The first ever human vs. computer no-limit Texas hold 'em competition took place from April 24-May 8, 2015 at River's Casino in Pittsburgh, PA. In this article I present my thoughts on the competition design, agent architecture, and lessons learned.

Acts of prevention and fight against money laundering (ML) crimes are prioritized by almost every government in the world, at the same level of the most relevant global issues. Money laundering is a crime that typically consists in making a certain illegal financial gain into a legal gain. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) the annual global estimate of laundered money is about 2% - 5% of the Gross World Product, or US$800 billion - US$2 trillion [1]. As if the financial volume were not enough, another reason for governments to focus on this crime is for the fact that it is clearly connected to other types of crimes such as illegal drug trade, fraud, corruption, kidnapping, terrorism, arms smuggling, among others. Most countries' financial authorities, usually Central Banks, are responsible for controlling and defining antimoney laundering (AML) regulations, demanding from financial institutions the implementation of procedures that apply the defined norms.

The adoption of probabilistic and decision-theoretic representations and statistical learning methods has led to a large degree of integration and cross-fertilization among AI, machine learning, statistics, control theory, neuroscience, and other fields. The progress in AI research makes it timely to focus research not only on making AI more capable, but also on maximizing the societal benefit of AI. We recommend expanded research aimed at ensuring that increasingly capable AI systems are robust and beneficial: our AI systems must do what we want them to do. In summary, we believe that research on how to make AI systems robust and beneficial is both important and timely, and that there are concrete research directions that can be pursued today.

Artificial intelligence (AI) research has explored a variety of problems and approaches since its inception, but for the last 20 years or so has been focused on the problems surrounding the construction of intelligent agents — systems that perceive and act in some environment. In this context, "intelligence" is related to statistical and economic notions of rationality — colloquially, the ability to make good decisions, plans, or inferences. The adoption of probabilistic and decision-theoretic representations and statistical learning methods has led to a large degree of integration and cross-fertilization among AI, machine learning, statistics, control theory, neuroscience, and other fields. The establishment of shared theoretical frameworks, combined with the availability of data and processing power, has yielded remarkable successes in various component tasks such as speech recognition, image classification, autonomous vehicles, machine translation, legged locomotion, and question-answering systems. As capabilities in these areas and others cross the threshold from laboratory research to economically valuable technologies, a virtuous cycle takes hold whereby even small improvements in performance are worth large sums of money, prompting greater investments in research. There is now a broad consensus that AI research is progressing steadily, and that its impact on society is likely to increase. The potential benefits are huge, since everything that civilization has to offer is a product of human intelligence; we cannot predict what we might achieve when this intelligence is magnified by the tools AI may provide, but the eradication of disease and poverty are not unfathomable. Because of the great potential of AI, it is important to research how to reap its benefits while avoiding potential pitfalls. The progress in AI research makes it timely to focus research not only on making AI more capable, but also on maximizing the societal benefit of AI. Such considerations motivated the AAAI 2008–09 Presidential Panel on Long-Term AI Futures and other projects on AI impacts, and constitute a significant expansion of the field of AI itself, which up to now has focused largely on techniques that are neutral with respect to purpose. We recommend expanded research aimed at ensuring that increasingly capable AI systems are robust and beneficial: our AI systems must do what we want them to do. The attached research priorities document [see page X] gives many examples of such research directions that can help maximize the societal benefit of AI. This research is by necessity interdisciplinary, because it involves both society and AI. It ranges from economics, law and philosophy to computer security, formal methods and, of course, various branches of AI itself. In summary, we believe that research on how to make AI systems robust and beneficial is both important and timely, and that there are concrete research directions that can be pursued today.

The Automated Negotiating Agents Competition is an international event that, since 2010, has contributed to the evaluation and development of new techniques and benchmarks for improving the state-of-the-art in automated multi-issue negotiation. A key objective of the competition has been to analyze and search the design space of negotiating agents for agents that are able to operate effectively across a variety of domains. The competition is a valuable tool for studying important aspects of negotiation including profiles and domains, opponent learning, strategies, bilateral and multilateral protocols. Two of the challenges that remain are: How to develop argumentation-based negotiation agents that next to bids, can inform and argue to obtain an acceptable agreement for both parties, and how to create agents that can negotiate in a human fashion.

Success in the quest for artificial intelligence has the potential to bring unprecedented benefits to humanity, and it is therefore worthwhile to investigate how to maximize these benefits while avoiding potential pitfalls. This article gives numerous examples (which should by no means be construed as an exhaustive list) of such worthwhile research aimed at ensuring that AI remains robust and beneficial.

Prediction markets are economic mechanisms for aggregating information about future events through sequential interactions with traders. The pricing mechanisms in these markets are known to be related to optimization algorithms in machine learning and through these connections we have some understanding of how equilibrium market prices relate to the beliefs of the traders in a market. However, little is known about rates and guarantees for the convergence of these sequential mechanisms, and two recent papers cite this as an important open question.In this paper we show how some previously studied prediction market trading models can be understood as a natural generalization of randomized coordinate descent which we call randomized subspace descent (RSD). We establish convergence rates for RSD and leverage them to prove rates for the two prediction market models above, answering the open questions. Our results extend beyond standard centralized markets to arbitrary trade networks.

A market scoring rule (MSR) – a popular tool for designing algorithmic prediction markets – is an incentive-compatible mechanism for the aggregation of probabilistic beliefs from myopic risk-neutral agents. In this paper, we add to a growing body of research aimed at understanding the precise manner in which the price process induced by a MSR incorporates private information from agents who deviate from the assumption of risk-neutrality. We first establish that, for a myopic trading agent with a risk-averse utility function, a MSR satisfying mild regularity conditions elicits the agent’s risk-neutral probability conditional on the latest market state rather than her true subjective probability. Hence, we show that a MSR under these conditions effectively behaves like a more traditional method of belief aggregation, namely an opinion pool, for agents’ true probabilities. In particular, the logarithmic market scoring rule acts as a logarithmic pool for constant absolute risk aversion utility agents, and as a linear pool for an atypical budget-constrained agent utility with decreasing absolute risk aversion. We also point out the interpretation of a market maker under these conditions as a Bayesian learner even when agent beliefs are static.

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is a leading algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium in large zero-sum imperfect-information games. CFR is an iterative algorithm that repeatedly traverses the game tree, updating regrets at each information set.We introduce an improvement to CFR that prunes any path of play in the tree, and its descendants, that has negative regret. It revisits that sequence at the earliest subsequent CFR iteration where the regret could have become positive, had that path been explored on every iteration. The new algorithm maintains CFR's convergence guarantees while making iterations significantly faster---even if previously known pruning techniques are used in the comparison. This improvement carries over to CFR+, a recent variant of CFR. Experiments show an order of magnitude speed improvement, and the relative speed improvement increases with the size of the game.

This paper provides the first formalization of self-interested planning in multiagent settings using expectation-maximization (EM). Our formalization in the context of infinite-horizon and finitely-nested interactive POMDPs (I-POMDP) is distinct from EM formulations for POMDPs and cooperative multiagent planning frameworks. We exploit the graphical model structure specific to I-POMDPs, and present a new approach based on block-coordinate descent for further speed up. Forward filtering-backward sampling -- a combination of exact filtering with sampling -- is explored to exploit problem structure.