The presented framework is the The multirobot coalition formation problem seeks to intelligently first to leverage a conceptual clustering technique to partition partition a team of heterogeneous robots into any set of coalition formation algorithms in order to derive coalitions for a set of real-world tasks. Besides being N Pan optimal hierarchy classification tree, given any classification complete (Sandholm et al. 1999), the problem is also hard taxonomy. The results contribute to the state-ofthe-art to approximate (Service and Adams 2011a). Traditional approaches in multiagent systems by demonstrating the existence to solving the problem include a number of greedy of crucial patterns and intricate relationships among existing algorithms (Shehory and Kraus 1998; Vig and Adams coalition algorithms.

In this paper we consider a scenario where one or more robotic bodyguards are protecting an important individual (VIP) moving in a public space against harassment or harm from unarmed civilians. In this scenario, the main objective of the robots is to position themselves such that at any given moment they provide maximum physical cover for the VIP. The robots need to follow the VIP in its movement and take into account the movements of the civilians as well. The environment can also contain obstacles which present challenges to movement but also provide natural cover. We designed two algorithms for the movement of the bodyguard robots: Threat Vector Resolution (TVR) for a single robot and Quadrant Load Balancing (QLB) for teams of bodyguard robots. We evaluated the proposed approaches against rigid formations in a simulation study.

Understanding trust, influence and reputation and constructing computational models of these notions are two essential scientific challenges in computer science as well as social sciences. Although scientists in both disciplines have independently conducted research on these topics over the last couple of decades, there is a huge gap between two literatures. This paper therefore illustrates an interdisciplinary work-in-progress on trust, influence and reputation modeling based on human reasoning. Using a survey-based data collection approach, we would like to understand how humans gain/lose trust in their daily life interactions and how behavior/attitudes of humans can be influenced or shaped in various social encounters. The data will be then transformed into mathematical models to be used in technological or software systems.

We consider a strategic variant of the facility location problem. We would like to locate a facility on a closed interval. There are n agents located on that interval, divided into two types: type 1 agents, who wish for the facility to be as far from them as possible, and type 2 agents, who wish for the facility to be as close to them as possible. Our goal is to maximize a form of aggregated social benefit: maxisum– the sum of the agents’ utilities, or the egalitarian objective– the minimal agent utility. The strategic aspect of the problem is that the agents’ locations are not known to us, but rather reported to us by the agents– an agent might misreport his location in an attempt to move the facility away from or towards to his true location. We therefore require the facility-locating mechanism to be strategyproof, namely that reporting truthfully is a dominant strategy for each agent. As simply maximizing the social benefit is generally not strategyproof, our goal is to design strategyproof mechanisms with good approximation ratios. In this paper, we provide a best-possible 3approximate deterministic strategyproof mechanism, as well as a 23/13 approximate randomized strategyproof mechanism, both for the maxisum objective. We provide lower bounds of 3 and 3/2 on the approximation ratio attainable for maxisum, in the deterministic and randomized settings, respectively. For the egalitarian objective, we show that no bounded approximation ratio is attainable in the deterministic setting, and provide a lower bound of 3/2 for the randomized setting. To obtain our deterministic lower bounds, we characterize all deterministic strategyproof mechanisms when all agents are of type 1. Finally, while still restricting ourselves to agents of type 1 only, we consider a generalized model that allows an agent to control more than one location. In this generalized model, we provide best-possible 3and 3 approximate strategyproof 2 mechanisms for the maxisum objective in the deterministic and randomized settings, respectively.

The leading approach for solving large imperfect-information games is automated abstraction followed by running an equilibrium-finding algorithm. We introduce a distributed version of the most commonly used equilibrium-finding algorithm, counterfactual regret minimization (CFR), which enables CFR to scale to dramatically larger abstractions and numbers of cores. The new algorithm begets constraints on the abstraction so as to make the pieces running on different computers disjoint. We introduce an algorithm for generating such abstractions while capitalizing on state-of-the-art abstraction ideas such as imperfect recall and earth-mover's distance. Our techniques enabled an equilibrium computation of unprecedented size on a supercomputer with a high inter-blade memory latency. Prior approaches run slowly on this architecture. Our approach also leads to a significant improvement over using the prior best approach on a large shared-memory server with low memory latency. Finally, we introduce a family of post-processing techniques that outperform prior ones. We applied these techniques to generate an agent for two-player no-limit Texas Hold'em that won the 2014 Annual Computer Poker Competition, beating each opponent with statistical significance.

