Successful Student has compiled the 25 Best Artificial Intelligence Colleges in the United States. Artificial Intelligence (AI), also known as machine learning, is a discipline within computer science. Artificial Intelligence is usually conceived of as doing more than just computing numbers (such as a calculator), but is more conceptual in nature (such as describing subjective qualities, or giving meanings to different contexts). An example of AI would be speech recognition and communicating, such as Apple's Siri, or Amazon's Alexa. Amazon has announced three new AI tools for anyone wanting to build apps on Amazon Web Services: Amazon Lex, Amazon Polly, and Amazon Rekognition. According to Amazon "This frees developers to focus on defining and building an entirely new generation of apps that can see, hear, speak, understand, and interact with the world around them." For those interested in developing apps, see our 20 Best App Development Colleges article. Google, Facebook, Amazon, Apple and Microsoft are all working on AI. Facebook's FAIR (Facebook Artificial Intelligence Research) program engages with academia to assist in solving long term problems in AI. Facebook is hiring AI experts around the world to assist in their project.

Siemens has been researching neural networks for about 30 years and has made significant progress in applying this technology to artificial intelligence. For example, the company's Software Environment for Neural Networks (SENN) is being continuously refined and adapted to new and evolving applications, including the optimization of gas turbines and wind turbines. "We hold something like 50 patents for learning processes," notes Sterzing. Siemens Power Generation Services and CT have developed a system that continuously optimizes the operation and control of combustion in gas turbines. Based on AI from CT, the system, which is known as a Gas Turbine Autonomous Control Optimizer (GT-ACO), is currently being installed at a top customer in Asia.

Manipulation, bribery, and control are well-studied ways of changing the outcome of an election. Many voting rules are, in the general case, computationally resistant to some of these manipulative actions. However when restricted to single-peaked electorates, these rules suddenly become easy to manipulate. Recently, Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra studied the computational complexity of strategic behavior in nearly single-peaked electorates. These are electorates that are not single-peaked but close to it according to some distance measure. In this paper we introduce several new distance measures regarding single-peakedness. We prove that determining whether a given profile is nearly single-peaked is NP-complete in many cases. For one case we present a polynomial-time algorithm. In case the single-peaked axis is given, we show that determining the distance is always possible in polynomial time. Furthermore, we explore the relations between the new notions introduced in this paper and existing notions from the literature.

This includes memory stores and the representations of elements in those memories, but not their contents, Most research in AI is analytic, in that it selects some facet which change as the result of external stimuli and internal of intelligence and attempts to understand it in detail, typically processing. In this sense, a cognitive architecture is analogous in isolation from other elements. This is balanced by to a building architecture, which describes its fixed a smaller movement, synthetic in character, that aims to discover structure (e.g., floors, rooms, and doors), but not its replaceable how different aspects of intelligence interact.

How can individuals and communities protect their privacy against social network analysis tools? How do criminals or terrorists organizations evade detection by such tools? Under which conditions can these tools be made strategy proof? These fundamental questions have attracted little attention in the literature to date, as most social network analysis tools are built around the assumption that individuals or groups in a network do not act strategically to evade such tools. With this in mind, we outline in this paper a new paradigm for social network analysis, whereby the strategic behaviour of network actors is explicitly modeled. Addressing this research challenge has various implications. For instance, it may allow two individuals to keep their relationship secret or private. It may also allow members of an activist group to conceal their membership, or even conceal the existence of their group from authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, it may assist security agencies and counter terrorism units in understanding the strategies that covert organizations use to escape detection, and give rise to new strategy-proof countermeasures.

Several recently developed Multi-Agent Path Finding (MAPF) solvers scale to large MAPF instances by searching for MAPF plans on 2 levels: The high-level search resolves collisions between agents, and the low-level search plans paths for single agents under the constraints imposed by the high-level search. We make the following contributions to solve the MAPF problem with imperfect plan execution with small average makespans: First, we formalize the MAPF Problem with Delay Probabilities (MAPF-DP), define valid MAPF-DP plans and propose the use of robust plan-execution policies for valid MAPF-DP plans to control how each agent proceeds along its path. Second, we discuss 2 classes of decentralized robust plan-execution policies (called Fully Synchronized Policies and Minimal Communication Policies) that prevent collisions during plan execution for valid MAPF-DP plans. Third, we present a 2-level MAPF-DP solver (called Approximate Minimization in Expectation) that generates valid MAPF-DP plans.

This paper studies a criteria-based mechanism for nurturing and enhancing agents' group-benefiting individual efforts whenever the agents are self-interested. The idea is that only those agents that meet the criteria get to benefit from the group effort, giving an incentive to contribute even when it is otherwise individually irrational. Specifically, the paper provides a comprehensive equilibrium analysis of a threshold-based criteria mechanism for the common cooperative information gathering application, where the criteria is set such that only those whose contribution to the group is above some pre-specified threshold can benefit from the contributions of others. The analysis results in a closed form solution for the strategies to be used in equilibrium and facilitates the numerical investigation of different model properties as well as a comparison to the dual mechanism according to only an agent whose contribution is below the specified threshold gets to benefit from the contributions of others. One important contribution enabled through the analysis provided is in showing that, counter-intuitively, for some settings the use of the above-threshold criteria is outperformed by the use of the below-threshold criteria as far as collective and individual performance is concerned.

In many real-world systems, strategic agents' decisions can be understood as complex - i.e., consisting of multiple sub-decisions - and hence can give rise to an exponential number of pure strategies. Examples include network congestion games, simultaneous auctions, and security games. However, agents' sets of strategies are often structured, allowing them to be represented compactly. There currently exists no general modeling language that captures a wide range of commonly seen strategy structure and utility structure. We propose Resource Graph Games (RGGs), the first general compact representation for games with structured strategy spaces, which is able to represent a wide range of games studied in literature. We leverage recent results about multilinearity, a key property of games that allows us to represent the mixed strategies compactly, and, as a result, to compute various equilibrium concepts efficiently. While not all RGGs are multilinear, we provide a general method of converting RGGs to those that are multilinear, and identify subclasses of RGGs whose converted version allow efficient computation.

We consider Max-min Share (MmS) fair allocations of indivisible chores (items with negative utilities). We show that allocation of chores and classical allocation of goods (items with positive utilities) have some fundamental connections but also differences which prevent a straightforward application of algorithms for goods in the chores setting and vice-versa. We prove that an MmS allocation does not need to exist for chores and computing an MmS allocation - if it exists - is strongly NP-hard. In view of these non-existence and complexity results, we present a polynomial-time 2-approximation algorithm for MmS fairness for chores. We then introduce a new fairness concept called optimal MmS that represents the best possible allocation in terms of MmS that is guaranteed to exist. We use connections to parallel machine scheduling to give (1) a polynomial-time approximation scheme for computing an optimal MmS allocation when the number of agents is fixed and (2) an effective and efficient heuristic with an ex-post worst-case analysis.

Security problems can be modeled as two-player partially observable stochastic games with one-sided partial observability and infinite horizon (one-sided POSGs). We seek for optimal strategies of player 1 that correspond to robust strategies against the worst-case opponent (player 2) that is assumed to have a perfect information about the game. We present a novel algorithm for approximately solving one-sided POSGs based on the heuristic search value iteration (HSVI) for POMDPs. Our results include (1) theoretical properties of one-sided POSGs and their value functions, (2) guarantees showing the convergence of our algorithm to optimal strategies, and (3) practical demonstration of applicability and scalability of our algorithm on three different domains: pursuit-evasion, patrolling, and search games.