This paper analyzes repeated multimarket contact with observation errors where two players operate in multiple markets simultaneously. Multimarket contact has received much attention from the literature of economics,management, and information systems. Despite vast empirical studies that examine whether multimarket contact fosters cooperation/collusion, little is theoretically known as to how players behave in an equilibrium when each player receives a noisy observation of other firms’ actions. This paper tackles an essentially realistic situation where the players do not share common information; each player may observe a different signal (private monitoring). Thus, players have difficulty in having a common understanding about which market their opponent should be punished in and when punishment should be started and ended. We first theoretically show that an extension of 1-period mutual punishment (1MP) for an arbitrary number of markets can be an equilibrium. Second, by applying a verification method, we identify a simple equilibrium strategy called "locally cautioning (LC)" that restores collusion after observation error or deviation. We then numerically reveal that LC significantly outperforms 1MP and achieves the highest degree of collusion.

The number of applications of service robotics in public spaces such as hospitals, museums and malls is a growing trend. Public spaces, however, provide several challenges to the robot, and specifically with its planning capabilities: they need to cope with a dynamic and uncertain environment and are subject to particular human-robot interaction constraints. A major challenge is the Joint Intention problem. When cooperating with humans, a persistent commitment to achieve a shared goal cannot be always assumed, since they have an unpredictable behavior and may be distracted in environments as dynamic and uncertain as public spaces, and even more so if the human agents are customers,visitors or bystanders. In order to address such issues in a decision-making context, we present a framework based on Hierarchical Factored POMDPs. We describe the general method for ensuring the Joint Intention between human and robot , the hierarchical structure and the Value Decomposition method adopted to build it.We also provide an example application scenario: an Escort Task in a shopping mall for guiding a customer towards a desired point of interest.

This paper presents a model of exaggeration suitable for implementation on a robot. Exaggeration is an interest form of dishonesty in that it serves as a tradeoff between the different costs associated with lying and the reward received by having one’s lie accepted. Moreover, exaggeration offers the deceiver additional control in the form of much the exaggerated statement differs from the truth. We use a color guessing game to examine the different tradeoffs between these costs and rewards and their impact on exaggeration. Our results indicate some amount of exaggeration is the preferred option during most early interactions. Further, because the cost of lying increases linear with the number of lies, exaggeration decreases with additional interactions. We conclude by arguing why social robots must be capable of lying.

This study focuses on the question: "What are the computational formalisms at the heart of deceptive and counter-deceptive machines?" We formulate deception using a dynamic epistemic logic. Three different types of deception are considered: deception by lying, deception by bluffing and deception by truth-telling, depending on whether a speaker believes what he/she says or not. Next we consider various situations where an act of deceiving happens. Intentional deception is accompanied by a speaker's intent to deceive. Indirect deception happens when false information is carried over from person to person. Self-deception is an act of deceiving the self. We investigate formal properties of different sorts of deception.

Intelligent systems rely on pattern recognition and signature-based approaches for a wide range of sensors enhancing situational awareness. For example, autonomous systems depend on environmental sensors to perform their tasks and secure systems depend on anomaly detection methods. The availability of large amount of data requires the processing of data in a “streaming” fashion with online algorithms. Yet, just as online learning can enhance adaptability to a non-stationary environment, it introduces vulnerabilities that can be manipulated by adversaries to achieve their goals while evading detection. Although human intelligence might have evolved from social interactions, machine intelligence has evolved as a human intelligence artifact and been kept isolated to avoid ethical dilemmas. As our adversaries become sophisticated, it might be time to revisit this question and examine how we can combine online learning and reasoning leading to the science of deceptive and counter-deceptive machines.

Narratives are powerful because of their impact on our emotional experiences. Recent years have witnessed significant advances in affective computing and intelligent interaction, presenting a broad range of opportunities for enhancing the design, implementation, and adaptivity of interactive narratives. This paper presents preliminary work examining story-centric games and interactive narratives from the perspective of psychological theories of emotion, with a particular focus on player affect. We examine the sources and duration of player emotion, social facets of emotion, players’ individual differences in emotion, and meta-emotions. Recommendations and future directions for research on player emotion in interactive narratives are discussed.

This research studies the impact of Time-Of-Use (TOU) tariffs in a competitive electricity market place. Specifically, it focuses on the question of how should an autonomous broker agent optimize TOU tariffs in a competitive retail market, and what is the impact of such tariffs on the economy. We formalize the problem of TOU tariff optimization and propose an algorithm for approximating its solution. We extensively experiment with our algorithm in a large-scale, detailed electricity retail markets simulation of the Power Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC) and: 1) find that our algorithm results in 15\% peak-demand reduction, 2) find that its peak-flattening results in greater profits and/or profit-share for the broker and allows it to win in head-to-head competition against the 1st and 2nd place brokers from the Power TAC 2014 finals, and 3) analyze several economic implications of using TOU tariffs in competitive retail markets.

The Markov Decision Process (MDP) framework is a versatile method for addressing single and multiagent sequential decision making problems. Many exact and approximate solution methods attempt to exploit structure in the problem and are based on value factorization. Especially multiagent settings (MAS), however, are known to suffer from an exponential increase in value component sizes as interactions become denser, meaning that approximation architectures are overly restricted in the problem sizes and types they can handle. We present an approach to mitigate this limitation for certain types of MASs, exploiting a property that can be thought of as "anonymous influence" in the factored MDP. In particular, we show how anonymity can lead to representational and computational efficiencies, both for general variable elimination in a factor graph but also for the approximate linear programming solution to factored MDPs. The latter allows to scale linear programming to factored MDPs that were previously unsolvable. Our results are shown for a disease control domain over a graph with 50 nodes that are each connected with up to 15 neighbors.

We consider stochastic planning problems that involve multiple objectives such as minimizing task completion time and energy consumption. These problems can be modeled as multi-objective Markov decision processes (MOMDPs), an extension of the widely-used MDP model to handle problems involving multiple value functions. We focus on a subclass of MOMDPs in which the objectives have a {\em relaxed lexicographic structure}, allowing an agent to seek improvement in a lower-priority objective when the impact on a higher-priority objective is within some small given tolerance. We examine the relationship between this class of problems and {\em constrained MDPs}, showing that the latter offer an alternative solution method with strong guarantees. We show empirically that a recently introduced algorithm for MOMDPs may not offer the same strong guarantees, but it does perform well in practice.

This article describes the MultiAgent Decision Process (MADP) toolbox, a software library to support planning and learning for intelligent agents and multiagent systems in uncertain environments. Some of its key features are that it supports partially observable environments and stochastic transition models; has unified support for single- and multiagent systems; provides a large number of models for decision-theoretic decision making, including one-shot decision making (e.g., Bayesian games) and sequential decision making under various assumptions of observability and cooperation, such as Dec-POMDPs and POSGs; provides tools and parsers to quickly prototype new problems; provides an extensive range of planning and learning algorithms for single-and multiagent systems; and is written in C++ and designed to be extensible via the object-oriented paradigm.