Deciding the outcome of an election when voters have provided only partial orderings over their preferences requires voting rules that accommodate missing data. While existing techniques, including considerable recent work, address missingness through circumvention, we propose the novel application of conventional machine learning techniques to predict the missing components of ballots via latent patterns in the information that voters are able to provide. We show that suitable predictive features can be extracted from the data, and demonstrate the high performance of our new framework on the ballots from many real world elections, including comparisons with existing techniques for voting with partial orderings. Our technique offers a new and interesting conceptualization of the problem, with stronger connections to machine learning than conventional social choice techniques.

In a search task, a group of agents compete to be the first to find the solution. Each agent has different private information to incorporate into its search. This problem is inspired by settings such as scientific research, Bitcoin hash inversion, or hunting for some buried treasure. A social planner such as a funding agency, mining pool, or pirate captain might like to convince the agents to collaborate, share their information, and greatly reduce the cost of searching. However, this cooperation is in tension with the individuals' competitive desire to each be the first to win the search. The planner's proposal should incentivize truthful information sharing, reduce the total cost of searching, and satisfy fairness properties that preserve the spirit of the competition. We design contract-based mechanisms for information sharing without money. The planner solicits the agents' information and assigns search locations to the agents, who may then search only within their assignments. Truthful reporting of information to the mechanism maximizes an agent's chance to win the search. Epsilon-voluntary participation is satisfied for large search spaces. In order to formalize the planner's goals of fairness and reduced search cost, we propose a simplified, simulated game as a benchmark and quantify fairness and search cost relative to this benchmark scenario. The game is also used to implement our mechanisms. Finally, we extend to the case where coalitions of agents may participate in the mechanism, forming larger coalitions recursively.

The logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR), the most common automated market making rule for prediction markets, is typically studied in the framework of dealer markets, where the market maker takes one side of every transaction. The continuous double auction (CDA) is a much more widely used microstructure for general financial markets in practice. In this paper, we study the properties of CDA prediction markets with zero-intelligence traders in which an LMSR-style market maker participates actively. We extend an existing idea of Robin Hanson for integrating LMSR with limit order books in order to provide a new, self-contained market making algorithm that does not need “special” access to the order book and can participate as another trader. We find that, as expected, the presence of the market maker leads to generally lower bid-ask spreads and higher trader surplus (or price improvement), but, surprisingly, does not necessarily improve price discovery and market efficiency; this latter effect is more pronounced when there is higher variability in trader beliefs.

Models of strategic candidacy analyze the incentives of candidates to run in an election. Most work on this topic assumes that strategizing only takes place among candidates, whereas voters vote truthfully. In this paper, we extend the analysis to also include strategic behavior on the part of the voters. (We also study cases where only candidates or only voters are strategic.) We consider two settings in which strategic voting is well-defined and has a natural interpretation: majority-consistent voting with single-peaked preferences and voting by successive elimination. In the former setting, we analyze the type of strategic behavior required in order to guarantee desirable voting outcomes. In the latter setting, we determine the complexity of computing the set of potential outcomes if both candidates and voters act strategically.

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept prescribing for a player an optimal strategy to commit to, assuming the opponent knows this commitment and plays the best response. Although this solution concept is a cornerstone of many security applications, the existing works typically do not consider situations where the players can observe and react to the actions of the opponent during the course of the game. We extend the existing algorithmic work to extensive-form games and introduce novel algorithm for computing Stackelberg equilibria that exploits the compact sequence-form representation of strategies. Our algorithm reduces the size of the linear programs from exponential in the baseline approach to linear in the size of the game tree. Experimental evaluation on randomly generated games and a security-inspired search game demonstrates significant improvement in the scalability compared to the baseline approach.

Modern organizations (e.g., hospitals, social networks, government agencies) rely heavily on audit to detect and punish insiders who inappropriately access and disclose confidential information. Recent work on audit games models the strategic interaction between an auditor with a single audit resource and auditees as a Stackelberg game, augmenting associated well-studied security games with a configurable punishment parameter. We significantly generalize this audit game model to account for multiple audit resources where each resource is restricted to audit a subset of all potential violations, thus enabling application to practical auditing scenarios. We provide an FPTAS that computes an approximately optimal solution to the resulting non-convex optimization problem. The main technical novelty is in the design and correctness proof of an optimization transformation that enables the construction of this FPTAS. In addition, we experimentally demonstrate that this transformation significantly speeds up computation of solutions for a class of audit games and security games.

