synergistic (resp., antagonistic) if the Shapley value of one agent when the other agent participates in a joint effort is higher (resp. lower) than when the other agent does not participate. Our main theoretical result is that any graph specifying synergistic and antagonistic pairs can arise even from a restricted class of cooperative games. We also study the computational complexity of determining whether a given pair of agents is synergistic. Finally, we use the concepts developed in the paper to uncover the structure of synergies in two real-world organizations, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund.

Stackelberg security games (SSGs) have been deployed in a number of real-world domains. One key challenge in these applications is the assessment of attacker payoffs, which may not be perfectly known. Previous work has studied SSGs with uncertain payoffs modeled by interval uncertainty and provided maximin-based robust solutions. In contrast, in this work we propose the use of the less conservative minimax regret decision criterion for such payoff-uncertain SSGs and present the first algorithms for computing minimax regret for SSGs. We also address the challenge of preference elicitation, using minimax regret to develop the first elicitation strategies for SSGs. Experimental results validate the effectiveness of our approaches.

We introduce the simultaneous model for cake cutting (the fair allocation of a divisible good), in which agents simultaneously send messages containing a sketch of their preferences over the cake. We show that this model enables the computation of divisions that satisfy proportionality -- a popular fairness notion -- using a protocol that circumvents a standard lower bound via parallel information elicitation. Cake divisions satisfying another prominent fairness notion, envy-freeness, are impossible to compute in the simultaneous model, but admit arbitrarily good approximations.

The probabilistic serial rule is one of the most well-established and desirable rules for the random assignment problem. We present the egalitarian simultaneous reservation social decision scheme – an extension of probabilistic serial to the more general setting of randomized social choice. We consider various desirable fairness, efficiency, and strategic properties of social decision schemes and show that egalitarian simultaneous reservation compares favorably against existing rules. Finally, we define a more general class of social decision schemes called simultaneous reservation, that contains egalitarian simultaneous reservation as well as the serial dictatorship rules. We show that outcomes of simultaneous reservation characterize efficiency with respect to a natural refinement of stochastic dominance.

Researchers have introduced the Dynamic Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (Dynamic DCOP) formulation to model dynamically changing multi-agent coordination problems, where a dynamic DCOP is a sequence of (static canonical) DCOPs, each partially different from the DCOP preceding it. Existing work typically assumes that the problem in each time step is decoupled from the problems in other time steps, which might not hold in some applications. Therefore, in this paper, we make the following contributions: (i) We introduce a new model, called Markovian Dynamic DCOPs (MD-DCOPs), where the DCOP in the next time step is a function of the value assignments in the current time step; (ii) We introduce two distributed reinforcement learning algorithms, the Distributed RVI Q-learning algorithm and the Distributed R-learning algorithm, that balance exploration and exploitation to solve MD-DCOPs in an online manner; and (iii) We empirically evaluate them against an existing multi-arm bandit DCOP algorithm on dynamic DCOPs.

Online mechanism design has been widely applied to various practical applications. However, designing a strategy-proof online mechanism is much more challenging than that in a static scenario due to short of knowledge of future information. In this paper, we investigate online auctions with time discounting values, in contrast to the flat values studied in most of existing work. We present a strategy-proof 2-competitive online auction mechanism despite of time discounting values. We also implement our design and compare it with off-line optimal solution. Our numerical results show that our design achieves good performance in terms of social welfare, revenue, average winning delay, and average valuation loss.

Selecting good conference keywords is important because they often determine the composition of review committees and hence which papers are reviewed by whom. But presently conference keywords are generated in an ad-hoc manner by a small set of conference organizers. This approach is plainly not ideal. There is no guarantee, for example, that the generated keyword set aligns with what the community is actually working on and submitting to the conference in a given year. This is especially true in fast moving fields such as AI. The problem is exacerbated by the tendency of organizers to draw heavily on preceding years' keyword lists when generating a new set. Rather than a select few ordaining a keyword set that that represents AI at large, it would be preferable to generate these keywords more directly from the data, with input from research community members. To this end, we solicited feedback from seven AAAI PC members regarding a previously existing keyword set and used these 'community-sourced constraints' to inform a clustering over the abstracts of all submissions to AAAI 2013. We show that the keywords discovered via this data-driven, human-in-the-loop method are at least as preferred (by AAAI PC members) as 2013's manually generated set, and that they include categories previously overlooked by organizers. Many of the discovered terms were used for this year's conference.