Exploiting parallelism is a key strategy for speeding up computation. However, on hard combinatorial problems, such a strategy has been surprisingly challenging due to the intricate variable interactions. In this paper we introduce a novel way in which parallelism can be used to exploit hidden structure of hard combinatorial problems, orthogonal to divide-and-conquer and portfolio approaches. We demonstrate the success of this approach on the minimal set basis problem, which has a wide range of applications e.g., in optimization, machine learning, and system security. We also show the effectiveness of our approach on a related application problem from materials discovery. In our approach, a large number of smaller sub-problems are identified and solved concurrently. We then aggregate the information from those solutions, and use this information to initialize the search of a global, complete solver. We show that this strategy leads to a significant speed-up over a sequential approach since the aggregated sub-problem solution information often provides key structural insights to the complete solver. Our approach also greatly outperforms state-of-the-art incomplete solvers in terms of solution quality. Our work opens up a novel angle for using parallelism to solve hard combinatorial problems.

Saving energy is a major concern. Hence, it is fundamental to design and construct buildings that are energy-efficient. It is known that the early stage of architectural design has a significant impact on this matter. However, it is complex to create designs that are optimally energy efficient, and at the same time balance other essential criterias such as economics, space, and safety. One state-of-the art approach is to create parametric designs, and use a genetic algorithm to optimize across different objectives. We further improve this method, by aggregating the solutions of multiple agents. We evaluate diverse teams, composed by different agents; and uniform teams, composed by multiple copies of a single agent. We test our approach across three design cases of increasing complexity, and show that the diverse team provides a significantly larger percentage of optimal solutions than single agents.

Taxi service is an indispensable part of public transport in modern cities. The taxi system is operated by a large number of self-controlled drivers lacking of centralized scheduling and control, which makes it inefficient, difficult to analyze and optimize. It is thus important to take into account taxi drivers' strategic behavior in order to optimize taxi systems' efficiency. This paper reviews existing taxi system researches for modeling taxi system dynamics, introduces the taxi system efficiency optimization problem, and presents a game theoretic approach for optimizing the efficiency of taxi systems. Challenges and open issues in the taxi system efficiency optimization problem are also discussed.

This paper introduces a novel autonomous interactive learning cooperative (ILCP) who receives expected value and variance of load from consumers and participates in the electricity market on their behalf. Using an axiomatic approach, the share of each consumer's payment as well as its weight in calculating the modification of total day-ahead load are formulated. This scheme applies double-seasonal smoothing exponential, a recent load forecasting technique, and a classifier for real-time to day-ahead price direction forecasting (Gaussian Naïve Bayes). In addition to this, the ILCP employs interactive cooperative algorithms for both trading cooperative and consumer side. The ILCP scheme is investigated and its performance is compared to those of non-cooperative real-time pricing (RTP), LCP (non-interactive learning cooperative) and CP (non-interactive non-learning cooperative). The developed system was implemented using PJM(world's largest  wholesale electricity market) real-time and day-ahead data for 2013 and half of 2014; real load profiles were selected from a set of 579 residential and commercial consumers, and weather data were applied to forecasting electricity price direction. We demonstrate the advantages of ILCP to lower the average electricity cost and to reduce unit price variations.

Communication involves transferring information from one agent to another. An intelligent agent, either human or machine, is often able to choose to hide information in order to protect their interests. The notion of information hiding is closely linked to secrecy and dishonesty, but it also plays an important role in domains such as software engineering. In this paper, we consider the ethics of information hiding, particularly with respect to intelligent agents. In other words, we are concerned with situations that involve a human and an intelligent agent with access to different information. Is the intelligent agent justified in preventing a human user from accessing the information that they possess? This is trivially true in the case where access control systems exist. However, we are concerned with the situation where an intelligent agent is able to using a reasoning system to decide not to share information with all humans. On the other hand, we are also concerned with situations where humans hide information from machines. Are we ever under a moral obligation to share information with a computional agent? We argue that questions of this form are increasingly important now, as people are increasingly willing to divulge private information to machines with a great capacity to reason with that information and share it with others.