We consider approval-based committee voting, i.e., the setting where each voter approves a subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of winners (committee). We propose a natural axiom for this setting, which we call justified representation (JR). This axiom requires that if a large enough group of voters exhibits agree- ment by supporting the same candidate, then at least one voter in this group has an approved candidate in the winning committee. We show that for every list of ballots it is possible to select a committee that provides JR. We then check if this axiom is fulfilled by well-known approval-based voting rules. We show that the answer is negative for most of the rules we consider, with notable exceptions of PAV (Proportional Approval Voting), an extreme version of RAV (Reweighted Approval Voting), and, for a restricted preference domain, MAV (Minimax Approval Voting). We then introduce a stronger version of the JR axiom, which we call extended justified representation (EJR), and show that PAV satisfies EJR, while other rules do not. We also consider several other questions related to JR and EJR, including the relationship between JR/EJR and unanimity, and the complexity of the associated algorithmic problems.

Renewable power sources such as wind and solar are inflexible in their energy production, which requires demand to rapidly follow supply in order to maintain energy balance. Promising controllable demands are air-conditioners and heat pumps which use electric energy to maintain a temperature at a setpoint. Such Thermostatically Controlled Loads (TCLs) have been shown to be able to follow a power curve using reactive control. In this paper we investigate the use of planning under uncertainty to pro-actively control an aggregation of TCLs to overcome temporary grid imbalance. We present a formal definition of the planning problem under consideration, which we model using the Multi-Agent Markov Decision Process (MMDP) framework. Since we are dealing with hundreds of agents, solving the resulting MMDPs directly is intractable. Instead, we propose to decompose the problem by decoupling the interactions through arbitrage. Decomposition of the problem means relaxing the joint power consumption constraint, which means that joining the plans together can cause overconsumption. Arbitrage acts as a conflict resolution mechanism during policy execution, using the future expected value of policies to determine which TCLs should receive the available energy. We experimentally compare several methods to plan with arbitrage, and conclude that a best response-like mechanism is a scalable approach that returns near-optimal solutions.

Ellipsis is a linguistic process that makes certain aspects of text meaning not directly traceable to surface text elements and, therefore, inaccessible to most language processing technologies. However, detecting and resolving ellipsis is an indispensable capability for language-enabled intelligent agents. The key insight of the work presented here is that not all cases of ellipsis are equally difficult: some can be detected and resolved with high confidence even before we are able to build agents with full human-level semantic and pragmatic understanding of text. This paper describes a fully automatic, implemented and evaluated method of treating one class of ellipsis: elided scopes of modality. Our cognitively-inspired approach, which centrally leverages linguistic principles, has also been applied to overt referring expressions with equally promising results.

Notions of identity and of the self have long been studied in social psychology and sociology as key guiding elements of social interaction and coordination. In the AI of the future, these notions will also play a role in producing natural, socially appropriate artificially intelligent agents that encompass subtle and complex human social and affective skills. We propose here a Bayesian generalization of the sociological affect control theory of self as a theoretical foundation for socio-affectively skilled artificial agents. This theory posits that each human maintains an internal model of his or her deep sense of "self" that captures their emotional, psychological, and socio-cultural sense of being in the world. The "self" is then externalised as an identity within any given interpersonal and institutional situation, and this situational identity is the person's local (in space and time) representation of the self. Situational identities govern the actions of humans according to affect control theory. Humans will seek situations that allow them to enact identities consistent with their sense of self. This consistency is cumulative over time: if some parts of a person's self are not actualized regularly, the person will have a growing feeling of inauthenticity that they will seek to resolve. In our present generalisation, the self is represented as a probability distribution, allowing it to be multi-modal (a person can maintain multiple different identities), uncertain (a person can be unsure about who they really are), and learnable (agents can learn the identities and selves of other agents). We show how the Bayesian affect control theory of self can underpin artificial agents that are socially intelligent.