We study hedonic games with dichotomous preferences. Hedonic games are cooperative games in which players desire to form coalitions, but only care about the makeup of the coalitions of which they are members; they are indifferent about the makeup of other coalitions. The assumption of dichotomous preferences means that, additionally, each player's preference relation partitions the set of coalitions of which that player is a member into just two equivalence classes: satisfactory and unsatisfactory. A player is indifferent between satisfactory coalitions, and is indifferent between unsatisfactory coalitions, but strictly prefers any satisfactory coalition over any unsatisfactory coalition. We develop a succinct representation for such games, in which each player's preference relation is represented by a propositional formula. We show how solution concepts for hedonic games with dichotomous preferences are characterised by propositional formulas.

Most research into Swarm Intelligence explores swarms of autonomous robots or simulated agents. Little work, however, has been done on swarms of networked humans. This paper introduces UNU, an online platform that enables networked users to assemble in real-time swarms and tackle problems as an Artificial Swarm Intelligence (ASI). Modeled after biological swarms, UNU enables large groups of networked users to work together in real-time synchrony, forging a unified dynamic system that can quickly answer questions and make decisions. Early testing suggests that human swarming has significant potential for harnessing the Collective Intelligence (CI) of online groups, often exceeding the natural abilities of individual participants.

Games that model real world interactions are often complex, with huge numbers of possible strategies and information states. We are interested in better understanding the effect of abstraction in game-theoretic analysis. In particular, we focus on the strategy selection problem: how should an agent choose a strategy to play in a game, based on an abstracted game model? This problem has three interacting Figure 1: 2-players asymmetric abstractions components: (1) the method for abstracting the game, (2) the method for selecting a strategy based on the abstraction, and An example of an abstraction meta-game is shown in Figure (3) the method for mapping this strategy back to the original 1. In this example, we have two players who are playing game. This approach has been studied extensively for the one-shot normal form game shown at the top of the poker, which is a 2-player, zero-sum game. However, much figure; this is the base game. They each perform their own less is known about how abstraction interacts with strategy (unspecified) abstraction to reduce the game.

People collaborate in carrying out such complex activities as treating patients, co-authoring documents and developing software. While technologies such as Dropbox and Github enable groups to work in a distributed manner, coordinating team members' individual activities poses significant challenges. In this paper, we formalize the problem of "information sharing in loosely-coupled extended-duration teamwork." We develop a new representation, Mutual Influence Potential Networks (MIP-Nets), to model collaboration patterns and dependencies among activities, and an algorithm, MIP-DOI, that uses this representation to reason about information sharing.

We survey some recent research regarding strategic behaviour in resource allocation problems, focusing on the fair division of indivisible goods. We consider a number of computational questions like how a single strategic agent misreports their preferences to ensure a particular outcome, and how agents compute a Nash equilibrium when they all act strategically. We also identify a number of future directions like dealing with non-additive utilities, and partial or probabilistic information about the preferences of other agents.

Though substantial research has been dedicated towards using technology to improve education, no current methods are as effective as one-on-one tutoring. A critical, though relatively understudied, aspect of effective tutoring is modulating the student's affective state throughout the tutoring session in order to maximize long-term learning gains. We developed an integrated experimental paradigm in which children play a second-language learning game on a tablet, in collaboration with a fully autonomous social robotic learning companion. As part of the system, we measured children's valence and engagement via an automatic facial expression analysis system. These signals were combined into a reward signal that fed into the robot's affective reinforcement learning algorithm. Over several sessions, the robot played the game and personalized its motivational strategies (using verbal and non-verbal actions) to each student. We evaluated this system with 34 children in preschool classrooms for a duration of two months. We saw that (1) children learned new words from the repeated tutoring sessions, (2) the affective policy personalized to students over the duration of the study, and (3) students who interacted with a robot that personalized its affective feedback strategy showed a significant increase in valence, as compared to students who interacted with a non-personalizing robot. This integrated system of tablet-based educational content, affective sensing, affective policy learning, and an autonomous social robot holds great promise for a more comprehensive approach to personalized tutoring.

In cooperative multi-agent sequential decision making under uncertainty, agents must coordinate to find an optimal joint policy that maximises joint value. Typical algorithms exploit additive structure in the value function, but in the fully-observable multi-agent MDP (MMDP) setting such structure is not present. We propose a new optimal solver for transition-independent MMDPs, in which agents can only affect their own state but their reward depends on joint transitions. We represent these dependencies compactly in conditional return graphs (CRGs). Using CRGs the value of a joint policy and the bounds on partially specified joint policies can be efficiently computed. We propose CoRe, a novel branch-and-bound policy search algorithm building on CRGs. CoRe typically requires less runtime than available alternatives and finds solutions to previously unsolvable problems.

This paper considers a mechanism design problem for locating two identical facilities on an interval, in which an agent can pretend to be multiple agents. A mechanism selects a pair of locations on the interval according to the declared single-peaked preferences of agents. An agent's utility is determined by the location of the better one (typically the closer to her ideal point). This model can represent various application domains. For example, assume a company is going to release two models of its product line and performs a questionnaire survey in an online forum to determine their detailed specs. Typically, a customer will buy only one model, but she can answer multiple times by logging onto the forum under several email accounts. We first characterize possible outcomes of mechanisms that satisfy false-name-proofness, as well as some mild conditions. By extending the result, we completely characterize the class of false-name-proof mechanisms when locating two facilities on a circle. We then clarify the approximation ratios of the false-name-proof mechanisms on a line metric for the social and maximum costs.

Many real world security problems can be modelled as finite zero-sum games with structured sequential strategies and limited interactions between the players. An abstract class of games unifying these models are the normal-form games with sequential strategies (NFGSS). We show that all games from this class can be modelled as well-formed imperfect-recall extensive-form games and consequently can be solved by counterfactual regret minimization. We propose an adaptation of the CFR+ algorithm for NFGSS and compare its performance to the standard methods based on linear programming and incremental game generation. We validate our approach on two security-inspired domains. We show that with a negligible loss in precision, CFR+ can compute a Nash equilibrium with five times less computation than its competitors.

Evolutionary game theory provides the principal tools to model the dynamics of multi-agent learning algorithms. While there is a long-standing literature on evolutionary game theory in strategic-form games, in the case of extensive-form games few results are known and the exponential size of the representations currently adopted makes the evolutionary analysis of such games unaffordable. In this paper, we focus on dynamics for the sequence form of extensive-form games, providing three dynamics: one realization equivalent to the normal-form logit dynamic, one realization equivalent to the agent-form replicator dynamic, and one realization equivalent to the agent-form logit dynamic. All the considered dynamics require polynomial time and space, providing an exponential compression w.r.t. the dynamics currently known and providing thus tools that can be effectively employed in practice. Moreover, we use our tools to compare the agent-form and normal-form dynamics and to provide new "hybrid" dynamics.